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The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces internal and transnational Islamic 
insurgent threats that have the potential to disrupt Southeast Asian regional 
stability. As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and 
multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a 
security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has 
become increasingly more important to the US and its War on Terror. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the 
Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand 
today.  Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security 
initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies.  Finally, this thesis will recommend 
a solution strategy necessary for the purging of radical Islamic insurgency and 
transnational terrorism from Thailand.  By accepting current policy deficiencies 
and implementing the courses of action recommended in this thesis, the US and 
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The Kingdom of Thailand currently faces the threat of terrorism from two 
fronts: an internal Islamic insurgency in the southern provinces and increasing 
activity by transnational terrorists who use the Kingdom as a networking base for 
operations.  
As a Major Non-NATO Ally and the signatory of several bilateral and 
multilateral security arrangements with the US, Thailand has solidified itself as a 
security alliance partner whose stability and influence in Southeast Asia has 
become increasingly important to the US and its War on Terror. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the 
Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand 
today.  Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security 
initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies.  Finally, this thesis will recommend 
a solution strategy necessary for the purging of both the radical Islamic 
insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand.   
As with any effective counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism strategy, 
success lies in gaining the support of the most important mobilizable resource:  
the people.  The insurgency that exists in Thailand is unique. Unlike the country’s 
Buddhist majority in a country of some 63 million people, the Muslim population 
in the provinces of the far south is closely tied to its Malaysian Islamic heritage.  
Underdevelopment, poverty, drug use, corrupt government officials, 
unemployment, violence, and lack of attention from the Buddhist national 
leadership in Bangkok have plagued this part of Thailand for decades and assist 
in fueling the insurgency there today.   
Simultaneously, since the 1990s’ birth of al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asian arm, 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI), transnational terrorists have found the Kingdom an 
attractive and convenient networking hub for weapons trading, financial 
transactions, front companies and charities, the recruitment of militant Islamic 
elements, and a planning base for terrorist operations.   
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Although there has been no direct connection made to date between the 
militant Islamic insurgency in the south of Thailand and JI, there have been 
numerous arrests, intelligence findings, and financial discoveries that indicate 
that that such a relationship either exists or has the potential to develop. 
 The Thai government, in coordination with other countries in the region 
and the US, has made significant progress in the fight against terrorism since 
September 11, 2001.  Yet, there are still obstacles to overcome.  The 
government must more effectively address the legitimate Muslim grievances in 
the south, as well as the militant Islamic insurgency that exists there.  The 
government must simultaneously address the fields of interest that continue to 
make Thailand an attractive safe-haven and planning base for transnational 
terrorists.  Like many Southeast Asian nations, however, Thailand is not fully 
capable of better addressing these problems without international assistance. 
This thesis will examine several areas of Thai and US policy that, if more 
fully developed, will effectively counter the threats that exist in the Kingdom and 
Southeast Asia.  Several areas requiring improvement include counter-terrorism 
legislation, intelligence gathering and sharing, cultural awareness, immigration 
reforms, anti-corruption policies, police and military operations, and better 
security and stability activities in coordination with other Southeast Asian nations.  
In Thailand, the most critical areas requiring improvement are policies and 
actions aimed at gaining the support and trust of the local Islamic population.     
With much of the world’s attention devoted to the wars in the Iraq and 
Afghanistan, a considerable security vacuum has been created in Southeast 
Asia.  The creation of this vacuum has presented many new opportunities for 
terrorists and insurgents to plan, coordinate, and act more freely. 
By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of 
action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a 




…the American response to the war on terror may not be at all 
adequate in neutralizing the terror threat within Southeast Asia; in 
fact, it may even backfire. The embers of radical Islamist terrorism 
can only be doused by the adoption of a comprehensive approach 
that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political 
and ultimately, ideological challenges.  
-See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna (2004),                                      
Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore 
 
Relations between the U.S. and Thailand are strong and multi-
faceted. Thailand is one of five U.S. Treaty Allies in Asia, and we 
have a close and active security relationship with the Thai. Thai 
troops fought alongside Americans in Korea and Vietnam. More 
recently, Thailand has provided critical support…for Operation 
Enduring Freedom [and Operation Iraqi Freedom].  
…Thailand is our seventeenth-largest trading partner with two-way 
trade of about $20 billion. The U.S. is the second largest foreign 
investor in Thailand. 
…Thailand has actively cooperated with us on all aspects of the 
war on terror. 
 
-Matthew Daley (2003),                                      
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State                                      
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs                                      
 
As demonstrated by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley’s 
testimony before the House International Relations Committee in 2003, the US 
has a significant national interest in the stability of Thailand.  Americans and 
Thais have fostered an intimate relationship that encompasses all aspects of 
international policy from economics to politics to the spilling of blood alongside 
one another in war.  
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Since the 1960s, Thailand has experienced and effectively dealt with 
secessionist movements in its predominately Muslim southern provinces.  By the 
late 1980s, the problem seemed to be eliminated for the most part.  However, 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US, militant Muslim movements 
around the world have gained new momentum.  Such is the case in Thailand as 
well.  The reinvigorated insurgency that exists in Thailand today is once again 
threatening stability throughout the country and the region. Between January 
2004 and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout 
Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Unlike Thailand’s Buddhist majority, the 
Muslim culture in the provinces of the far south is closely tied to its Malaysian 
Islamic heritage.  Underdevelopment, poverty, drug use, corrupt government 
officials, violence, and lack of attention from the country’s Buddhist government 
leaders in Bangkok have plagued this part of Thailand for decades.  The result of 
these suppressed regional troubles, in concert with the new global emergence of 
Islamic militancy, has given a renewed intensity to an insurgency that was 
believed to be eliminated less than a decade ago.   
Along with increased Islamic fundamentalism inside the borders of nations 
around the world, there has also emerged a new era of transnational terrorist 
networking.  This terrorist networking, fuelled by a globalization that has reached 
all corners of the planet, transcends the borders of sovereign nations and links 
many organizations that were previously isolated from one another.  Following a 
global awareness of Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda (AQ) (“the base”) network as 
the primary terrorist threat today, evidence of other AQ-linked networks has 
emerged in various regions of the world.  The transnational terrorist organization 
known as Jemaah Islamiah (JI) (“Islamic Community”) has emerged as the 
premier AQ-linked network in Southeast Asia.  In 2002 the large-scale terrorist 
attacks of JI began with the bombing of the Bali nightclub that left 202 dead, 
followed by the 2003 bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that left 11 
dead and 150 injured.  Unfortunately Thailand has found itself victim of the 
existence of such terrorist organizations with the discovery of financial networks, 
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front companies, arms smugglers, and terrorist operatives inside the borders of 
the Kingdom. In August 2003, the terrorist leader Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam 
Isamuddin), JI’s operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in 
Ayuthya, Thailand.  According to CIA reports after the capture, JI had plans to 
attack US-managed hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of 
Bangkok’s vulnerable international airport (Simon, 2003a). 
As a result of the unique situation that exists today, the Kingdom of 
Thailand currently faces the threat of terrorism from two fronts, an internal Islamic 
insurgency in the southern provinces, as well as a network of transnational 
terrorists who use the Kingdom as a networking base for operations.  
Thailand has the difficult task of countering both the internal and 
transnational threats that exists within its borders.  Thailand can not, however, 
counter these threats by itself. Granted, the US and other allies already devote a 
considerable amount of money, people, intelligence, training, and other 
resources to assist Thailand in its fight to establish and maintain security and 
stability.  The environment that exists today, however, demands that Thailand 
reexamine its approach to dealing with the threats that exist there, while the US, 
likewise, reevaluates its methods and means of supporting the Kingdom.  
  
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a history and analysis of the 
Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorist operations that exist in Thailand 
today.  Secondly, this thesis will highlight current Thai, US, and regional security 
initiatives and underscore policy deficiencies.  Finally, this thesis will recommend 
a solution strategy necessary for the purge of radical Islamic insurgency and 
transnational terrorism in Thailand.   
Chapter II of this thesis provides a background history of Thailand’s Malay 
Muslims as well as the militant Islamic organizations that exist in the Kingdom.  
Chapter III analyzes Southeast Asia’s transnational terrorist organizations and 
their operations in Thailand.  Chapter IV explores the implications of a link 
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between Southeast Asia’s primary transnational threat – Jemaah Islamiah – and 
Thailand’s southern insurgency.  It should be noted that the purpose of this 
chapter is not to prove that there is a direct link between the two threats, but 
rather to explore the likelihood of such a relationship developing.  Chapter V 
analyzes current Thai and US anti-terrorism policies and denotes policy 
deficiencies.  Chapter VI provides solution strategy options for the problems 
associated with both transnational terrorism and southern insurgency.  And 
chapter seven provides a summary conclusion to the thesis. 
 
B. RELEVANCY 
…designation of Thailand as an MNNA [Major Non-NATO Ally] 
represents an affirmation of the importance the US places on the 
US-Thai alliance relationship in the 21st century. Thailand has been 
a treaty ally of the United States for nearly 50 years, since the 1954 
Manila Pact. The alliance partnership has continued to expand over 
the years. (“Major Non-NATO Ally status for Thailand,” 2003) (See 
also Appendix E) 
Since 1945, Thailand has been a close U.S. ally. The two nations 
have entered into several bilateral and multilateral arrangements 
including the 1954 Manila Pact and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat 
agreement, both of which solidified a long-term bilateral security 
alliance. The U.S-Thai alliance granted the United States use of 
Thai military facilities during the Vietnam War. Additionally, 
Thailand’s anti-communist stance and geographic proximity to 
Vietnam were vital to the United States during the Cold War, and its 
current support in the “War on Terror” has once again united the 
two nations. (Garcia, 2004) 
As an MNNA, Treaty Ally, a supporter of the US War on Terror, and the 
partner in a $20+ billion/year two-way trade relationship with the US, Thailand is 
a nation that holds significant US economic, political, social, and security 
interests. Thailand also plays as a key role in the regional stability of all of 
Southeast Asia, an area in which the United States has significant interests.  
While there are several countries in Southeast Asia that invite only limited US 
involvement into their national affairs, there also exist strong US allies, such as 
Thailand and the Philippines, which allow and request cooperation from the US.  
 5
Given the opportunities that these allies present in allowing US assistance into 
their countries, it is in the best interest of the US to engage these friendly nations 
with all elements of statecraft.  Just as in the Philippines, Thailand requires an 
improved US engagement strategy at all levels of government to not only 
promote the political, economic, and security interests of the US in the region, but 
to also allow for increased worldwide effectiveness in the US’s fight against 
global terrorism. 
With much of the world’s attention devoted to the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, a considerable security vacuum has been created in Southeast 
Asia.  The creation of this vacuum has presented many new opportunities for 
terrorists and insurgents to plan, coordinate, and act much more freely than 
before.  It is critical to regional and global security that the proper US attention 
and resources be committed with equal and appropriate proportionality around 
the world.  Such a commitment will assist in protecting US interests abroad, 
protecting our ally nations such as Thailand, and mitigating Southeast Asian 
regional threats in the US War on Terror (WOT). 
There is already a considerable amount of literature written about the 
more well-known terrorist organizations that exist throughout Southeast Asia.  
These groups include Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF) and Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG) in the Philippines, Malaysia’s 
Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) in 
Indonesia, and others.  This thesis provides specific insight into the internal and 
transnational insurgent organizations and their operations in Thailand.  The 
effects of these organizations and operations in the Kingdom have already 
proven capable of affecting Southeast Asian regional stability in many ways, as 
will be described throughout this paper.   
 
C. RESOURCES AND DEFINITIONS 
The information used to support this thesis was derived from multiple 
research sources.  In addition to open source documents, a great deal of 
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information came directly from academic and official government documents 
provided by both Thai and US agencies. The most accurate and up-to-date 
information, however, came from interviews and meetings conducted in Thailand 
with academic professionals from Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Royal 
Thai military officers, media representatives, and US government officials from 
various agencies.  
Because the issues of terrorism and insurgency in Thailand have 
worsened exponentially since the beginning of 2004, a comprehensive, English-
language publication focused solely on Thailand’s most recent problems does 
not exist.  As a result, a great deal of information about the problems in the 
Kingdom, especially in the southern provinces, comes from ongoing media 
coverage of the situation.  Because they are media sources, all attempts have 
been made to cite only facts since there is admittedly a great deal of journalistic 
sensationalism present in the writing.    
This thesis is an unclassified document.  While there is a certain amount 
of classified information related to the insurgency in Thailand, most of that 
information is secured simply because it is politically sensitive or controversial.  
With regard to the substance and details of the insurgency itself, however, this 
thesis is representative of all research conducted by the author. 
 A note about definitions and names used in this thesis is also necessary.  
While western writing formally addresses individuals by their surnames, the same 
is not always true in Thai and Asian culture.  For example, Thai Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra is often referred to by his given name, Thaksin.  Depending 
on the context used in various parts of this thesis, some Thai people are 
therefore referred to by their given names and not their surnames.  This is in 
complete agreement with acceptable Thai culture and does not imply any 
disrespect whatsoever. 
The use of the terms “insurgent” and “terrorist” in this thesis must be 
clarified at this point.  The “War on Terror” is unfortunately an ambiguous 
concept.  The situation in the world today is, perhaps, better understood as a 
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global insurgency.  The enemy is the insurgent.  Very often, the insurgent uses 
terrorism as one tactic among several to achieve broader strategic goals.  It 
should therefore be understood that we, the free world, are fighting a global 
counterinsurgency, primarily against Islamic fundamentalists, who wish to 
establish alternative governments (governed by Sharia law) in a given region 
(such as an established Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia or a re-established 
Islamic caliphate in the Middle East) or country. 
The CIA’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency supports this logic with the 
following definition of insurgency: 
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward 
completely or partially controlling the resources of a country 
through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political 
organizations. Insurgent activity—including guerrilla warfare, 
terrorism, and political mobilization (such as propaganda, 
recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international 
activity) is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy 
while increasing insurgent control and legitimacy. The common 
denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire to control a 
particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from 
purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not include the 
creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given 
area or country (Central Intelligence Agency, n.d., p.2). 
 There are, therefore, very few organizations that fit the description of a 
terrorist organization.  The simplest example of this concept is Al Qaeda (AQ).  
This organization does not kill solely for the purpose of killing.  Instead, AQ and 
Osama Bin Laden himself have announced religious, political, and geographic 
goals that the network hopes to achieve.  Terrorism is just one tactic used by AQ 
to achieve such goals, and as a result the organization should more appropriately 
be labeled as an insurgent one.   
This thesis will make it clear that an insurgency is taking place in southern 
Thailand today.  The majority of Southern Thailand’s Muslims, including Islamic 
leaders in the region, do not support the violence or secession.  Those 
individuals  and  organizations  that  do  support  the  militant  activities, however,  
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embody the definition of insurgency by taking part in activities “designed to 
weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing insurgent control and 
legitimacy.”   
The term transnational “terrorist” is used in this thesis to refer to radical 
Islamic individuals and/or organizations that support or participate in regional or 
global insurgent activities that transcend national boundaries.  While the term 
transnational “terrorist” would more appropriately be labeled transnational 
“insurgent” as per the definition above (since they use terrorism as one tactic 
among many), the term “terrorist” is nevertheless used in this thesis to maintain 















II. OVERVIEW OF THAILAND’S INTERNAL ISLAMIC 
INSURGENCY 
A. THAILAND’S MUSLIMS 
Ninety percent of the Kingdom of Thailand’s 63 million people are 
Buddhist.  Muslim communities in Thailand are mostly located in the south, along 
the border with Malaysia.  3.2 million Muslims constitute less than five percent of 
Thailand’s total population.  Muslims, however, are the majority in the three 
southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.  Muslims account for 1.3 
million of the 1.7 million people in the southern region.  Compared to the majority 
of Buddhist Thais, southern Malay Muslims in Thailand differ greatly in their 
language, religion, and culture.  Most Muslims are Sunnis. In the southern 
provinces, 10% of the total Muslim population is Wahabi, a very strict brand of 
fundamental Islam – the same brand followed by Osama bin Laden.  
For centuries, the southern part of what is now Thailand was a part of the 
former Kingdom of Pattani, which identified three main pillars of the Muslim 
community that still exist today.  The first pillar is the belief in traditional virtues 
and the greatness of the Kingdom of Pattani (Pattani Darussalam).  Second is 
the identification with the Malay race, a characteristic still evident today in the 
frequent cross-border contact with ethnic kin in Malaysia’s Kelantan province.  
Third is a religious orientation based on Islam (Chalk, 2001, p.243).   
Technically, Thailand is the only Southeast Asian country never to have 
been colonized (although many countries have occupied or used part of Thailand 
at various times over history – such as Japan during WWII).   Siam (the former 
name of the general Thailand region), brought the northern reaches of the 
Kingdom of Pattani under its rule in the late 1700s.  Eventually, Thailand began 
to exert strong influence over the entire Malay Peninsula, and had it not been for 
British colonialism in Malaysia, Thailand would have likely continued to dominate 
much of the population on the peninsula.  In 1902 Thailand turned over all the 
Malay states to British control.  However, the current Thai-Malaysian border, 
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which was drawn along with the signing of an Anglo-Thai treaty in 1909, left three 
provinces within Thailand that had a majority Muslim/Malay population: Yala, 
Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces.  Other southern provinces, such as Songkhla 
and Satun, have large Muslim populations as well (See Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1.   The Southern Provinces of Thailand  
  (“Thailand Islamic insurgency,” 2004) 
 
 
Since the early 1900s, there have been several insurgencies in Thailand – 
most related to political movements lead by the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT).  Other insurgencies have been motivated by Islamic secessionism in the 
south. Over the course of several decades, the Thai military gained valuable 
experience in the conduct of counter-insurgency as a result of being surrounded 
by countries experiencing civil wars, such as Myanmar (Burma), Cambodia, 
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Laos, and Malaysia.  Thailand also fought its own successful counter-insurgency 
against 12,000 CPT rebels in the 1960s and 1970s.   
Today, insurgency in the south has again resurfaced with far more 
violence than seen before.  The cause of today’s Islamic militancy in the south is 
a complex one.  As Doctor Panitan Wattanayagorn from Chulalongkorn 
University in Bangkok has said, “In order to understand the problems in 
Thailand’s south today, we must look to the past” (2004).  For 150 years leading 
up to 1932, Bangkok was ruled under an absolute monarchy.  On June 24, 1932, 
a coup d’etat was led by a group of military officers known as the “Promoters”. 
The Promoters gained control of Bangkok and called upon the king to agree to 
the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which he agreed to. The result of 
the 1932 constitution was that from its inception until the late 1980s, there was 
both internal and external pressure to unite the provinces of Thailand into one 
nation.  Correspondingly, government policy changed from one of relative 
accommodation to one aimed at strong national unity. 
In 1938, under Prime Minister Luang Phibunsongkhram, the Thai 
government began its most aggressive nationalist programs to date.  Under 
Phibun in 1939, the most visible aspect of nationalism was a change of the name 
from Siam to Thailand in order to show a distancing from China (the name Siam 
first appears historically as the name other countries, including China and 
Cambodia, gave to the Thai-speaking peoples of the Chaophraya valley).   
This was a period of mass nationalism, not just elite nationalism, a 
social and political phenomenon that was more nearly egalitarian in 
its implications than it could have been earlier under a monarchist 
psychology.  In decades to come, when Thai were to speak of this 
first Phibun era and use the pronoun we, they were to signify a 
degree of common participation in their nation’s life that was 
sharply distinguished from their experience of earlier decades 
(Wyatt, 2003, p.241). 
Phibun, like many of his successors, was a military officer-turned Prime 
Minister.  For several decades to follow, military leaders held the reigns of control 
over Thailand since no civilian group, in fact, had the cohesion and ability to 
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govern as effectively as the military.  Also peculiar to this era was that from 1932-
57, Thai royalty was physically absent for various reasons, including falling-outs 
with the military.  As author and Cornell University professor David Wyatt writes, 
this was “a most unusual period, dominated not by a king but rather a handful of 
the Promoters [a group of military officers] of the 1932 coup.  It was they who had 
to face and surmount the grave dangers of a world of warfare and great power-
politics…” (2003, p.234).   
Thailand’s history since 1932 has included 16 constitutions (the most 
recent in 1997) and 17 military coups (Macan-Markar, 2004).  Since the Kingdom 
became a constitutional monarchy, the military has played a prominent role in 
government control and politics.  Under Phibun and other military officers-turned-
Prime Minister following him, the country became modernized and united in order 
to confront external threats.  But at the same time, the nation was weakened 
internally.  Individual cultures within the country lost their identity and by the 
1950s and 1960s Thailand saw a strong emergence of communists and 
separatist groups.  In response, military action was used with great 
aggressiveness and all uprisings against the government were suppressed.   
According to Panitan, by the 1980s the government in Bangkok once 
again changed its strategy, this time to a more flexible, three-pronged approach:  
military operations were shifted to political priorities; economic flexibility allowed 
for self-sufficient economic associations; and government policies acknowledged 
and observed political rivalries among the security forces in the south.  By 1988 
the government felt that the Thai south had essentially returned to normalcy.  
The combined military command that had effectively dealt with southern unrest 
was disbanded.  The aftermath of the military being in the south too long had, 
however, taken its toll.  When the army withdrew, Members of Parliament (MP) 
took control of the southern region.  Thai students who were studying in areas 
overseas, including the Middle East, returned to the region.  The same happened 
in other countries around Southeast Asia as a new openness and political 
freedom was experienced.  Along with this new openness came more open 
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borders.  At the time of this new freedom of movement, there was also more 
regional travel between Thailand, Burma, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia than in 
the past.  Radical leaders and their organizations entered the south freely, and 
over time the key leaders of militant organizations became well known figures in 
the southern provinces.  As Panitan describes, the new leaders in the south were 
now those who had previous military training and/or were respected former 
members of separatist organizations.   These men took up important positions in 
education and other agencies.  In some cases, they were elected into 
government office.   The national leadership in Bangkok felt that a positive 
transition was taking place:  They believed that that the former “trouble makers” 
were now mainstream and pacified.  The reality, as Panitan recalls, was that 
many of the former separatists were not,  in fact, converts to mainstream political 
ideas.  As the 1980s drew to a close and the 1990s progressed, the country saw 
economic development on a level never before seen.  Money from the 
government flowed to all reaches of the country, including the south (to a lesser 
extent).  
More money from the government was given to local schools at this time 
as well.  The problem, however, was that the government did not concern itself 
with regulation of the southern Islamic schools.  The result was that separatist 
leaders, who could influence daily life and education in the south among the 
Muslim communities, used the opportunity at hand to plant the seeds of radical 
fundamentalism (Wattanayagorn, 2004).  Following the global expansion of 
radical Islamic militancy that occurred after September 11, 2001, fundamentalists 
around the world, including Thailand, took advantage of the opportunity to act.  
Since that time, the south has been witness to a new stream of bombings, 
assassinations, arson attacks, and shootings.    
 
B. MUSLIM GRIEVANCES AND THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE 
There are several reasons why the Islamic secessionist campaigns waged 
since the 1970s in Thailand resulted in very little success.  In addition to effective 
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Thai/Malaysian police efforts against militants along the joint border, there was 
never, in fact, a comprehensive, large-scale repression of Muslims in the 
Kingdom.  Additionally, Thailand’s rapid economic development increased the 
standard of living for everyone, including the Muslims in the south, to a limited 
degree.  Finally, since Thailand’s new constitution was enacted in 1997, 
government decentralization has allowed greater local autonomy, including more 
administrative freedom granted to Muslim leaders in the southern provinces 
(Abuza, 2003b, pp.78-79) 
Thai Muslims, however, do in fact have many legitimate grievances that 
the Thai government is currently attempting to address.  The government’s 
ineffective response to such grievances has only inflamed the situation.  To 
complicate matters, economic development in the south is markedly less 
progressed than in the rest of the country.  According to the government’s 
National Economic and Social Development Board, Muslim communities 
dominate two of the four poorest provinces in the country (Abuza, 2003 b, p.79).  
A January 2005 US Report For Congress indicated that the southern region “has 
lagged behind the rest of Thailand in economic development and contributes only 
1.4 percent of the country’s GDP” (Chanlett-Avery, 2005, p.3). 
As Tan and Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and Strategic 
Studies in Singapore have pointed out,  
The lack of central governmental coverage over its remote southern 
part suggests that Thailand may in some respects demonstrate 
elements of state weakness as well. Moreover, any attempt on the 
part of Bangkok to highlight the terrorist problem in the south could 
inadvertently restrict the flow of foreign investment [and tourism] 
into the country. Stated differently, the common dilemma 
confronting these weak Southeast Asian states [such as Thailand] 
is essentially a matter of poor governance (2004, p.97). 
There are several basic grievances that southern Malay Muslims have.  
The primary one is the fact that despite the technical claim that Thailand is a 
secular state, it in reality is not.  Every aspect of Thai government is permeated 
with Buddhism.  This fact can easily be seen by observing any government 
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function or speech or by entering any government building – all three will contain 
some homage paid to Buddha.  The fact that Buddhism is officially embraced is 
in itself a problem since other cultures, such as the Malay Muslims in the south, 
feel somewhat alienated.  Mr. Don Pathan is an American citizen with a Thai 
Muslim family lineage.  He currently serves as a Regional Desk Editor for The 
Nation, one of Bangkok’s English-speaking newspapers.  Pathan’s unique 
cultural background has granted him access to Malay Muslim people and 
organizations in southern Thailand that are otherwise unapproachable by others, 
especially government officials.  According to him, southern Malay Muslims want 
nothing more than recognition of their culture and heritage.  Most Muslims today 
do not want secession leading to a free state.  Most, according to Pathan, also 
do not have a problem with Buddhism or the Bangkok government; they only 
have a problem with the government’s suppression of the Muslim culture 
(2004b).  In addition to the dominance of Buddhism throughout the Thai 
government, there is also a basic lack of knowledge of Muslim culture on the part 
of the Thai government.  This was evidenced routinely throughout 2004 when 
security forces would use male soldiers search women, walk into Mosques with 
their shoes on, or use dogs to search the houses of Thai Muslims.  In each case, 
the security forces were violating basic principles of Muslim culture and religion.  
While it is not realistic to expect the Thai government to diminish in any way its 
sponsorship of Buddhism and Buddhist culture, a greater acceptance and 
acknowledgement of other religions and cultures by the government in Bangkok 
is necessary. 
According to Doctor Surachart Bamrungsuk from Chulalongkorn University 
in Bangkok, officials truly need better cultural understanding.  Surachart 
acknowledges, however, that the Thai government is slowly making changes to 
realize these cultural differences.  He describes how in 1923, Thai King Rama VI 
issued a Muslim cultural manual to the Thai civil servants serving in Southern 
Thailand (Bamrungsuk, 2004).  The Thai government today is slowly creating 
and making use of similar manuals.  Compounding the problem in the south, 
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however, is that provincial and local civil administration and security forces, 
including police, are staffed through national recruitment policies.  More to the 
point, local citizens are not hired for police, military, and civil administration 
positions throughout the south.  The result is that not only are these officials often 
uneducated on the Muslim culture they encounter on a daily basis, but they are 
more importantly unfamiliar with the local populace that is the critical component 
to solving the problems of the south.   
In November 2004, the Thai government announced that it would hire 
3,000 local villagers to augment the police forces in the south.  Staffing of police 
had become increasingly more difficult in the troubled region because many 
officers transferred out of the south because of the continued violence.  The new 
initiative to use locals included budgetary allocation as well as planning for 
additional police stations.  Officers who performed well and did not create 
problems were to be considered for “promotion” to the regular police force 
(“Thailand to launch,” 2004).  While a program that includes local people in 
security operations is absolutely necessary in the south, it still remains to be 
seen whether or not the Thai government is truly committed to making such a 
program work.  A long-term program that addresses training, funding, legal 
authority, and recruitment to sustain the force will all require approval and 
implementation by the government for such an initiative to be effective over time. 
An additional problem with the current organizational structure is that the 
local governors in the southern provinces do not have control over the security 
forces being employed in their provinces.  According to Dr. Surachart, this 
disconnect has created a situation where the activities of the civil administration 
and the security forces are generally uncoordinated (Bamrungsuk, 2004).   
Another highly-criticized decision by Thai Prime Minister Thaksin 
Shinawatra was his call for the 2002 disbandment of the Civil Police Military 
(CPM) 43 organization in the south.  CPM43 was a joint task force that served as 
the focal point for intelligence and information gathering.  It also served as a point 
of contact through which locals in the south could contact the government and 
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make the population’s issues known.  Since the abolishment of the CPM, 
southerners report that they are confused by the current array of police, military, 
and Para-military forces in the south.  Locals do not know who to contact in order 
to not only make grievances heard, but to report suspected or known insurgent 
activity as well. When overall control of southern Thailand operations was taken 
out of the hands of the Royal Thai Army (RTA), many administrative and 
intelligence mechanisms simply ceased to exist.  Informants were exposed after 
the shift in power, and as a result many were killed (Pathan, D., 2004b).  This 
shift also contributed to a break in trust between the people and the security 
forces.  Since the police took control of the south’s security, they have had, 
unfortunately, to start at the beginning of the trust and network-building process. 
Southern Islamic leaders have also shared their resentment toward the 
government for not involving them in helping to solve the problems of the south. 
Despite issues of mistrust that may exist, it would seem appropriate that the 
government be more creative and use the influential Muslim institutions in place 
to help solve the problems that are embedded with the Muslim people.  Instead, 
many suspected Islamic institutions are targeted for government disbandment.  
One example of this includes the website for PULO, one of the southern 
insurgent organizations.  While the government continuously tries to shut down 
the website, it usually reappears in a different location on the internet (Pathan, 
D., 2004b). Some Muslims argue that the government might have better results if 
it instead tried to support the site and regulate its content.  The same goes for the 
southern Islamic schools, or Pondoks.  The Thai government claims that many of 
the insurgents in the south are teachers and students from these schools.  While 
that claim has proven to be true with the arrests of several insurgents in the 
south, over-regulation or simply shutting down the schools is likely to further 
complicate problems.  
The Thai government is slowly acknowledging and addressing many of 
the issues described here.  This is a time of transition for both the government 
and southern Muslims.  As Doctor Panitan states, there is always a 
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slowness/weakness in transitional periods.  What makes this transitional period 
most dangerous, however, is the fact that the timing of the current situation is 
highly conducive to the intervention of international terrorists (Wattanayagorn, 
2004).  Up until now, it appears that transnational terrorists, such as the Al-
Qaeda affiliated Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Southeast Asia, have been relatively 
unsuccessful in establishing a foothold among the Muslims that exist in southern 
Thailand.  This is partly due to the fact that the Malay Muslims in the Thai south 
have their own unique culture and history.  They do not necessarily want to 
become subordinate to an alien organization like JI.  But with rapid globalization, 
there is no doubt that southern Muslims are fully aware of the activities of JI and 
AQ.  Out of the large population that is aware of the global Islamic insurgency 
that is happening around the world, it would not be unrealistic to expect a certain 
percentage of the southern population to be receptive to JI.   
Pathan agrees that this is a very sensitive time regarding Muslim 
influences from outside of Thailand.  He cautions that the government must 
devote serious time and resources to development and reform in the south.  
“While most Muslims in the south don’t have an ‘us and them,’ ‘ Muslims and 
Buddhists,’ attitude”, Pathan says, “Things appear to slowly be changing.”  
Monks, civilians, and tourists in the south are being targeted and killed – all of 
which is a first for Thailand.  The situation is now becoming “ripe” for the 
introduction of a more extreme, fundamentalist influence (Pathan, D., 2004b). 
As Doctor Surachart concludes, “the people in the south only want three 
things:  good work, good payment, and a good life” (Bamrungsuk, 2004).  
Without addressing such basic needs and grievances as these, the Thai 
government is likely to see things become worse before they get better. 
 
C. THAILAND’S MILITANT ISLAMIC ORGANIZATIONS 
Despite the fact that the majority of Malay Muslims do not support the 
violence and insurgency in the south of Thailand today, the fact remains that 
there are numerous militant Islamic organizations that are behind the almost-
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daily killings, bombings, and arson attacks there.  These organizations operate 
with varying degrees of success.  The exact motivate ions for violence among the 
groups vary as well.  The Thai government has often speculated in the past and 
present that the militants in the south are nothing more than criminals, some 
seeking political influence, much like a mafia.  Secession has always been a 
popular theme in the south, and another possibility is that the southern 
population does not necessarily want to secede but is instead resorting to 
violence in order to force the government in Bangkok to devote adequate 
resources and time needed to develop the south.  And yet another explanation 
for the violence is that the population is being manipulated by the global Islamic 
insurgency that calls for a separate, pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia.  
This later speculation implies that there may be some dimension of transnational 
terrorist presence influencing the militant activities in the south, a topic that is 
addressed in detail in Chapter IV.  
Regardless of the motivations for violence, the simple fact remains that 
the organizations in the south today have systematically designed several major 
attacks against the government in 2004 alone that have left several hundred 
people dead.  In January 2004, an Insurgent raid against a southern Army depot 
left several soldiers dead, some with their throats slit, and over 300 weapons 
stolen.  In April of 2004, a coordinated insurgent attack on security force outposts 
throughout the southern provinces resulted in the death of over 100 insurgents 
and several security force personnel.  February 2005 saw Thailand’s first car 
bomb explosion.  In addition to these major attacks, there have been killings on 
almost a daily basis since January 2004.  While targets were initially security 
force personnel and government officials, the focus has since shifted to include 
tourists, Buddhist monks, and businessmen.  The nature of the insurgency in the 
south is changing.   
According to Dr. Zachary Abuza, a well-respected expert on Southeast 
Asian terrorism, some of the older separatist organizations with a history of 
violence are no longer active in the Thai south and have already “died out.” 
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Abuza claims that, contrary to what the Thai government asserts, old 
organizations like PULO and BRN (both described later in this chapter) do not 
pose a threat today.  In contrast, he claims that newer organizations, such as the 
Gerakan Mujahideen Pattani (GMIP) (described later in this chapter) and other 
radical manifestations are truly the groups instrumental in Thailand’s current 
insurgency.  Abuza also believes that it is these new groups that do in fact have 
links to the Jemaah Islamiah transnational terrorist network (described in Chapter 
III) (“Terror warning:  Gov’t blind to JI link,” 2005).  Listed below are several 
organizations that have established themselves over the years as contributors to 
violence in the south.  They are categorized according to what Abuza might call 
“The Old” and “The New.”  Because the current activities of each of these groups 
are difficult to discern, all organizations are listed here, regardless of history or 
the possibility of being obsolete. 
 
1. “The Old” 
Two well known radical groups in Thailand are the PULO and New PULO 
(Pattani United Liberation Organization).  PULO has been conducting 
secessionist activities since the 1960s.  Peter Chalk from the RAND Corporation 
has provided the following description of the group:  
PULO’s ideology is based on the UBANGTAPEKEMA, an acronym 
derived from Ugama, Bangsa, Tanach, Air, and Perikemanusiaan 
(Religion, Race/Nationalism, Homeland, and Humanitarianism). 
Integral to this concept is recognition of the need for a long-term 
strategy to prepare for the goals of secession. To this end, PULO 
has placed priority on improving the standard of education among 
the southern Malay population as well as fostering local political 
consciousness and national sentiment.  
The group sanctions violence as part of its secessionist struggle 
and recognizes the need to intensify international publicity on the 
plight of Pattani’s Malay–Muslims. Militant insurgent actions are 
carried out by a separate armed wing known as the Pattani United 
Liberation Army (PULA), which has claimed responsibility for 
several bomb and arson attacks against government 
establishments in the south (Chalk, 2001, p.243). 
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In 1995 the New PULO emerged as a break-off faction that has more 
consistently conducted operations in pursuit of Pattani self-autonomy with much 
less physical violence inflicted on the Thai population.  By limiting the scale of 
violence aimed at human beings, the New PULO, perhaps, is attempting to 
establish a greater image of legitimacy.   
The New PULO has also demonstrated a greater awareness to conserve 
limited resources.  The group relies on young drug addicts to conduct more 
rudimentary operations on a consistent basis, as compared to PULO which 
conducts rather large, dramatic attacks quite infrequently.  In the event that a 
New PULO member is captured by authorities, there is also a much smaller 
chance of the group’s security being compromised by young, uninformed drug 
addicts.  Thai authorities estimate that the NEW PULO pays its operators 
approximately 500baht (US$12.50) “to carry out basic sabotage attacks such as 
torching bus depots or bombing bridges” (Chalk, 2001, p.243). 
PULO and NEW PULO have been unwilling, for the most part, to 
coordinate their activities because of their differences in operational outlooks.   
Nonetheless, the organizations did agree to form a tactical alliance 
in mid-1997 in an attempt to refocus national and regional attention 
on the “southern question.” Operating under the name of “Bersatu” 
(Solidarity), the two Pattani groups carried out a series of 
coordinated attacks (codenamed “Falling Leaves”) aimed at killing 
off state workers, law enforcement personnel, local government 
officials, school teachers, and other perceived symbols of Thai 
Buddhist repression. Between August 1997 and January 1998, no 
less than 33 separate attacks were carried out as part of this effort, 
resulting in nine deaths, several dozen injuries, and considerable 
economic damage” (Chalk, 2001, p.243). 
In early 1998, many PULO/NEW PULO leaders were arrested during 
Thai/Malaysian police raids.  The key leaders captured were: Abdul Rohman 
Bazo, the chairman of New PULO’s political kasdan wing; Haji Maer Yala, senior 
assistant to Bazo; Haji Da-oh Thanam, the Supreme Commander of New 
PULO’s Operational Wing; and  Hayi Sama Ae Thanam, PULO’s military leader. 
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Some Thai government officials claim that PULO and NEW PULO are not 
as active as before since the arrests of the key leaders in 1998.   
In May 2003, however, PULO openly boasted that Thai security forces 
were “falling like leaves” as Muslims fought to free the south from Bangkok’s rule.  
Lukman B. Lima, PULO Deputy President, charged that Bangkok illegally 
incorporated the southern provinces into Thailand 100 years ago and now ruled it 
with colonial repression and crimes against humanity in the area (“Thailand 
Islamic insurgency,” 2004). 
In addition to PULO and New PULO, there are several other organizations 
that support insurgent activity throughout Thailand’s southern provinces.    
GlobalSecurity.org, which references the USCINCPAC Virtual Information 
Center, has analyzed the predominant radical Islamic organizations in southern 
Thailand.   Unless other specific references are cited, the following details of 
these Islamic organizations are credited to GlobalSecurity.org’s research titled 
“Thailand Islamic Insurgency” (2004). 
Barisan National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP, sometimes referred to as 
BIPP).  This separatist organization was formed in 1959 and had actually ceased 
activities until early 2002, when it was believed to be involved in the resurgence 
of violence in the south.  The group is actually headquartered in northern 
Malaysia and actively participates in Malaysian politics.  
Barasi Revolusi Nasional (BRN).  Since its formation in March 1960, the 
group has since split into three separate factions as a result of internal 
ideological differences.  The first faction, the BRN Coordinate, has recently been 
inactive in Thailand but is reportedly carrying out political activity in Malaysia. The 
second faction, the BRN Congress chaired by Rosa Burako, has mainly focused 
on military-type attacks in the south.  The third faction, the BRN Uram, previously 
headed by the late Hajji Abdul Karim, has emphasized political and religious 
progress.  Among  the three factions, the BRN Congress is considered the most  
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operational and militarily active. Headquartered in Malaysia, the BRN Congress 
has consistently carried out political and military activities in the southern border 
provinces.  
 
2. “The New” 
Mujahideen Pattani Movement [BNP].  The goal of the Muhahideen 
Pattani is to consolidate many of the smaller insurgent organizations existing 
throughout the southern provinces.  Since its establishment in 1985 in Northern 
Malaysia, the group has focused on personal education and political reform work.  
Some of the BNPs leadership consists of elements that split from the BIPP.  
Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP). The GMIP, also known as the 
Pattani Islamic Mujahideen Movement, or the Pattani Islamic Holy Warriors 
Movement, is considered by some to be the only significant armed insurgency 
currently operating in the south today.  Its leaders were influenced by the 
Afghanistan war [against the Soviets] and the international jihadi movement that 
sprang from it in the 1990s.  GMIP leader Nasori Saesaeng, also know as Ae 
Wae Keleh after his home village of Keleh in Bajoh District of Narathiwat 
Province, fought in Afghanistan in the early 1990s.  According to Royal Thai 
Police intelligence sources, Nasori met and operated with Nik Adli Nik Aziz, the 
leader of Malaysia’s Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), in Afghanistan 
(“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).   
The link between Nasori (the leader of Thailand’s GMIP) and Aziz (the 
leader of Malaysia’s KMM) is significant.         
Thai military intelligence sources suspect that, in the attempts to 
annex southern Thailand, Kumpulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM), 
based in Trengganu, helped to revive the local separatist groups 
GMIP and Barisan Revelusi Nasional (BRN). With support from the 
Malaysian militants, GMIP and BRN have been transformed into 
insurgency groups with a regional agenda departing from their past 
goal of carving out a Pattani state (“Thailand Islamic insurgency,” 
2004) 
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In 1999 Aziz purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including 
24 pounds of explosives.  He was “committed to waging a violent jihad against 
the Malaysian state, which he considered to be secular and oppressive” (Abuza, 
2003b, p.125).  Aziz was detained in Malaysia in August 2001 under the 
Malaysia Internal Security Act. 
It was the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) that Thai Prime 
Minister (PM) Thaksin Shinawatra named as the insurgent group responsible for 
the January 2004 raid on the southern Thai army camp that left four soldiers 
dead and over 300 weapons stolen (Simon, 2003a). 
United Front for the Independence of Pattani [Bersatu- Malay for “United”].  
Today many people consider Bersatu the leading organization of Thailand’s 
Islamic insurgency.  This group was formed with the intent of finally unifying the 
various splinter groups.  The goal was to conserve resources to decrease and 
eventually eliminate the need for foreign sources of support. On August 31, 1989, 
core leaders of all terrorist movement groups, namely the New PULO, the 
original PULO, the Barisan Revolusi Nasional Melayu Pattani (BRN), the Barisan 
National Pember-Basan Pattani (BNPP) and the Mujahideen Pattani met.  The 
leadership held a joint session called "the gathering of the fighters for Pattani." 
The results of the meeting included an agreement to establish a cohesive group, 
then called the “Payong Organization,” and eliminate the need for external 
support.  In 1991, the name of the organization was changed to The United Front 
for the Independence of Pattani, or Bersatu, as it is now often called.  The group 
is constantly on the move, carrying out guerrilla activities and avoiding direct 
clashes with the Thai military and police.  Instead, their method of operation is 
more conducive to sabotage against public facilities.  Bersatu has claimed that 
60-80 of their fighters have trained in SW Asia. 
Bersatu insurgents have likewise attempted to carry out political 
propaganda campaigns to rally Thai Muslims against the Buddhist government of 
Thailand.  The organization has deliberately tried to destabilize the southern 
regions by:  
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. . . attacking schools, harming and threatening the life and property 
of school teachers, coercing parents to stop sending their children 
to Thai schools, terrorizing and harming those who cooperate with 
the government authorities, creating achievements and influence by 
harming state authorities, planting bombs at public premises, and 
committing arson against public buildings (“Thailand Islamic 
insurgency,” 2004) 
In Malaysia, the terrorist organization Al-Ma'unah is the leading national 
force attempting  to establish a pan-Islamic state. In Indonesia, Laskar Jihad and 
the Islamic Defenders Front fight to establish an Islamic caliphate. The Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) want to form 
an independent Muslim state including their portion of the southern Philippines.  
In Thailand it is the organizations previously discussed that also want to establish 
a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia. 
The result of such groups actually attaining their goals, as analyzed by 
Andrew Tan from the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, 
could likely be a situation similar to that in the former Yugoslavia where a 
resulting number of squabbling mini-states, some with fundamentalist Islamic 
orientation, have been characterized by even greater conflict.  Such a scenario 
has the potential to realistically disrupt Southeast Asian security (Tan, 2000, 
p.267).   
 
D. RADICAL TERRORISM:  BEYOND SEPARATISM 
The rise in Islamic consciousness has raised fears in the 
[Southeast Asian] region that extreme forms of Islam may develop, 
if the experience of the Middle Eastern countries is any guide.  In 
this context, Islam is a potent mobilising [sic] symbol in harnessing 
political opposition to nationalistic government…Economic distress 
and inequalities could lead many to seek solace in more extreme 
forms of Islam. 
Increased globalisation [sic] and the growing ease of 
communication have made possible cross-border linkages and 
networks.  These have facilitated the spread of pan-Islamic militant  
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ideology throughout Southeast Asia and the subsequent 
emergence of the new terrorism in the region (Tan, 2004, p.224, 
227). 
Some analysts, such as Dr. Andrew Tan from the Institute of Defence [sic] 
and Strategic Studies in Singapore, cited above, believe that the new terrorism 
emerging in Southeast Asia is much more than a movement to promote 
separatism.  Globalization has helped to foster a new breed of radical Islamists 
that are willing to use ultra-violent terrorism as the vehicle for change.  This new 
threat has the potential to impose greater violence in the future than has been 
seen at any time so far in Thailand.   
 
1. The Seven Step Strategy Toward Islamic Revolution in Southern 
Thailand 
In late 2004, Lieutenant Colonel Thammanoon Maisonti from the Royal 
Thai Army translated into English a Thai Interior Ministry book written as the 
result of analyzing captured insurgent documents.  While the translated title of 
the Interior Ministry document is Inside the Muslim Separatist Problem in the 
South, the document describes a violent Islamic insurgency that goes beyond 
mere separatism.  A more appropriately-named section of the document is titled 
“The Seven Step Strategy of Islamic Revolution in Southern Thailand,” which is 
depicted graphically in Figure 2 (Maisonti, 2004, p.26).  
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Figure 2.   The Seven Step Strategy of Islamic Revolution in Southern 
Thailand (from Maisonti, 2004, p.26). 
 
As Thammanoon writes, each of the seven steps has a specific purpose 
that collectively creates a militant population capable of waging jihad.  The first 
step toward revolution involves militant Muslim propaganda aimed at persuading 
the Muslim community to take action against the Thai government.  
Thammanoon explains that, “This propaganda is primarily aimed at young 
Muslims and is reinforced with claims of mistreatment and injustice on the part of 
Thai government officials.”  The second step of the process involves 
fundamentalist infiltration into mass organizations, “such as Muslim religious 
associations and Islamic schools, in order to establish a presence and eventually 












































four involves the recruitment of more Muslims by using infiltrated organizations to 
communicate to others.  The ultimate goal, partially achieved at this time 
according to the Interior Ministry document, is to have “a total of 30,000 religious 
members, 3,000 members for ‘normal’ missions, and 300 members who conduct 
the most extreme, violent commando-type actions that promise the reward of 
martyrdom”. In the fifth step, influential militant leaders indoctrinate the recruited 
population with Islamic fundamentalism and tactical training that includes 
guerrilla and terrorist operations. In this fifth step, “members are given the 
ultimate test by being required to conduct an actual operation in support of the 
organization’s goals.” Following this initiation, members are deployed for 
harassment operations against government officials and symbols of the 
government.  “Terror tactics are used to discredit the Thai government in the 
eyes of impressionable Muslims in the south, as well as to gain support and 
resources from members of the international community who have similar 
fundamentalist ideologies.” Finally during the seventh step of the process, 
Muslims are sent forward to wage the holy war, the jihad, in order to establish a 
pure Islamic state free of infidels (Maisonti, 2004, p.27). 
 
2. Training Insurgents 
According to the Interior Ministry book that also details the operational 
methods of the insurgents, there is a training cell for terrorists in all three 
southern Thai provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, and Yala.  When Muslims are 
selected for training throughout the provinces, they are instructed to meet with a 
guide who thereafter takes them to a training site.  Training then typically occurs 
between 8:00pm and 5:00am the next morning.  Instructors are disguised from 
the students as well as from the other instructors in order to maintain anonymity.  
Training is divided into three levels:  physical fitness to prepare for tactical 
training; guerrilla tactics and weapons training that often occurs on rubber 
plantations throughout the south; and then deployment on a real-world 
commando operation as the final stage of training.  All levels of training include a 
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critical element of indoctrination of radical fundamentalism.  The duration of 
training is unspecified and continues until the leaders of the insurgent 
organization feel that the recruits are capable of conducting successful 
operations (as cited in Maisonti, 2004, p.28). 
 
3. Operations 
Once training is complete, insurgents proceed in an operational capacity 
to inflict violence throughout the region.  When leaders feel that it is necessary 
for an operation to go forward, the insurgents are directed to meet at specific rally 
points throughout the south.  At the rally points the militants are issued weapons.  
From there they proceed to carry out the operation, return their weapons, and 
disperse back into their villages.  Until the time that insurgents meet at the 
specified rally points, they often are unaware of who else belongs to the militant 
organization.  “Sometimes, militants do not even know that members of their own 
hometowns are part of the extremist organization…” (Maisonti, 2004, p.28).   
An interview with Mr. Don Pathan from The Nation newspaper in Bangkok 
reinforces the details of insurgent operations found in the government document 
translated by Thammanoon.  Pathan describes the operations of one insurgent 
leader in the south named Ismael Rayalong, also known as Ustad Soh (Ustad or 
Ustaz, meaning Islamic spiritual leader or teacher).  Soh, according to Pathan, is 
one of the individuals that the Thai 4th Army (responsible for the southern 
provinces) has suspected as one of the leaders behind the violence today.  For 
four or five years Soh has organized cells, made up of 4-5 men, all recruited from 
different regions to maintain operational security, to conduct acts of violence 
(Pathan, D., 2004b).   
One insurgent, a 31-year-old Islamic teacher named Abdullah Akoh, 
operated under the guidance of Soh.  Abdullah’s operational cell included four 
other men, all from different villages. In September 2004, Pathan interviewed 
Abdullah, handcuffed to his hospital bed after being shot by a security force 
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officer.  Pathan’s report provides details of the April 28, 2004 raid as well as the 
assassination of a security force officer.  
[Abdullah’s] team kept to themselves [sic] and were not permitted to 
know who was in the other cells. During military training, which 
included low crawls and simulated assaults using branches in place 
of guns and knives, Ustad Soh would make sure that each 
participating cell came from villages that were as far apart as 
possible in order to avoid further contact. 
April 28, 2004, was just around the corner. The date was to mark 
Hikmahtullah’s [Talekat Hikmahtullah Abandan: a terrorist 
organization in the south whose translated name means Direction 
from God Towards Invincibility] first strike against the state that its 
members so despised. But for Abdullah, the price of this assault 
was too high. He said he was not willing to walk into certain death 
no matter how committed he was to the group’s cause. 
“I asked Ustad Soh for guns, but he said we would only use 
knives,” Abdullah said…“He said that what he had been teaching 
us would be enough to keep us out of harm’s way and that we 
would be able to take a knife wound or a gunshot [without being 
hurt],” he added. 
By the end of the day, 106 Muslim insurgents lay dead. Most, if not 
all, had been armed with nothing more than a knife when they 
attacked 11 police outposts across the region….Abdullah said he 
was shocked and saddened by the deaths of his comrades and 
blamed Ustad Soh for their deaths…[But] In spite of his falling out 
with his mentor, Abdullah said he was still committed to the idea of 
seeing Pattani liberated. 
Three weeks after the bloody incident, Ustad Soh came around 
again, claiming to have a new set of instructions from his higher 
ups. This time guns and bombs could be used, Abdullah said. In 
July, Ustad Soh showed up with a 9mm handgun…“Something has 
to be done in this area. There has to be an incident, make some 
noise,” Abdullah quoted Ustad Soh as saying. 
The nature of the attack would be similar to many previous hits – a 
security officer was to be shot with a handgun at close range by a 
gunman riding on the back of a motorbike. Abdullah said he spent a 
week monitoring a solider at a nearby outpost, observing how the 
soldiers moved to and from the nearby markets. 
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On July 22, Abdullah was prepared to take a life. The target would 
be a young Thai soldier. To him [Abdullah] it was just a target he 
had been observing for the past week or so. The act was for a 
noble cause, the liberation of Pattani from the infidels, Abdullah told 
himself. Abdullah said he drove up to the young soldier that he had 
been monitoring and pumped three or four shots into him – he 
doesn’t remember the exact number – at point blank range. But he 
wasn’t about to get away with this attack so easily. A soldier in the 
vicinity grabbed his rifle and shot Abdullah as he was speeding 
away on the back of his motorbike…“I don’t know how many rounds 
hit me but I was in tremendous pain,” Abdullah said. 
The two sides entered into a fierce gunfight that lasted several 
minutes. Abdullah was able to catch a quick breath of air when the 
soldier had emptied his magazine. It was also at this moment that 
his driver decided to flee, leaving him lying on the roadside in a 
pool of blood, where he was taken into the custody of security 
forces (Pathan, D., 2004a).  
Reports such as Pathan’s provide a useful insight into not only the 
operations but the mindset and ideology that motivates insurgents in the south to 
kill people.  For emerging organizations in the south like Hikmahtullah, Sai Buri, 
and Agot (Ustad Help Ustad), the goal of the violence is not simply to kill Thais or 
Buddhists or moderate Muslims in order to force a political or social agenda.  It 
also appears that insurgents in the south today do not limit their goals to 
irredentist action for the purpose of recreating a Pattani free from Siam.  Instead 
the basis for the violence is deeply rooted in fundamentalist Islam:  the 
insurgents are liberating true Muslims from infidels.  The target of such a struggle 
is the state and symbols of the state:  all representatives of the infidel. The 
catalyst for this terrorism, as Tan and others have pointed out, is the global jihad 
that insurgents witness happening around the world.  There is a new sense of 
militant Islamic freedom and a new call to take action. The result, as seen in the 
Thai south, is radical terrorism.  
  
E. CONCLUSION 
It appears that there has been a shift in focus from separatism (creation of 
a pan-Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia) to a more global ideology that 
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embraces fundamentalist Islam.  As a result, the organizations described here, 
some old and some new, appear to have adapted their ideology to fit into the 
new world order accordingly. The Interior Ministry document, along with reports 
such as Pathan’s, provides insight into the changing world mindset that motivates 
radical actors to kill others in the name of Islam.  Regardless of the evolving 
situation, the Thai government will find that the equation for a solution centers on 
the local Malay Muslims in the Thai south who either support or reject the actions 






III. SOUTHEAST ASIA’S TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS AND 
THEIR OPERATIONS IN THAILAND 
While the threat of internal militant Islamic organizations in Thailand is the 
focus of much of violence in the south today, there exists evidence of 
transnational terrorism in the Kingdom as well.  This latter analysis that considers 
the involvement of an external threat is one that the Thai government, generally 
speaking, would rather not pursue.  While the problem in the south is a very 
serious one that has claimed several hundred lives, it is at the same time 
relatively localized.  The Thai government prefers that it stay that way.   
Before the arrest of Jemaah Islamiah operatives in Thailand in 2003, 
including the monumental arrest of Hambali - the JI operations chief captured in 
Ayuthya, Thailand in August 2003 – PM Thaksin adamantly denied the existence 
of JI cells operating inside the Kingdom.  Despite known JI cells that currently 
exist and are being monitored by Thai authorities today, the government would 
very much like to believe that such cells are not significant to a regional 
transnational threat (interview with anonymous US government agency officials 
in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004).   For a country that gains 
considerable national revenue from tourism and foreign industry, the threat of 
terrorism is simply not conducive to economic prosperity.  Since there have been 
no activities directly linked to transnational terrorism in Thailand since the August 
2003 arrest of Hambali, the issue of externally supported terrorism is one that 
that the Thai government does not aggressively pursue.  The potential for such a 
non-engagement strategy to backfire is real, however.  As Don Pathan from The 
Nation newspaper noted, Singapore in 2002 was confronted with a similar 
situation when it discovered major JI operations being planned there.  The 
Singaporean government had to make the decision to either make the public 
aware of the situation or keep it a secret and deal with it internally.  The 
government chose to make the problem known to its citizens and the result was 
a strong rallying of Singaporean citizens to do whatever was necessary to unify 
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efforts against terrorism.  Up until 2003, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
chose to do the opposite:  he ignored, or at least did not pursue further 
indications that JI was operating in Thailand.  Then in 2003, with the arrest of JI 
operatives in Bangkok and Hambali in Ayuthya, the threat was out in the open.  
As Pathan recalls, Thaksin and his administration lost credibility with the people, 
especially when the individuals who had previously tried to warn the government 
came forward to tell their stories (Pathan, D., 2004b).  CNN’s Maria Ressa, 
author of Seeds of Terror.  An Eyewitness Account of Al-Queda’s Newest Center 
of Operations in Southeast Asia, said in a July 2004 phone interview that Thaksin 
and the Thai government must simply “end their denial of the situation involving 
transnational terrorists in Thailand” (personal communication, July 20, 2004). 
Regardless of how the Thai government confronts the issue of 
transnational terrorism, the reality is that militant Islamic terrorists from abroad 
are something that all nations must deal with today – Thailand not excluded.   
 
A. JEMMAH ISLAMIAH (JI) 
Zachary Abuza, author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia:  Crucible of 
Terror (2003), has written that al-Qaeda (AQ) set out to establish a foothold in 
Southeast Asia with three main goals in mind.  They would first graft onto existing 
radical movements and organizations in the region.  The second goal was to link 
these groups into a transnational network.  The third and most important goal 
was to establish a financially independent and technically proficient terrorist arm 
of AQ in Southeast Asia.  That organization is Jemaah Islamiah (or Jemaah 
Islamiyah)(JI).   
Southeast Asia was appealing to the Al-Qaida leadership in the first 
place because of the network of Islamic charities, the spread of 
poorly regulated Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, 
and economies that already had records of extensive money 
laundering (Abuza, 2003b, p.121).   
The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) provides the following 
information about JI’s history and operations.  Jemaah Islamiah is a terrorist 
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network with links to al-Qaida. Through the late 1990s the network plotted in 
secrecy, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state 
comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and 
southern Thailand.  December 2001 investigations by authorities in Singapore 
uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and 
Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. After foiling the terrorist attempts in 
Singapore, “Plan B” was carried out with the October 12, 2002 Bali bombing 
which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others.  The Bali attack was the final 
outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against soft targets 
such as tourist spots in the region were considered. Recent investigations have 
linked the JI to several December 2000 killings where dozens of bombs were 
detonated in Indonesia and the Philippines.   The exact strength of the 
organization is currently unknown.  Southeast Asian authorities continue to 
uncover and arrest JI elements on a routine basis. Following the regional 
crackdown against JI in 2001, it is unclear how the network has responded. JI is 
believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, 
and Thailand.  With regard to financing, “Investigations indicate that, in addition 
to raising its own funds, JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle 
Eastern and South Asian contacts, nongovernmental organizations, and other 
groups—including al-Qaida” (Aftergood, 2004)..  
According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), JI operates through 
cells, but in a very ad hoc and loosely organized structure.  The top lieutenants 
appear to be protégés of cofounders Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, 
of Pondok Ngruki (a pesantren, or religious boarding school, in Central Java 
known for producing some of the most fanatical Islamic militant leaders in 
Southeast Asia).  Other key strategic planners include Indonesian nationals living 
in Malaysia and veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.  The 
second tier members in the cell structure are assigned as field coordinators, 
responsible for delivering money and explosives and for choosing a local 
subordinate who can effectively act as team leader of the foot soldiers.   The 
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bottom rung of the cell infrastructure, “the people who drive the cars, survey 
targets, deliver the bombs, and most often risk arrest, physical injury, or death, 
are selected shortly before an attack is scheduled” (“Indonesia backgrounder,” 
2002, p.i).  
All of JI’s senior leaders trained in Afghanistan in the late 1980s and early 
1990s before JI formally existed.  “It was in the camps of the Saudi-financed 
Afghan mujahideen leader Abdul Rasul Sayyaf that they developed jihadist 
fervour [sic], international contacts, and deadly skills” (“Jemaah Islamiyah in 
South East Asia,” 2003, p. i).  The 2003 ICG report also notes that, about the 
internal structure, the JI network is held together by not just ideology, but also by 
“an intricate network of marriages that at times makes it seem like a giant 
extended family. Insufficient attention has been paid to the role the women of JI 
play in cementing the network. In many cases, senior JI leaders arranged the 
marriages of their subordinates to their own sisters or sisters-in-law to keep the 
network secure” (ICG, 2003, pi).   
According to Maria Ressa, CNN Jakarta Bureau Chief and author of 
Seeds of Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda’s Newest Center of 
Operations in Southeast Asia (2003), by the mid 1990s JI’s structure was 
beginning to coalesce.  The headquarters for JI was in Malaysia, the leader (or 
amir) was Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and Nurjaman Riduan Isamuddin, aka Hambali, 
was his deputy (Ba’aysir and Hambali have both since been captured, and the JI 
headquarters has moved to several countries throughout Southeast Asia 
depending on operational goals, law enforcement climate, and political 
influences). By 1996, JI had divided up Southeast Asia into regional 
“commands”, called Mantiqis, similar to AQ’s organizational structure.  Southern 
Thailand is a part of Mantiqi 1, which also includes Malaysia and Singapore.  The 
other Mantiqis can be seen in Figure 3.  In addition to the regional leadership of 
each Mantiqi, which composes the policymaking body (called the regional shura, 
similar to that in AQ), there exist five divisional deputies, chosen by Ba’aysir 
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years ago and instrumental in the initial organization of the JI network (Ressa, 
2003, p.75).  This cell structure is depicted in Figure 3. 
AMIR
Abu Bakar Ba’aysir (Now 






















Figure 3.   Jemaah Islamiah Cell Structure 
(Adapted from the writings of Ressa, 2003, p.75) 
 
Although founded in 1993-1994, JI did not conduct its first terrorist act until 
2000 when it bombed a train station and hotel in Yala, Thailand. In the first six or 
seven years, the group patiently built up its network by recruiting, training, and 
strengthening its technical proficiency (Abuza, 2003b, p.129). 
Beginning in 2002 there were numerous bombings and killings throughout 
Southeast Asia.  At the time none were linked together by authorities until later 
when intelligence agencies began putting the pieces together and discovered 
similar patterns and names.  In addition to the Thailand bombing in 2000 that 
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premiered Jemaah Islamiah’s acts of terrorism, the year saw the JI’s bombing of 
a Jakarta mall, the targeted bombing of a Philippine ambassador, thirty eight 
bombs exploded across Indonesia on Christmas Eve, and the bombing of the 
light rail in Manila.  In 2002 the large scale terrorist killings of JI began with the 
bombing of the Bali nightclub that left 202 dead, followed by the 2003 bombing of 
the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta that left 11 dead and 150 injured.  In August 
2003, the notorious terrorist Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam Isamuddin), JI’s 
operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in Ayuthya, Thailand.  
According to CIA reports after the capture, JI had plans to attack US-managed 
hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of Bangkok’s 
vulnerable international airport (Simon, 2003a). 
On October 23, 2002, under Executive Order 13224, the US placed 
Jemaah Islamiah on the global terrorist organization list, and encouraged all 
nations around the world to do likewise.  Since its inception, JI has morphed into 
a complex organization made up of many networks and cells throughout 
Southeast Asia.  In Thailand, there are numerous radical Muslim groups and 
movements that are suspected of being involved with the complex, underground, 
JI terrorist network (interview with anonymous US government agency officials in 
Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004).   
Zachary Abuza, author of Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, provides the 
following additional information about JI structure:  
JI, like al-Qaeda, is not event driven. Terrorism is asymmetric 
warfare and terrorists strike when they have a high probability of 
success; they cannot afford failure. Both [JI and AQ] place a 
premium on training and meticulous planning; neither lash [sic] out 
with ill-timed and ill-conceived attacks to take pressure off 
themselves. Both place a premium on maintaining the 
organisation's [sic] integrity. When leaders are arrested, they are 
quickly replaced. 
The conditions that drove these people to terrorism have not 
diminished. Mass unemployment is very destabilizing. Diminished 
expectations and frustration-aggression among educated youth is 
high. This jihad is as much about anti-Westernism as it is about 
Islam. For Muslims of the world, there is only one lesson to be 
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learnt from the Iraq war: no state can confront the US. The only 
way the West can be made to pay and "taste" the humiliation 
Muslims feel every day is through terrorism.  
The financial war on terrorism has failed in South-East Asia and not 
one terrorist dollar has been frozen although the region has 
become more financially vital to al-Qaeda. Much of the fundraising 
is impossible to stop: hawala [a form of underground banking], cash 
being brought in on person, and petty crime. But the states have 
not even curtailed funds they should be able to, such as that of 
corporations and charities. 
Between 1999 and 2000 JI held three meetings that included 
members of other small and radical Muslim groups from around the 
region, including Thai and Bangladeshi organizations [sic]. There is 
evidence that JI cadres are using south-eastern Bangladesh to 
regroup. The May-June arrests in Thailand and Cambodia further 
highlight the penetration of societies that were thought to be fairly 
immune to Islamic radicalism (Abuza, 2003c). 
An equally significant point of concern is the self-sufficiency that networks 
such as JI have.  This quality is much to the credit of Osama Bin Laden and the 
blueprint with which he created AQ.  Because of the front companies, charities, 
non-governmental organizations, and other financial enterprises that JI 
possesses throughout Southeast Asia, the network has the ability to act 
independently, regardless of what happens in places like Afghanistan and Iraq.   
It is because of these details of cell structure, organizational design, and 
monetary self-sufficiency that the arrests of Ba’aysir in Indonesia and Hambali in 
Thailand should not be interpreted by any means as an end to Jemaah 
Islamiah’s ability to continue its operations.   
 
B. THAI MUSLIM LINKS TO TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM 
It is clear that Thailand has been an AQ networking hub in Southeast Asia 
since the mid-1990s.  Omar al Faruq, one of the senior-most AQ leaders in SEA, 
admitted that JI attempted to establish links with Muslim militants in Thailand.  
The secretary general of the Thai National Security Council, General Vinai 
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Pattiyakul, “acknowledged that some southern Muslim radicals had been trained 
in Afghanistan and Libya” (Abuza, 2003b, p,171).    
There exists much speculation about PULO/NEW PULO links to external 
terrorist organizations.  Some Thai officials believe that the 1995 bomb blast in 
Hat Yai, Thailand was actually a premature explosion of a device that was to be 
used on a “joint, externally-backed PULO-Shi’ite sabotage mission (Chalk, 2001, 
p.245). 
Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM, the Free Aceh Movement), an Indonesian 
secessionist movement formed in 1975 for establishing the independence of the 
province on the northern tip of Sumatra island, has also found Thailand a 
convenient hub for networking.  Although GAM has never officially been linked to 
JI or AQ, the US suspects that ties do exist.  In late 1999 the Rabitatul Mujahidin 
(RM) organization was established by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (JI’s amir) as a focal 
point for coordinating activities between al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, MMI 
[Mujahidin Council of Indonesia], and AQ cells in Myanmar, Aceh, and Thailand 
(Abuza, 2003 b, p.176).   
Despite a lack of hard evidence that southern Muslims are connected in 
some way to international terrorism, there exists proof of JI leaders making 
attempts to establish such ties. Hambali, the JI operations chief captured in 
Thailand in August 2003, claimed to have tried, but with no success, in dealing 
with southern Thai Muslims.  The JI leader told US interrogators after his arrest 
that, “Thai militants refused to help him blow up tourist spots in the country” 
because they did not agree with the targets (Perrin, 2004).  Hambali’s statement 
should be taken as a warning to Thailand.  Because Hambali said he was not 
able to establish links at the time does not mean that coordination hasn’t since 
been established.  The JI leader could also just as easily have been lying about 
his lack of success in establishing a network. 
Prior to 2003, PM Thaksin continued to deny that any militant activities 
within Thailand’s borders were the acts of criminals or the dregs of previous 
separatist movements involved in drug trafficking, banditry, and black market 
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sales.  After the 2002 Bali bombing, Thailand remained in denial that JI and AQ 
were planning similar attacks in Phuket and Pattaya.  Thai information ministry 
personnel rejected regional information reports that Hambali was planning future 
operations inside the country.  Although Thai officials admitted that Hambali and 
other JI operatives had transited the Kingdom, they denied that any meetings 
had taken place to plan the Bali attack.  The senior Thai counterterrorism official 
at the time, Major General Tritot Ronnaritivichai, claimed that “the only plans they 
[Hambali and his leadership] were making in Thailand were where to run next” 
(Abuza, 2003 b, p.223).   
On May 16, 2003, based on information from Singaporean authorities, 
Thailand arrested Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, and 
three Thais.  All three men were known members of JI, planning to bomb the 
2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok, which was 
to be attended by US President George W. Bush.   Arifin said that he had been 
hiding in Thailand since 2002, and that he was “involved with a group of like-
minded individuals in planning terrorist attack against certain targets in Thailand” 
(Ressa, 2003, p.217).  Between Singapore and Thailand authorities, the two 
determined that JI was also planning attacks against five embassies in Bangkok 
as well as two beach resorts in Pattaya and Phuket, Thailand (Ressa, 2003, 
p.217).   
Following the 2003 arrests in Bangkok and the soon-after capture of 
Hambali himself in Ayuthya, Thailand, PM Thaksin could no longer deny that 
Jemaah Islamiah was actually planning and conducting operations in Thailand. 
January 2004 saw the beginning of a new emergence of southern 
violence.  An insurgent raid on a southern army depot left four soldiers dead and 
over 300 weapons stolen.  Although no hard evidence was found, the Thai 
military at the time announced that the recent violence in the south was most 
likely linked to Jemaah Islamiah:  Thai national security advisor, General Kitti 
Rattanachaya, said Thai Islamic separatists have wide ranging contacts with 
regional terrorist groups including JI, and that attacks to seize weapons and 
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explosives were in preparation for larger attacks (“Thailand says Jemaah 
Islamiah behind attacks in the south,” 2004).   
February 17, 2005 witnessed an unprecedented event - Thailand’s first car 
bomb.  The explosion left six people dead and over 40 injured. Narathiwat’s 
Provincial Governor Pracha Terat indicated he believed the main ingredient in 
the bomb was about 100 kilograms of ammonium nitrate.   While the amount of 
explosive was debatable, Pracha stated that with regard to who was behind the 
bombing, “If they were Thais, they would not have planted such a powerful bomb, 
[one] comparable to those in Iraq” (“Car bomb aftermath:  no foreign involvement: 
PM,” 2005). Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, a security expert from Chulalongkorn 
University in Bangkok, reinforced the position that it was not possible for the 
violence to escalate as it has without foreign assistance.  Following such 
speculation, PM Thaksin once again rejected the claim and said that the 
bombers were most likely family members of local Thai suspects being pursued 
by security forces in the south. 
Jane’s Intelligence Review has likewise detailed a shift in the Islamic 
threats in Southeast Asia from internal domestic issues to a transnational 
concern.  As Pattani nationalism has faded, Islamic consciousness has emerged 
as the force behind the violence and insurgency in the south.  “JI operatives from 
outside Thailand have looked to the Wahabi centers [such as Wahabi 
communities in the Thai southern provinces] as the most likely sources of 
ideological and operational support “(“Thailand faces up to southern extremist 
threat,” 2003). 
 
C. WHY TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISTS USE THAILAND AS A 
NETWORKING HUB 
In Southeast Asia, porous borders, passport fraud, and lax 
immigration procedures are contributing significantly to the region’s 
enabling environment that is fostering the growth of terrorism and 
other forms of transnational violence (Smith, 2004, p.214). 
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Thailand is used as a safe haven and networking hub for transnational 
terrorists, to include AQ and JI for the same reasons that the Philippines is a 
common terrorist operating ground: Thailand is a convenient country in which to 
conduct “business.”  
Weapons are easily bought in Thailand.  “Tamil Tigers fighting for a 
homeland in Sri Lanka have shopped for weapons for years in Thailand” (Abuza, 
2003 b, p.172).  Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defence [sic] and 
Strategic Studies in Singapore states that, “Serious regulatory weaknesses also 
help explain the relative accessibility of weapons and explosives.  The extremely 
lucrative arms trade in Southeast Asia has its locus in Thailand and Cambodia” 
(Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148).  The Thai military has similarly been involved in 
illegal black market weapons sales for many years.  Ramakrishna references an 
estimate by Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn that one third of the illegal weapons in 
Southeast Asia “come from illegal arms sales by rogue Thai military elements.  
Some of these weapons have found their way to radical Islamist groups in the 
region.  Certainly, firearms from Thailand have reached JI militants in Indonesia” 
(Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148). 
Money flow through Thailand is also quite easy to manipulate.  Thai 
regulatory systems are weak while corruption inhibits the government and police 
forces. Because Thailand is so heavily involved in the worldwide drug trade, 
money laundering is quite common.   
Transportation through Thailand, with its lax immigration requirements, is 
another attribute that makes the country attractive to terrorists needing a transit 
and planning hub.  In addition to lenient immigration laws at airports, Thailand 
has a very porous border with Malaysia, allowing for easy travel between the two 
countries.  As Paul J. Smith from the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in 
Hawaii writes,  
The border between Thailand and Malaysia has been described as 
a ‘meandering ribbon of dun-colored water’ where ‘border guards 
are few’ that, among other things, facilitated the clandestine 
passage of Hambali [the Jemaah Islamiah operations chief] from 
Malaysia into Thailand in January 2002 (Smith, 2004, p.216). 
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Passport forgery is another major enterprise that thrives in both the 
Kingdom and throughout Southeast Asia.  Smith writes that “Thailand is 
considered one of the key locations where passports are forged or fabricated.  
Law enforcement officials regularly describe Thailand as on of the global centers 
for passport forgery” (Smith, 2004, p.215). 
The funding of terrorist activities is one area that remains very much 
uninterrupted by the efforts of the War on Terror.  In the early 1980s when 
Osama Bin Laden set out to establish his networks in the fight against the 
Soviets in Afghanistan, he did so with a clear plan in mind.  Bin-Laden wanted to 
create a network that had ties to the main AQ core, but ones that could also 
operate independently with their own established financial infrastructures.  Within 
that infrastructure, AQ networks would be partially reliant on the Muslim 
community for funding and partially self-sustaining through the use of front 
organizations, charities, and businesses.  AQ and JI financial success is 
structured around intricate layers of charities, financial institutions, mosques, 
front companies, fundraisers, and websites. 
In Bangkok, for example, there exist up to six general trading companies 
that have been linked to firms on the UN’s list of terrorist-supporting 
organizations.  Some of the companies in Bangkok include three Middle Eastern 
companies that have had offices there since 1997, including Al Jallil Trading Co. 
Ltd, Al Amanah Enterprise Co. Ltd, and Sidco Co. Ltd.  All three firms were 
raided by intelligence officials following US and Israeli intelligence investigations 
(Abuza, 2003a, p182). 
The great amount of corruption and money laundering within the Thai 
financial sector can not be ignored as convenient facilitators for terrorist funding 
activities.  Dr. Zachary Abuza, associate professor of international politics at 
Simmons University, states that according to the Thai government, an estimated 
US$2.2 billion in drug money is laundered annually.  It is also estimated that 
some 40 percent of Thailand’s GDP is underground, unregulated, and untaxed.  
Abuza also explains that,  
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Thailand is a centre of much JI/Al Qaeda financial operations. In 
December 2001, Thai police with the assistance of the CIA broke 
up two counterfeiting rings run by Dawood [Dawood Ibrahim, alias 
Sheikh Dawood Hassan] in Bangkok. In March 2002, Thai 
authorities arrested 25 Middle Eastern men suspected of 
laundering Al Qaeda funds in the Kingdom. In addition, several of 
the suspects were charged with forging travel documents, 
passports and visas, for Al Qaeda members. (Abuza, 2003a, p188). 
Illegal money making operations are rampant in the southern provinces.  
Some insurgent organizations and criminal gangs are thought to earn roughly 
US$225,000 a year in contract killings.  These groups are also involved in illegal 
gun-running markets along the Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Burmese borders.  The 
weapons are then brought south where they are purchased by Acehnese GAM 
rebels, MILF officials, and other criminal gangs (Abuza, 2003a, p189). 
In 1999, Thailand enacted new anti-money laundering laws and offices to 
offset the regulation problems it was experiencing.  The systems were created to 
deal with internal financial corruption, but enforcement and regulation remained 
minimal.  Such regulatory laws and tools could, in fact, prove very useful against 
transnational terrorist financing if implemented properly.  Considering the amount 
of money circulated illegally in Thailand in support of illegal arms and drug 
smuggling, there is no reason to not accept that terrorist-backing funds are 
laundered through the Kingdom as well. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
Because of the many attributes that make the Kingdom of Thailand a 
desirable haven in which to plan, operate, and coordinate resources, it is not 
surprising that a transnational terrorist organization such as JI uses the country 
as a networking hub.  Because JI has proven its ability to operate in and around 
Thailand, the possibility of a future relationship between JI and southern Thai 
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IV. JI AND THAILAND’S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY 
Further investigations of the JI and Al Qaeda networks in 
Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia since September 11 and Bali 
attacks revealed that key JI members including Hambali, 
Mohammed Mansour Japarah and Yazid Sufaat had visited 
Thailand on various occasions.  They found the country and its 
southern part easy to access (Chongkittavorn, 2003, p.186). 
With the current US War on Terror focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, there 
exists a considerable lack of international attention given to the threats in 
Southeast Asia.  For transnational terrorists in the region, such as those 
belonging to JI, this vacuum has created great opportunities in which to operate 
and grow relatively unhindered.   This has occurred while influential world powers 
focus their instruments of statecraft on the Middle East and South Asia.  
Thailand, like many other Southeast Asian nations, has therefore become even 
more of an attractive location for terrorists to escape from the reaches of the War 
on Terror. 
Terrorist organizations such as JI have demonstrated their continuous 
ability to recruit, mobilize, and motivate both actual and would-be fighters, 
supporters, and sympathizers (Hoffman, 2004).  What is especially concerning 
for Thailand with regard to JI’s ability to recruit is that this organization has shown 
its ability to accept, train, and organize recruits regardless of background, 
nationality, and race.  This is evidenced by the fact that Hambali, JI’s former 
operations chief and main link to AQ, was a non-Arab sitting on AQ’s leadership 
council. 
There are essentially two threats that must be addressed in combating 
terrorism in Thailand:  the domestic threat and the transnational threat.  Many 
experts and writers on the situation in Thailand have attempted to prove that a 
direct link between the two threats exists.  While there is a large amount of 
circumstantial evidence, much of which has already been discussed in previous 
chapters of this thesis, which would seem to indicate a link, the simple reality is 
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that no factual evidence exists to prove that Jemaah Islamiah has established a 
relationship with the insurgents in southern Thailand.  While no link currently 
exists, exploring the implications of such a relationship is useful in illuminating 
the potential dangers and, therefore, reinforcing the need to implement the policy 
changes recommended by this thesis.  
  
A. THE DANGER OF A POTENTIAL LINK BETWEEN THE DOMESTIC 
AND TRANSNATIONAL THREATS 
The Islamic insurgency in Thailand, if not eliminated in a constructive and 
timely manner, has the very real potential of falling under the influence of 
transnational terrorist networks like JI.   This warning assumes that such a 
marriage of threats has not already occurred.  The current ineffectiveness in 
combating the internal instability and insurgency in the south presents a very 
attractive opportunity for more influential and powerful external threats to enter 
the region.  The southern region is already saturated with numerous small, 
militant Islamic organizations that are ideal targets for recruitment under the 
umbrella of JI.  The first generations of Southeast Asian militant Islamic 
insurgents, to include Thai Muslims, got their taste of jihad when many traveled 
to Afghanistan in the 1980s to help the Mujahideen fight the Soviets (Ressa, 
2003, p.12).  In order for organizations such as Jemaah Islamiah to continue to 
exist and grow, there is a need for the terrorist generations of the future to be 
motivated by their own jihads.  The spilling of non-Muslim blood in Afghanistan is 
what gave the originators of today’s terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, 
who have schooled and trained and fought in the Middle East alongside the 
mujahideen, a fanaticism that has never been witnessed before.  As Abuza 
notes, “Up to a thousand Southeast Asian Muslims fought with the mujahidin in 
the 1980s, and there is an Afghan connection to most of the radical Islamic 
groups [in Southeast Asia]” (Abuza, 2003b, p. 10). Small-scale terrorism in 
Thailand, which has grown exponentially since early January 2004, should at 
least be considered as more than random acts of banditry by local criminals.  It is 
exactly the current type of hostile, unstable violence that attracts JI to step in, 
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organize, and take in to the “family” the smaller groups of insurgents who before 
were operating without coordinated direction. 
It is not unreasonable to envision a recruiting effort by JI that highlights to 
the southern Muslim population the Thai government’s inability to take care of its 
own Muslim citizens.  More disturbing is to consider that perhaps JI has already 
infiltrated the region.  A scenario that must be considered is that JI has been 
manipulating the south’s instability to make the proposition of a unified Southeast 
Asian Islamic insurgency all the more attractive to the disenfranchised south.  
As Doctor Panitan Wattanayagorn from Chulalongkorn University in 
Bangkok has said, the insurgency in the south has evolved (Wattanayagorn, 
2004).  By recalling events in 2003 and 2004, he demonstrates the progression 
of violence from random acts of violence to coordinated insurgency.  According 
to Panitan, there is now a more systematic, organized method that has taken 
over insurgent operations in the south.  This organized military approach 
indicates that there is possibly support from external sources.  As Panitan points 
out, the people in the south no longer provide information to the security forces.  
On January 4, 2004, the first raid occurred on the southern Army depot where 
weapons were stolen and soldiers were killed.  The insurgents were testing the 
military and overestimated the strength of the Army – they easily overran the 
camp.  Then things were quiet again until April 28, 2004.  A systematic insurgent 
raid on multiple security outposts in the south occurred.  More than a hundred 
insurgents were killed.  This time the insurgents had underestimated the security 
forces.  But the attack was even more systematic and coordinated than in 
January.  The insurgency is not diminishing and the increased coordination and 
strategizing indicates that a more sophisticated, external element is helping to 
orchestrate the violence (Wattanayagorn, 2004). 
 Asia Times reporter Julian Gearing has written that, “Disaffected youth [in 
the southern provinces], many of whom speak little or no Thai, are easy prey to 
the growing influence of a purist form of Islam and what they may view as the 
heroic struggle of jihadists such as Osama bin Laden” (2004).   
 50
On March 31, 2004, armed insurgents raided a mining quarry in Yala 
Province.  After tying up two security guards, ten masked men armed with 
assault rifles stole 1.4 tons of ammonium nitrate (commonly used as fertilizer but 
also easily used as an explosive), 58 sticks of dynamite, and 180 detonators. 
Considering the amount of explosives stolen, it seemed evident that the 
responsible insurgents were larger attacks.  As the deputy chief of Thailand’s 
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC – a southern command 
established for conducting stability and security operations in the troubled 
provinces), General Pallop Pinmanee stated that, “With this amount of fertilizer, 
you could blow up a whole town” (“Explosives stolen in Thai raid,” 2004).  In a 
Bangkok Post report that appeared two days after the quarry raid, the attackers 
were identified as a PULO bomb expert, other locals from Narathiwat Province, 
and two Indonesian nationals.  More importantly, one of the Indonesians, only 
known by the name Muka, “was said to be a relative of Hambali, the Indonesian 
operations chief of the Jemaah Islamiah terrorist group who was arrested in 
Thailand last year” (Pathan, M.A., 2004a). 
Deputy Chief of ISOC, General Pallop Pinmanee, announced in late 
March 2004 that the number of active insurgents in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat 
provinces was around 500 with a goal of expanding to 3,000 insurgents.  In 
March 2004 there were as many as 70,000 insurgent sympathizers in the deep 
south, meaning 3-5% of the three southern province’s 1.6 million population were 
separatist sympathizers.  A further indicator of increased organizational design 
was that the insurgency was structurally organized into “core members, armed 
trainees and sympathizers or ‘united front’ members” (“Pallop says rebels have 
huge support,” 2004). 
Although the Thai government acknowledged in 2003 that transnational 
terrorists were using Thailand as a networking hub, the Thai government claims 
that the violence specific to the southern provinces is not a result of international 
terrorist influence.  Brief statements from government officials, such as Defense 
Minister General Chetta Thanacharo’s comments that participation of foreign 
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terror groups in southern violence can not be ruled out, are usually as far as the 
Thai government goes in addressing the possibility of a viable international 
terrorist capability in Thailand (“Pallop says rebels have huge support,” 2004). 
James T. Kirkhope, a research director from the Terrorism and Research 
Center in Arlington, Virginia has said, 
A review of historical Thai-Muslim antagonisms and recalling the 
arrest of Hambali, an Indonesian leader of both al-Qaeda and 
Jemaah Islamiya, provides fuel to the belief that a burgeoning 
separatist insurgent terrorist campaign with some limited external 
support may not be far fetched (Gearing, 2004). 
Supat Boontanom, editor of Chao Tai (Southern People) newspaper in 
Yala, describes the influx of foreign nationals in the south.  As Boontanom 
reported in April of 2004, “There have been a lot of Indonesians coming to 
southern Thailand, as they can enter easily because of our weak laws.  They 
have tried to be congenial with local people in the deep south” (Gearing, 2004).  
With reference to an increased Indonesian presence in southern Thailand, it 
should also be noted that Jemaah Islamiah, Pondok Ngruki (the Islamic boarding 
school in Central Java that schooled many of the men who have been linked to 
AQ), Hambali (the JI operations chief), and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (the Amir of 
Jemaah Islamiah), all have originated in Indonesia.   
According to the US Department of State’s “Patterns of Global Terrorism – 
2003” report, “Extremists [in Southeast Asia] have been able to win supporters by 
financially supporting schools and mosques that espouse their brand of Islam 
and exploiting religious sympathies or discontent among Muslim populations. 
Muslim populations in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, 
and Cambodia are vulnerable to such radical influences.”  
 
B. CONCLUSION 
Dr. Zachary Abuza has described the insurgency in Thailand by simply 
stating that militants “are no longer fighting for Pattani liberation against the 
imperialist Siamese.  They are fighting for Islamic Jihad” (Gearing, 2004).   
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Accepting the fact that today’s global Islamic insurgency directly impacts 
every country in the Southeast Asian region, including Thailand, is a crucial first 
step toward achieving stability in the Kingdom.  On November 16, 2004, PM 
Thaksin made his most bold statement to date by announcing that foreign Islamic 
extremists were supporting the violence in the south.  He said that the assistance 
came from individual relationships developed while Thais studied abroad in the 
Middle East and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.  The Prime Minister denied, 
however, that any international terrorist organizations were sponsoring the 
conflict – asserting only that individual assistance was occurring.  Thaksin said 
that hundreds of Thai Muslims had traveled to Middle Eastern countries and that 
Thai security agencies believed that some had received terrorist and militia 
training while abroad (Wannabovorn, 2004). 
The insurgent movement in the south, which was never able to achieve 
anything more than agitation of the Thai government for decades, has now 
begun to exhibit more organized, systematic operations.  If transnational 
terrorists have not yet established a base of influence among the southern 
radical constituency that is engaged in the south’s insurgency, it must at least be 
acknowledged that the situation is “ripe” for such an introduction to occur.   
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V. CURRENT THAI AND US ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES 
Although US power is still predominant in Southeast Asia, it will 
erode steadily if US policy does not take fundamental concerns in 
the region into account.  In this instance, a separation between 
security policy and economic and social policy is a false dichotomy, 
one that could damage US relations with Southeast Asia in the long 
run (“US security relations with Southeast Asia:  a dual challenge,” 
2004, p.4). 
A. THAILAND’S POLICIES AND ROLE IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON 
TERROR  
Thailand’s initial response to the WOT was not very supportive of US 
efforts.  The Thai response was not one of full commitment for several reasons.  
There was a concern for a possible flare-up of the southern Muslims in Thailand 
against US-led operations in the Middle East.  Specifically, there was a concern 
among Thai army officials that there could be a rebound of the southern Islamic 
insurgency which had been effectively quelled.   
Thailand initially did little, in fact, in response to the attacks of September   
11th.  Border security in the Kingdom was not increased, no immigration policies 
were changed, and law enforcement did little to crack down on what the US 
believed to be important AQ operatives in Thailand.  The US was critical of the 
Thai government for not arresting many AQ suspects that the US listed as being 
in Thailand.  The Thai government claimed that the evidence presented by the 
US was not sufficient enough to stand up in court.  There was also little done to 
stop the illegal money trafficking that was processed through the Kingdom. 
Ramakrishna explains that there were initially two key reasons for limited 
Thai and Southeast Asian commitment to the US War on Terror. 
First, several Southeast Asian states have significant Muslim 
communities whose concerns about the perceived US bias against 
Islam needed to be accommodated in order to forestall the 
possibility of a domestic backlash.  Second, the region has yet to 
fully recover from the devastating effects of the 1997/98 Asian 
financial crisis, and thus, governments, eager to attract foreign 
investors and tourists, are naturally loathe to buttress the 
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impression often created by Western media that their territories are 
radical Islamist terrorist hotbeds (Ramakrishna, 2004, p.148).  
It has also been speculated that there exists a lingering resentment by 
Thais against the US for its weak response in coming to the aid of Thailand 
during the Asian economic crisis in 1997/98.  In 2002 and 2003, however, 
Thailand became more involved in the War on Terror.  Thai troops were sent to 
Iraq and Afghanistan in non-combat roles in support of US operations.  In 2003 
Thailand was elevated to Major Non-NATO Ally status. Because of these 
affiliations with the US, Thailand has found itself more prone to threats of 
terrorism.  Regardless of these threats, the Kingdom has since maintained its 
support of the War on Terror.    
 
B. CURRENT THAI / US / REGIONAL POLICIES AND RECOMMENDED 
IMPROVEMENTS 
In order to achieve success in effectively combating the threats present in 
Thailand, the attention, resources, and long-term commitment of Thai, US, and 
other Southeast Asian nations must be thoroughly focused and coordinated.  
Several critical focal points in the fight against terrorism in Thailand are worth 
examining.  Some initiatives have been relatively successful while others require 
greater attention in order to be effective.  The most important factor in analyzing 
these various focal points is the realization that there is no one key point to target 
in eliminating the threats of terrorism and insurgency.  For example, an infusion 
of money into the south will not alone solve the problems there.  A 
comprehensive strategy utilizing multiple national resources and assets must be 
implemented.  The points below contain information on what is being done in 
specific areas of Thai, US, and regional policy.  Many of the focus areas 
described here are being addressed by some combination of Thai and/or US 
and/or Southeast Asian initiatives.  In defining what areas need improvement, it 
must be realized that although the Thai government is making efforts to confront 
deficiencies in practice and policy, several of these deficiencies can not be 
unilaterally addressed in any effective way.  It is in the interest of the US to 
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pursue foreign policies that better support Thai national strategy goals in order to 
promote Southeast Asian regional stability.  At the same time, however, it is 
critical that the US respect the limitations of the Thai government as well as 
cultural differences that exist between the East and West. 
 
1. Law Enforcement 
“In Asia, police forces have detained far more terrorists than military forces 
have detained, but most US security aid is given in the form of military 
assistance” (Dillon, 2004).  As reported by Dana Dillon from the Heritage 
Foundation, a US-based policy research and analysis group, the disparity 
between military and law enforcement support exists as a direct result of Section 
660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which was amended in 1973 to 
prohibit the use of foreign assistance funds to train police.  While various 
agencies do train police, such training requires a congressional exception.  The 
current laws were amended in the 1960s and 1970s when the US was spending 
millions of dollars a year but became concerned with a lack of policy guidance 
and the possibility that repressive regimes were being supported.  While today 
there are many safeguards throughout the vetting process created to monitor and 
avoid inappropriate support of foreign governments, the US laws remain the 
same.     
Considering that terrorism has changed the face of the world since  
Section 660 became law, a revision of US policy toward foreign law enforcement 
is appropriate in helping to combat terrorist networks that exist throughout 
Southeast Asia.  Police in more than 100 countries have arrested more than 
3,000 suspects linked to AQ, while the military has captured some 650 enemy 
combatants (Dillon, 2003; Slevin, 2003).  To assist Thailand in the location and 
prosecution of terrorist operatives, the US must re-engage support for not only 
police, but also the “entire judicial system from police to judges to prisons” 
(Dillon, 2004).    
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In Southeast Asia, with the exception of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the 
Philippines, JI operates underground in urban areas.  The majority of all JI/AQ 
operatives that have been captured in Thailand have been detained by various 
law enforcement agencies, often with the assistance of the US.   
To assist in countering terrorism abroad, the US and Thailand would 
benefit from developing a better-coordinated, foreign law enforcement assistance 
strategy.  In southern Thailand, law enforcement is plagued by low income, 
corruption, and sometimes-inadequate training.  Because of the southern 
region’s poorly-resourced government and social infrastructure, police and 
government programs do not receive the attention and funding necessary to deal 
with insurgency.  Corrupt officials have pilfered funds earmarked for 
development.  Misadministration by some government representatives, along 
with the heavy-handed security forces in the area, has further aggravated the 
already-alienated Muslim population.  According to a report by the South Asia 
Analysis Group, “Daily life in the urban areas [is] affected by common banditry 
and lawlessness making it difficult for the authorities to differentiate these 
activities from that of the separatists or militants” (Kuppuswamy, 2004). 
To make the situation of law enforcement in the south worse, there is an 
ever present divide between the police and the military in the region.  Constant 
disputes over which authority is ultimately responsible and in charge of security 
and stability continue to exist in the south today.  As Jane’s Intelligence Review 
reports, inter-agency rivalries have “created a serious divide between the Royal 
Thai Police (RTP) of (Southern) Region 9 and the 4th (Southern Region) Army of 
the Royal Thai Army (RTA)” (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 
2003). 
In the first half of 2004, the Thai government made sweeping personnel 
changes in the senior leadership of the police and the military.  Both the 4th 
Region’s Army Commander as well as Thailand’s national police chief were fired 
for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-dominated south.  These 
actions demonstrated at least an acceptance from the government that the 
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problems of terrorism and insurgency were not being addressed with the 
appropriate levels of commitment.  Whether these reforms will actually aid in 
stability and decrease corruption is yet to be seen.    
It is for these reasons that both Thailand, with the continued assistance 
from the US and other nations, must devote greater attention, training, and 
resources to law enforcement reform and training. 
 
2. Intelligence Operations 
…Southeast Asians have also demonstrated difficulties working 
multilaterally.  For example, many ASEAN governments are 
reluctant to share intelligence on a multilateral basis, and are more 
comfortable cooperating on sensitive issues through proven 
bilateral channels (“US security relations with Southeast Asia:  a 
dual challenge,” 2004, p.1). 
In a September 2004 interview in Bangkok, an anonymous US intelligence 
agency official remarked that Thais simply do not work coordinate and share 
intelligence well.  The official stated that when the US sponsored or coordinated 
the joining together of Thai-Thai or Thai-other intelligence agencies, sharing of 
information occurred rather efficiently.  Immediately after withdraw of US 
sponsorship or coordination for a specific operation or event, the Thai agencies 
withdrew back to into isolation and compartmentalization.  This isolation not only 
occurred when bi- or multi-lateral agencies were involved, but the official made 
clear that even within one Thai government agency, such as the Army, for 
example, compartmentalization among specific units was prevalent and stove-
piping straight to Bangkok was very common (interview with anonymous US 
government agency officials in Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004). 
Thailand’s intelligence operations, specifically in the areas of gathering 
and sharing information, require improvement.  In January 2000, three suspected 
terrorists, Khallad bin Attash, Khalid al-Mihdhar, and Nawaf al-Hazmi entered 
Thailand.  Malaysian and US intelligence agencies tracking these men through 
communications intercepts alerted Thai authorities of their travel to the Kingdom.  
Thai intelligence received the information on a weekend, and by the time the 
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information was processed and the seriousness of the situation realized, the men 
had disappeared into Bangkok.  Thai authorities put the men’s names on the 
travel watch list, but all three left the country unnoticed.  It was not until weeks 
after the men’s departures, sometime in February 2000, that Thai intelligence 
notified anyone of the departures, and at the time they only notified the 
Malaysians and not the US.  It was later discovered that the only reason the 
Thais mentioned the departures to the Malaysian authorities was because 
Malaysia had asked Thailand for several weeks for the whereabouts of the 
missing terrorists.   
It was later discovered that Khallad had proceeded on to Karachi on 
January 20.  He would later go on to mastermind the USS Cole attack in Yemen 
that killed 17 US servicemen.  Nawaf and Khalid left Bangkok on January 15, on 
a United Airlines Flight to Los Angeles. Once in the US, Nawaf and Khalid 
traveled across the country and met with members of another AQ cell, identified 
as the “Hamburg” cell, which was later found to be instrumental in the 9/11 
attacks on the US (John, 2004). 
The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the US, more commonly 
referred to as the 9/11 Investigation Committee, was careful in making 
accusations about the intelligence failure that occurred in this case.  Although the 
intelligence coordination was obviously unsatisfactory, the commission said that 
in the context of hindsight no one could have predicted the failure would 
contribute to the devastating 9/11 attacks (John, 2004).  It must be said, 
however, that had the FBI received information about Nawaf and Khalid and 
been able to track them in the US, it is possible that US law enforcement 
agencies could have broken up any number of the four cells that would later 
participate in the 9/11 attacks.  
It is also significant that Thailand’s intelligence resources have traditionally 
been focused on targets other than terrorists.  One of the primary focus points of 
Thai assets has been Burma (Myanmar), which has infuriated the Thai 
government for decades with rampant drug trafficking into the Kingdom as well 
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as continued border disputes.  Indochina is another target that has received 
considerable intelligence attention by the Thais. 
Compartmentalization among intelligence agencies has no doubt hindered 
the progress of tracking and locating terrorists.  Since 9/11 considerable efforts 
have been made by the US, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines to avoid failures such as the Malaysia-Thailand one described above.  
In early 2001, prior to 9/11, a classified, joint US-Thai counter-terrorism 
operations organization was created called the Counter Terrorism Intelligence 
Center (CTIC).  The CTIC combines, in close coordination, the CIA with key 
personnel from Thailand’s three main security agencies:  The National 
Intelligence Agency, the Thai police, and the armed forces.  The CTIC relies 
heavily on the CIA for its structure, guidance, and funding.  The two agencies 
share facilities, equipment, and information on a daily basis.  The continuing work 
of this agency enforces the efforts of the Thais and the US to locate and 
eliminate the threat of JI and other insurgent organizations operating in the 
Kingdom (“CIA, Thai agencies unite to root out Al Qaeda”, 2003, p.3). 
By December 2002, however, the Thai Information Ministry and the Prime 
Minster himself refused to accept or admit that terrorist operations were being 
conducted in Thailand.  CNN’s Maria Ressa recalls attempting to explicitly make 
clear to the Thais that transnational terrorists were operating in the Kingdom.  
According to Ressa, the Thai government countered the claims, saying that they 
believed that Thailand’s intelligence counterparts from other countries would 
surely have shared such information if it were true. Ressa re-affirmed to the Thai 
government that her information came from reliable sources, including the FBI, 
and that the documents were available for the Thais to see (Ressa, 2003, p.216).  
This interaction was a demonstration of denial on the part of the Thai government 
as well as the intelligence “stove piping” that often exists between even friendly 
nations. 
The situation in Thailand changed abruptly in 2003.  On May 16th, a 
Singaporean and three Thais, all suspected members of JI, were arrested while 
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developing a plan to bomb the 2003 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
summit (Ressa, 2003, p.217).  Between Singaporean and Thai authorities, the 
two determined that JI was planning other attacks throughout Thailand.  
Following the arrests, PM Thaksin could no longer deny transnational terrorist 
operations existed inside the Kingdom.  Thaksin admitted that JI had a cell in his 
country “with ambitious plans” (Ressa, 2003, p.217). 
The most significant intelligence operation success to date occurred on 
August 11, 2003, when Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam Isamuddin), Jemaah 
Islamiah’s operations chief and main link to al Qaeda, was captured in Ayuthya, 
Thailand.  Considered the most wanted man in Southeast Asia at the time, 
Hambali was the only non-Arab (he is Indonesian) sitting on AQ’s leadership 
council and thus existed as a critical link between JI and AQ.  His capture 
required the collaboration of Cambodian, Thai, Indonesian, Malaysian, and US 
authorities.  Phnom Penh, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur all provided tracking of 
Hambali while the Thai Special Branch and US officials conducted the actual raid 
and arrest.  After the interrogation of Mohamad Farik bin Amin (Zubair) and other 
AQ and JI operatives, it was learned that Hambali’s forged Spanish passport was 
about to expire.  Authorities then tracked down a prominent passport forger in 
Chiang Mai, Thailand, analyzed photographs in his possession, and were then 
able to make a connection with Hambali.  After interrogating two of Hambali’s 
agents who arrived to pick up the new forged passport, Hambali’s whereabouts 
was determined and he was apprehended (Smith, 2004, p.212).   Under 
interrogation, Hambali described plans to bomb the US, British, Australian, 
Israeli, and Singapore embassies in Bangkok (Simon, 2003a).  Based on 
interrogations of Hambali, authorities also learned that terrorist attacks were 
planned across Southeast Asia, despite the disruption of JI leadership from 
previous arrests.  According to CIA reports, JI had plans to attack two US-
managed hotels in Bangkok as well as commercial airliners by way of Bangkok’s 
vulnerable Don Muang International Airport (Simon, 2003a). 
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In 2002 there was criticism of Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra’s 
decision to disband the southern administrative structures known as the Civilian-
Police-Military Task Force 43 and the Southern Border Administrative Command 
(Funston, 2004).  Not only did these organizations provide a critical 
communications link between the southern Muslims and the Thai government, 
but the two served as intelligence gathering sources as well.  Criticism re-
emerged in March 2004 after Bersatu insurgents planted two bombs, one of 
which was detected before detonation and another that exploded only meters 
away from the Thai interior and defense ministers who were visiting the southern 
province of Narathiwat.   A March 2004 Bangkok Post article titled “Loss of 
Intelligence Makes Life Less Secure” sharply criticized the move to disband the 
two government organizations as a “grave policy error on the part of the Thaksin 
administration” based on “a police recommendation that the violence was now 
under control and most outlaw elements were neutralized.”  The report further 
stated that important undercover informers were cut off from the government’s 
payroll after the disbandment, thus “shutting off the flow of intelligence on the 
activities of insurgents.”  In reference to the bombings of the ministerial visit, the 
report stated that the fact that the bombs were planted close to where the two 
ministers were meeting pointed “conclusively to a serious security lapse.  It 
suggests terrible intelligence on the part of security officials, who appear to have 
no idea as to the activities of movements of the bombers, possibly insurgents” 
(“Loss of Intelligence Makes Life Less Secure,” 2004).  According to a Thai 
military intelligence source commenting on the bombing of the ministerial visit, 12 
insurgents, one of them a woman, arrived from Malaysia on March 22, split into 
two groups of six, and emplaced the two bombs (Boonyakaj, 2004).  None had 
been detected by intelligence sources prior to the bombing. 
Jane’s Intelligence Review reports that inadequate intelligence is 
prohibiting an effective government response to the insurgency in the southern 
provinces.  
It [poor intelligence] is the result of poor training and often minimal 
understanding of Islam and Malay culture and language on the part 
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of Thai Buddhist officials from other parts of the country - a 
shortcoming compounded by the closed nature of local Muslim 
society. Familiarization courses for police officers posted to the 
south undoubtedly go some way to improve matters at the basic 
civic relations level, but are hardly sufficient for the more sensitive 
tasks of intelligence gathering. Tellingly, neither of the two 
[Buddhist] Border Patrol Police intelligence officers lynched in April 
[2003] were able to speak the local Malay dialect “(“Thailand faces 
up to southern extremist threat,” 2003). 
 Thai officials in March 2004 announced that methods of monitoring JI 
operatives traveling between Cambodia and Thailand were being developed.  A 
Thai military officer said “cooperation on fighting terrorism, especially in 
intelligence gathering, would be discussed alongside drugs, crime, car theft, 
arms smuggling and border demarcation” (Nanuam, 2004b).  Proposals have 
been made to create a regional databank, but the levels of distrust that currently 
exist between US and Southeast Asian nations have historically prevented such 
a sharing network from becoming a reality (Ressa, 2003, p.220). 
In late October/early November 2004, the CIA offered anti-terror training to 
Thailand.  On November 3, 2004, the Borneo Bulletin quoted Deputy Prime 
Minister in charge of internal security Chavalit Yonchaiyudy as saying, “We don’t 
want any country, ally or not, to interfere with our internal affairs” (“Bangkok turns 
down CIA anti-terror training,” 2004).  However, according to an interview with a 
Thai government official who wished to remain anonymous, the Thai 
government, in fact, did want the specialized instruction, but with a considerable 
level of discretion.  For obvious reasons, there exists much suspicion in the Thai 
south of any Thai-US cooperation that might imply that the War on Terror will be 
brought to bear against Thai Muslims.  According to the anonymous official, a 
senior Thai security official leaked to the press that the CIA training was to occur 
and as a result the Thai government had no choice but to publicly refuse the 
training to avoid domestic opposition.   
Intelligence operations in Thailand have demonstrated improvement in 
efficiency since 9/11.  However, there still exists a need for better intelligence 
gathering, processing, and sharing among Thai, US, and other Southeast Asian 
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intelligence agencies. All of the instruments of national power are necessary to 
combat the threats of internal Islamic insurgency and transnational terrorism in 
the Kingdom.  Improved intelligence operations, with specific attention provided 
to the flawed areas discussed above, are critical to identifying where, when, and 
how these instruments of national power are applied.  
 
3. Immigration, Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Corruption  
Thai officials acknowledge that Thailand has become a safe haven for 
transnational terrorists involved in forged documents, narcotics, and weapons 
trafficking, as well as being a transit point and planning venue for regional 
terrorists.   
The Thai government’s level of cooperation with the US includes both the 
identification of terrorist financial assets and continuous reinforcement of anti-
money laundering legislation.  An October 2002 Congressional Report titled 
Foreign Support of the US War on Terrorism noted Thailand’s involvement in 
multilateral cooperation efforts on anti-money laundering.  The Kingdom is also a 
member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering (Congressional 
Research Service, 2002, p.45). In 2003 Thailand’s new anti-terrorism laws gave 
the Kingdom’s Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), an agency established in 
2000 to initially stop the laundering of drug money, wider powers to track illegal 
funds linked with suspected terrorist organizations.  Under the new laws, AMLO 
has three investigative units, one to track large transactions, one to track corrupt 
government officials, and one to search for funds associated with terrorist 
organizations (Corben, 2003).   
After the capture of Hambali in 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin issued two 
controversial executive decrees amending the Criminal Procedure Code and 
Anti-Money Laundering Act, delivering harsh punishment to perpetrators of 
terrorist offenses.  Thaksin’s new laws enacted provisions that allowed for 
detention without trial, similar to terrorism-related laws in the US, Singapore, and 
Malaysia  (Simon, 2003a).  Between October 2003 when Thaksin’s decrees were 
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issued, and March 2004, approximately 500 suspects had been arrested on 
international terrorism and money-laundering charges.   
The Thai government must, however, remain cognizant of the protection 
of human rights for its citizens when creating such laws, especially when it 
comes to enforcement, namely in the south.  When the anti-terrorism laws were 
generated in Thailand, fears were expressed that the new freedom given to 
authorities would be used against Muslim leaders who were making legitimate 
attempts to improve the situation in the south.  Some senior Thai officials 
complained that “the US was pushing them to arrest and interrogate terror 
suspects in ways that violated civil liberties under Thai law, including military-
style abduction, detention without trial, and unrestricted wire tapping” (Simon, 
2003a).  Such statements are flawed for obvious reasons.  Although the US has 
admittedly pressured countries such as Thailand to do more in the fight against 
terrorism, violating civil liberties is unfortunately a well-known internal reality 
among corrupt military, police, and civil authorities in the Kingdom. 
Thailand has traditionally been a meeting place for transnational terrorists 
and an easy place to obtain false documents.  The US, Australia, and several 
other countries have placed law enforcement agents at Bangkok’s Don Muang 
International Airport looking for people traveling with false documents.  On 
average, over 200 false passports are seized each week (Simon, 2003a).  In 
March 2004, the Thai government signed a Memorandum of Intent (MOI) with the 
US to install biometric scanners in international airports as part of the War on 
Terror.  The terrorist interdiction system, named PISCES (Personal Identification 
Secure Comparison and Evaluation System), matches facial images, fingerprints 
and biographical information via a high speed data bank in the US.  Thailand is in 
fact the first country in Southeast Asia to share online traveler information with 
the US (Ashayagachat, 2004a).   
Corruption is another well-known aspect of national concern that pervades 
not only in the military and police fields, but in government as well.  Prime 
Minister Thaksin has openly admitted that this is a real problem.  On February 
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20, 2004, following increased violence in the south that erupted the month 
before, the Prime Minister said that rogue officials could have played a part in the 
recent violence in the southern provinces.  “There must have been government 
officials involved in this, but how many, or what level of these people [sic], we are 
probing” (“Thailand: Officials implicated in southern unrest,” 2004).  Police Major 
General Thanee Thawichsri speculated the day before Thaksin’s announcement  
that the recent attacks could have been prompted by local elections, and 
politicians might have seized the opportunity to kill opponents and blame Muslim 
separatists (“Thailand: Officials implicated in southern unrest,” 2004).  
An April 2005 extortion racket in Bangkok’s Bo Bae garment market 
exposed mafia activities that allegedly included Thai political and military 
members.  Bo Bae revealed that mafia had been demanding money from street 
vendors in return for being left alone and safe from harm.  Soon after the incident 
came to a head, PM Thaksin announced that the government would take strong 
measures to eliminate the “parasitic burden” on traders.  Regarding military 
participation in the extortion, Thai Privy Council Chairman General Prem 
Tinsulanonda announced to defense leaders that military mafias must be 
eliminated in order for the armed forces to maintain their dignity and respect 
(Nanuam, 2005c).  It is evident that despite recent anti-corruption policies 
implemented by the Thai government, some officials are still involved in illegal 
activity for personal gain.  
Immigration reform initiatives, counter-corruption policies, and new anti-
terrorism laws demonstrate a genuine effort to reform the Thai government’s 
national policies which have been admittedly insufficient in the past.  There still 
exists much room for improvement in these areas.  Because the US has a 
genuine interest in regional stability as well as locating personnel and terrorist 
assets in Southeast Asia, greater devotion of resources in assisting the planning 
and implementation of Thai reforms is necessary. 
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4. Human Rights and Martial Law 
The majority of southern Muslims in Thailand do not support the current 
violence or the secession of a separate Islamic state.  Inadequate government 
policies toward reform and stability in the region, however, can only be 
interpreted as contributors toward the violence in which many southern Muslims 
would otherwise not participate.  While conducting anti-terrorist operations by law 
enforcement and military personnel in the south, the Thai government must be 
more cognizant of the potential for negative repercussions when a heavy handed 
approach is used against legitimate Muslim leaders attempting to improve 
democracy in the region.  Unfortunately, a heavy handed approach has been a 
recurring tactic in the government’s response to southern unrest and insurgency. 
In 2003 PM Thaksin launched a war on drugs throughout Thailand.  The 
action, later criticized by the US and human rights advocates around the world, 
resulted in the killing of more than 2,500 suspects and hundreds of arbitrary 
arrests.  In late April 2004, over 100 southern Muslim insurgents were killed after 
they simultaneously attacked more than 10 government outposts in Yala, 
Sonkhla, and Pattani Provinces.  During this incident, soldiers moved in to 
several locations and after seven hours of shooting, 5 police officers were dead, 
17 insurgents were captured, and 100 were killed, including 32 who were firing 
from Krue Se Mosque, a historic symbol of the (Muslim) Kingdom of Pattani.  In 
the aftermath of the April battle, General Panlop Pinmanee, deputy director of the 
southern Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was ordered to leave 
the southern region immediately for disobeying orders to negotiate, not battle, 
with the 32 insurgents fighting from the mosque (“Panlop moved for disobeying 
orders,” 2004).  Despite the highest insurgent casualty numbers in recent history, 
it must be emphasized in defense of the military and police that the insurgents 
themselves initiated the April 28, 2004 battle. 
Under the provisions of the Leahy Amendment which prohibits the US 
from training any foreign forces associated with human rights violations, Thailand 
risks being distanced from certain types of US support if questionable actions 
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continue to manifest within the Kingdom.  A February 2004 US State Department 
report highlighted Thailand’s worsening human rights situation, with specific 
attention paid to PM Thaksin’s 2003 anti-drug campaign in which 2,500 alleged 
drug dealers were killed.  April 2005 marked the beginning of PM Thaksin’s third 
war on drugs campaign in which he announced his intentions to rid Thailand of 
all illegal drugs by the end of the year.  Policies that include human-rights 
violations, as seen in Indonesia in the 1990s, led to a complete break-off of US 
support and training of Indonesian military, police, and security forces.  While it 
seems unlikely that the US would take such drastic measures as it did with 
Indonesia, Thaksin must recognize the potential some type of US policy change 
towards the Kingdom if human rights violations continue to make headlines.  The 
need for change in specific Thai human rights policies is not only critical to 
maintaining valuable support from the US, but an awareness of human rights 
issues is also fundamentally critical to maintaining long term stability inside 
Thailand’s borders. 
Following the January 4, 2004 insurgent raid on a southern army camp 
that left four soldiers dead and over 300 weapons stolen, martial law was 
established in the three southern provinces of Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat.  
Thousands of Thai troops have since been dispatched to the region to tackle the 
problems associated with the reemerging insurgency.  The April 28, 2004 
insurgent attacks on several security force outposts in the three southern 
provinces left more than 100 insurgents dead.  On October 25, 2004, after 
protesting the detainment of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to insurgents, 
78 people were suffocated or crushed to death after being detained by police and 
packed into trucks for transportation to jail.  According to Major General Sinchai 
Nutsatit, the detainees were stripped semi-naked after their arrest and taken on a 
five-hour drive to barracks in Pattani province.  An Islamic teacher from Prince of 
Songkhla  University  in Pattani, commenting on the Tak Bai incident as it is now  
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known, said that, “We have never seen this sort of torture in Thai history 
before…It’s a deliberate massacre” (“Thailand says 78 Muslims Died in Army 
Custody,” 2004).   
A significant problem with the Thai government response is that officials 
continue to react to violence in the region with force but do not attempt to 
understand the reason why the southern insurgents are creating the violence in 
the first place.  While the direct approach is often necessary, other options are 
rarely considered.  Following the suffocation of the 78 Muslims, PM Thaksin 
commented that “The protestors had several motives, but the main reason was 
separatism…I cannot allow the separatists to exist on our land.”  He added that 
“We can not allow these people to harass innocent people and authorities any 
longer…We have no choice but to use force to suppress them” (“78 killed in 
police action in Thailand,” 2004).  Two days after the suffocation incident, PULO 
announced on its website that attacks in Bangkok would come in retaliation for 
the deaths of the protestors (“How long can Bangkok dodge the militant bullet?” 
2004). To further exacerbate the situation in the south and suspicion of the 
government following Tak Bai, PM Thaksin announced on November 19, 2004 
that he rejected a UN probe into the incident because a Thai government 
investigation was already taking place. 
According to an April 2004 Bangkok University survey of over 1,000 
Muslims aged 18 and older, the primary reason given for violence in the south is 
conflicts among soldiers, police and other officials (24.4%), followed by poverty 
and unemployment (22.5%), religious conflicts (20.1%), cultural conflicts (16.8%), 
and the activities of local southern influential figures (16.2%) (“City Muslims don’t 
see eye to eye with ‘eye for an eye’ policy,” 2004). 
Nik Abdul Ragib, a Thai-Malaysian relations expert in Narathiwat 
explained that the majority of southern Muslims do not support the militant 
insurgent violence.  The locals, Ragib explained, only fear for their safety, which 
in  turn  leads  to  less   cooperation   with  the  authorities  because  of  potential  
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reprisals from the insurgents.  “By putting martial law into force the government 
will only widen the gap between the people and the authorities” (Kuppuswamy, 
2004).  
One ongoing case that has held the interest of human rights advocates is 
the March 12, 2004 disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit, chairman of 
Thailand's Muslim Lawyers Association.  Somchai went missing after leaving his 
home in the south for a meeting in Bangkok.  At the time of the disappearance, 
the lawyer was representing two Thai terror suspects, with suspected links to JI, 
who were on trial for allegedly plotting bomb attacks in the Kingdom.  In April 
2004, four police officials surrendered to authorities after arrest warrants were 
issued against them for involvement in the lawyer’s abduction.  The police 
officers have continued to maintain their claims of innocence (Crispin, 2004b).  In 
March of 2005, with Somchai suspected dead and no progress made after 
government investigations, human rights groups in Thailand and elsewhere 
throughout Southeast Asia announced that they will submit the case of the 
disappearance of to the UN Human Rights Commission conference.  Sunai 
Phasuk, advisor to the Senate committee on foreign affairs, criticized the Thai 
government for failing to answer questions about the case (Charoenpo, 2005).   
 In the south, Muslim community leaders and businessmen warned that 
heavy handed government action could drive away tourists and foreign investors 
as well as disrupt people’s day to day lives.  A statement released by the Islamic 
Committee of the southern province of Pattani in 2004 said, “Government 
operations have destroyed the credibility of the religious leaders and institutions.  
The Muslim community will not provide further cooperation unless the 
government stops such thug-like measures” (Kuppuswamy, 2004).  According to 
Surin Pitsuwan, a former Thai foreign minister, “A tactic of an eye for an eye has 
been adopted to suppress the violence.  Yet without sensitivity to Muslim culture, 
heavy handed activity may lead to further tension and more serious conflicts” 
(Kuppuswamy, 2004). 
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In March 2004, the Thai Army Commander, General Chaisit Shinawatra 
announced that the army had assigned informants to talk with key leaders of 
separatist groups about security in the region in an attempt to ease the tension 
between the government and the separatist insurgents.  Insurgent organizations 
to be negotiated with included PULO, BRN, and Bersatu (“Asia-Pacific daily news 
summary,” 2004b).  In contrast to offensive police and military operations waged 
against suspected insurgents in the region, this was a clear change of 
methodology on the part of the Thai government.  The success of this new 
strategy depends on the actors’ abilities to approach each other peacefully and 
try to understand the problem.  The idea of opening the lines of communication 
between the government and the insurgents, if given time to develop can only be 
seen as a step towards regional stability. 
In an April 2004 Wall Street Journal report titled “US Ally in Asia may have 
crossed line in terror fight”, it was reported that since the January 2004 insurgent 
raid on the southern army camp, “more than 100 Thai Muslims have disappeared 
in the southern part of the country, many of them taken in commando-style raids 
by unidentified assailants” (Crispin, 2004b).  “The government admits some 
misdeeds have been committed,” said Thai government spokesman Jakraphop 
Penkair.  He continued to admit that, “some officials saw it as necessary to carry 
out acts like abduction of people and beating some into confessions.  The 
government does not officially or unofficially endorse these policies” (Crispin, 
2004b). An August 2004 report released by Thailand’s Human Rights 
Commission accused southern security forces of torture, kidnappings, and 
extrajudicial killings in their crackdown on Muslim insurgents.  The commission’s 
report included documented cases of suspects being “blindfolded, beaten, 
strangled, electrocuted, humiliated and urinated on by official interrogators” 
(Corben, 2004). 
 The international situation and Thailand’s support for the US War on 
Terror has no doubt affected Muslim sentiments in the south as well. The war is 
generally interpreted by some Muslims around the world as a War on Islam.  
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Since Thailand was announced as a Major Non-NATO Ally by the US in late 
2003, Muslims have felt even further alienated from their government in 
Bangkok.   
Not all government responses to the southern insurgency have included 
the use of force.  The Thai government has made legitimate attempts, the results 
of which are still yet to be seen, to improve the situation for Thai Muslims.  In 
January 2004 PM Thaksin declared that it will take three years to stabilize the 
south.  He announced that the government would spend approximately US$500 
million to help the southern region.  It is unclear, however, what portion of the 
money will be spent on economic growth versus tightening security in the area 
(Crispin, 2004a). It should be noted that shortly after the announcement of the 
spending plan, however, the infusion of the funding into the south was ironically 
put on hold for an indefinite period of time as a result of increased violence in the 
south.  As of early 2005, Thaksin had continued to withhold funding because of 
the continuing insurgency which he feared would only prosper following an 
infusion of money to the region.  In another step towards better integration of 
southern Muslim culture into Thai society, Education Minister Adisai Bodharamik 
announced in 2004 that Islamic schools in the south would be registered as 
private educational institutions, thus entitling them to government development 
assistance (“Islamic schools to receive state development assistance,” 2004).  
In response to an April 2004 Senate Military Affairs report urging PM 
Thaksin to replace 75% of state officials in the south with local Muslims to off-set 
separatist ideology in the region, former 4th army commander General Harn 
Leenanond, chairman of a panel studying the report, told the Bangkok Post he 
agreed the policy would provide long-term solutions to many problems in the 
South. ''Under this policy, Muslim students and youths in southern border areas 
must receive assistance and a chance to further their studies in all fields, so they 
can graduate with degrees and help develop their communities,'' said Harn, who 
headed the army's southern forces command in the early 1980s. ‘‘ [The] policy 
will allow local Muslims to follow careers in the public sector, which in the long 
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run will dispel mistrust and suspicion,'' he said. ''Within 15 years of the policy 
being implemented, we will see our Muslim brothers working as government 
officials at all levels'' (“Call for more Muslim officials,” 2004). 
On November 3, 2004, one week after Tak Bai and one day after being 
spoken to by His Majesty the King about the violence in the south, PM Thaksin 
held a reception for about 400 Muslim leaders and representatives of Islamic 
organizations as well as 17 foreign ambassadors, eight senators, and 10 
members of Parliament.  Without hesitation, the Prime Minister asked key Muslim 
leaders to “forget the past, start anew,” and together with their communities 
discuss what they want the government to do to end the violence in the deep 
south (Santimatanedol, 2004).  Unfortunately, just as in the past, the Thaksin 
administration discussed an accommodating strategy that may have been 
productive but then in practice continued on with ineffective counterinsurgency 
activities.   
Controversy erupted in February 2005 when PM Thaksin announced his 
plan to divide the deep south into red, yellow, and green zones according to the 
level of violence that villages experience.  Red zones villages were those 
deemed sympathetic to the insurgency and, as a result, they would not receive 
any development funds unless they improved their status to yellow or green 
through self-policing.  There would have been approximately 350 villages out of 
1,500 in the south that were to be designated “red zones.” While the plan was to 
isolate some insurgents, innocent people would no doubt have simultaneously 
been punished.  A critical measure of success in counterinsurgency is whether or 
not more or less insurgents are being produced as a result of government 
activities.  In the case of denying certain areas development funds, the 
government may have forced some people who were heretofore impartial to the 
insurgency to ether support the violence or at least reject any inclination to help 
the government fight the insurgency.  Immediately following Thaksin’s 
announcement of the zoning plan, harsh opposition to the idea was unleashed by 
religious leaders, civil administrators, academics, anonymous Thai military 
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leaders, and the like.  Within one week of constant pressure from critics to 
abandon the idea of mass punishment for the south, government spokesman 
Jakrapob Penkair publicly announced that the zoning was merely an idea, not 
government policy, and that as of February 2005 it was “not being implemented 
or prepared at all” (“Thailand steps back,” 2005).  What was most disturbing 
about the plan, regardless of whether or not it was implemented, was the fact 
that the Thaksin administration believed it was a viable tactic to help solve the 
problems of the south.  Had it not been for critics voicing strong opposition, the 
plan would most likely have been implemented rather quickly.    
There are numerous problems with zoning measures, one being the 
possibility that insurgents would simply relocate to green zones where they could 
operate more freely, thus leaving the innocent people in red zones as the only 
ones punished.  Such a situation would then make it very easy for insurgent 
leaders to reinforce to the local population that the Thai government is in fact not 
concerned for the wellbeing of southern Muslims.  Historically speaking, the 
Malayan Emergency of the 1950s showed that zoning was effective for 
population control measures but cutting off aid to Malaya’s “black zones” – the 
equivalent of southern Thailand’s “red zones” – was counter-productive to the 
counterinsurgency fight. According to a Rand Corporation study of the Malayan 
Emergency, a 1952 law that allowed the levying of “collective punishment against 
people of an uncooperative village or town…was repealed in 1953 as unfair to 
innocent members of the population” (Komer, 1972, p. 36).  Rohan Gunaratna, 
author of Inside al Qaeda, has said with regard to the Thai zoning that since only 
a small number of Thai Muslims currently support the insurgency, "It's highly 
counterproductive to cut off aid to any village where there are insurgents 
because it will only radicalize entire villages" (“The Thai terror front,” 2005).   
Unfortunately, the positive measures taken by the Thai government to 
support and work with southern Muslims have been outweighed by questionable 
human rights practices and martial law abuses.  A genuine effort on the part of 
the Thai government to understand the Muslim grievances in the region, open 
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lines of communications with the insurgents, eliminate government sponsored 
violence against Muslims, and devote resources to develop the southern region 
are all necessary steps for stability in the south.   
 
5. Southeast Asian Regional Forums 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed on 
August 8, 1967 with the objective of unifying Southeast Asian governments for 
the purposes of accelerating the economic growth, social progress and cultural 
development in the region; promoting political and economic stability in the 
region; and resolving various issues in the region.  The original members of 
ASEAN are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.  New 
members that have joined since 1967 are Brunei Darussalam (January 8, 1984), 
Vietnam (July 28, 1995), Laos and Myanmar (July 23, 1997), and Cambodia 
(April 30, 1999).  Combined, all of these nations are referred to as “The ASEAN 
Ten.” 
In 1994 it was determined that ASEAN required a sub-organization 
specifically focused on peace and stability in the region.  The ASEAN nations 
recognized that rapid regional and global development had serious impacts on 
their security and strategic concerns.  It was also acknowledged that because of 
the great diversity of the cultures in Southeast Asia, there were significant 
challenges to peace and prosperity in the region. 
As a result, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was formed to deal with 
these security and stability concerns.  Today, the ARF includes the ASEAN 10 as 
well as 13 additional countries from around the world, including the US, charged 
with promoting peace and security operations. 
Up until 9/11, however, neither ASEAN nor the ARF actually accomplished 
a great deal in the arena of regional stability.  It was generally recognized when 
the ARF was formed that it would have to establish itself as a meaningful forum 
to enhance the peace and prosperity of the region.  The ARF did provide a much 
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needed system for senior governmental representatives to meet regularly and 
interact in order to address regional concerns.   
Following 9/11, ASEAN made progress once the serious threat of 
terrorism became a harsh reality.  The US also became increasingly more 
involved in the operations, activities, and financial support of ASEAN.  New 
agreements were made among the ASEAN 10 and the US to expand intelligence 
sharing, gain better accountability of the enormous number of weapons that 
transit Southeast Asia, locate and capture known terrorists, and better coordinate 
the tracking and seizure of suspected terrorist financial networks. 
ASEAN’s recent history and actual results in countering terrorism and 
instability in the region have proven mediocre.  During the October 2003 Asia 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bangkok, US President George 
W. Bush took advantage of the opportunity to use the summit as a conduit to 
reengage the issue of terrorism in Southeast Asia.  Several nations, such as 
Malaysia, were infuriated that Bush had turned an economic forum into a 
facilitator of the US War on Terror.  It seemed, however, that the US and its 
considerable influence perhaps now saw APEC as the vehicle to coordinate 
Southeast Asian anti-terrorism support more so than the ARF.  Economic fallout 
from the 2002 and 2003 Bali and Jakarta bombings reinforced the concept that 
“stopping terrorism goes hand in hand with APEC’s goal of promoting economic 
prosperity” (Simon, 2003b). 
Among some of the specific actions recommended by the 2003 APEC 
summit were controls on trade of shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADs), improved 
security of shipping in ports and on the high seas, and better monitoring of cross-
border financing and movements by terrorists.   
The US Bio-Terrorism Act, in force since December 2003, makes it harder 
for countries to ship containers to the US if the exporter does not use 
electronically sealed containers.  Thailand, along with Singapore, committed to 
the program in early 2004.   
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While attending the 2003 summit, President Bush also made the 
announcement that Thailand would now be promoted to the status of “Major Non-
NATO ally,” thus resulting in more favorable arms procurement and military 
assistance and modernization from the US (Simon, 2003b).  It is possible that 
such an action may, in fact, make Thailand, now more closely aligned with the 
US and its War on Terror, a more attractive target for terrorism.  
In an effort to establish better coordination with Malaysia to the south, 
Thailand in March 2004 announced new initiatives to coordinate police and 
security matters with its neighbor.  It was reported following a March 27, 2004 
bombing in a southern border town that left 28 people injured, including eight 
Malaysians, that the attackers had retreated across the border to Malaysia 
denied that the attackers crossed into their country.  However, because of 
administrative “red tape” that does, in fact, hinder pursuit by law enforcement 
personnel on both sides of the border, Malaysia and Thailand agreed to better 
coordinate security policies for cross-border law enforcement.    
On March 30, 2004, Thailand joined the 22 other ARF countries in Manila 
to discuss measures on countering terrorism in transport. This Second Inter-
sessional Meeting of the ARF focused its discussion on exchanged experiences 
in ensuring transport security as well as technical measures to enhance bilateral 
and multilateral coordination to counter terrorism in the region (“Asia-Pacific daily 
news summary,” 2004b). 
See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and 
Strategic Studies in Singapore have presented several valuable, alternative 
considerations in dealing with Southeast Asia’s terrorist threats with regard to 
regional initiatives (2004).  The two analysts first defend what many, including the 
US to a degree, describe as an over-cautious and inadequate anti-terrorist 
response among the ASEAN nations.   Tan and Ramakrishna counter pessimist 
criticism by stating that the reason ASEAN governments may not be “doing 
enough” is because of “certain domestic structural-institutional constraints that 
conceivably hinder regional cooperation” (p.92). This point carries much weight 
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considering that most of the countries in the region simply do not have the 
intelligence funding, resources, agents, and infrastructure that we find among US 
agencies.  In addition, the two researchers point out that “the American [military] 
response to the war on terror may not be at all adequate in neutralizing the terror 
threat within Southeast Asia; in fact, it may even backfire. The embers of radical 
Islamist terrorism can only be doused by the adoption of a comprehensive 
approach that addresses a host of real or perceived social, economic, political 
and ultimately, ideological challenges” (p.92). 
The 2004 APEC summit in Chile vanquished any question of whether or 
not APEC had become a vehicle for security, anti-terrorism, and counter-
proliferation-related issues.   The final communiqué signed by President Bush 
and the other leaders called for an “unmistakable resolve to collectively confront 
the threat of terrorism and its disastrous effects” (Goodenough, 2004). The 
leaders approved many counter-terrorism measures including commercial flight 
safety agreements and shipping initiatives. 
The ASEAN nations have the ability to do more to fight a coordinated 
effort against terrorism, but politics and cultural biases remain an obstacle.  The 
Indonesian government, for example, did not announce until March 2005 that it 
intended to formally outlaw JI (Brummitt, 2005).  Some Indonesian officials still 
refuse to acknowledge that JI exists, even after years of horrific terrorists attacks 
such as those at the JW Marriott and in Bali.  The governments of Islamic 
majority nations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, have shown their awareness 
to tread carefully in condemnation of Islamic militancy.  Instability and violence, 
which is already a very volatile matter in these countries, can be easily ignited if 
the fight against terrorism is conceived as a fight against Islam.  On the other end 
of the spectrum, Thailand, after a weak committal to the War on Terror initially, 
has since aligned itself rather strongly with the US.  In addition to the 
monumental designation as a Major Non-NATO US ally, Thailand has also since 
deployed  units  in  non-combat  roles  to support Operation Iraqi Freedom.  This 
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commitment in itself puts Thailand in harms way, as demonstrated by terrorist 
threats against the Kingdom delivered to Thailand’s embassy in Sweden in April 
2004.   
In addition, Thailand must take advantage of the situations involving 
Muslim extremism in Malaysia and Indonesia to learn about confronting radical 
Islam.  Both countries have offered to provide limited assistance but such offers 
have been rejected by the Thai government.  On November 4, 2004, the ARF 
met in Beijing.  The ARF members requested that Thailand provide the forum 
with an update on the situation in the Thai south since the matter continues to 
draw increased international attention.  Unfortunately, Thailand’s response was 
that the issue remains an internal matter.  Some believe that Thaksin continues 
to keep the situation internal rather than regional for political reasons.  
Regardless of the motivation, the result of rejecting offers of good will from 
neighboring Muslim states is an obstruction of progress and cooperation among 
the ASEAN members (“Why Thailand needs outside help to end conflict,” 2004).  
In later November 2004, PM Thaksin threatened to walk out of the annual 
ASEAN summit held in Laos if the insurgency in Thailand was brought up during 
the meetings. Again, Thaksin’s argument was that the issues in the south were of 
a domestic nature and not the concern of the other member nations. 
The cooperative measures achieved by ASEAN, ARF, and APEC 
demonstrate a genuine concern for stability throughout Southeast Asia.  
Cooperation among the regional nations has led to the arrests of hundreds of 
suspected JI and AQ operatives and leaders.  Through these cooperative forums 
the leaders of all concerned nations have committed themselves to countering 
terrorism, but with varying degrees.  Yet, it is because of these varying degrees 
of commitment and cooperation in the fight against terror that ASEAN, ARF, 
APEC, and other forums designed to promote regional stability have achieved a 
moderate level of success.  Because most of the nations in Southeast Asia, 
including Thailand, have limited resources, it is, therefore, in the US’ interest to 
increase its support of the regional forums.  However, the ultimate success or 
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failure of these various forums in the fight against regional terrorist organizations 
such as JI can only be realized by the cumulative successes that occur within the 
individual nations that make up the forums, with or without external support.     
 
6. Information Operations 
In addition to Thailand’s own internal efforts to implement Information 
Operations (IO) to help combat terrorism, ASEAN and APEC routinely include 
the topic of IO during regional summits as well.   
Regarding cyber-specific security measures, regional workshops held in 
Thailand and supported by the US Department of Justice have, for example, 
implemented plans for 
developing requisite legal frameworks for preventing cyber crime; 
improving law enforcement investigative units with training and 
equipment to investigate and deter computer crime; and increasing 
cooperation between industry and law enforcement agencies to 
reduce the opportunities for abuse of ICTs [Information and 
Communication Technology] (”Supporting regional collaboration on 
cyber-security,” 2003).  
In the area of computer technology, Thailand has unilaterally made efforts 
to confront the problem within its own borders as well. 
The Thai National Intelligence Agency (NIA) has also established a 
Cybersecurity Division, which will be responsible for the NIA's 
investigations related to computer and Internet technology. The 
establishment of this Division was reportedly in reaction to world 
terrorist events such as the September 11, 2001 attacks in the 
United States and local cyber-crimes... (“PHR2004 – The Kingdom 
of Thailand,” 2004). 
But IO should not be limited to the dealings of computer and internet 
activities.  Comprehensive IO must be understood as information management in 
both the virtual and physical worlds.  It encompasses a broad spectrum of 
activities through which terrorist funds can be tracked, financial and social 
networks can be revealed, public diplomacy can be exercised, psychological 
operations (discussed in Chapter 6) can be used to influence both friendly and 
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hostile entities, offensive operations in the cyber-realm can disrupt insurgent 
information channels, and the networking of US, Thai, and regional intelligence 
and military assets through varied communications channels can be achieved. 
Despite the poverty and underdevelopment in the south today, 
globalization has created an interconnectivity that unites even the most remote 
parts of the world.  Thailand’s first car-bomb explosion in February 2005, along 
with the increase in the number of cell phone-detonated bombs, reveals 
similarities among terrorist tactics used in Thailand and elsewhere around the 
world.  The value of developing a comprehensive IO campaign would be worth 
the cost for Thailand.  The United States, with an extensive range of IO assets 
and capabilities can help Thailand in this area of emphasis while at the same 
time developing a more expansive IO network of its own throughout Southeast 
Asia. 
 
7. Maritime Interdiction and Security 
…many emerging threats in the [Southeast Asian] region lie in the 
realm of maritime security.  Weak and underpaid Southeast Asian 
navies and lax port facilities are causing many in the US and 
regional defense sectors to worry that terrorists may begin targeting 
the Straits of Malacca [linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans] and 
generally turn to piracy.  US security cooperation with Southeast 
Asia has traditionally focused on armies, which have been far more 
important politically in the region than navies (“US security relations 
with Southeast Asia: a dual challenge,” 2004, p.1). 
In July 2004, Thailand, the US, and several other Southeast Asian nations 
met in the Republic of the Philippines for a Maritime Threats Workshop.  The 
purpose of this and other similar initiatives was to address the increases in 
maritime transnational threats throughout Southeast Asia.  A US Army War 
College issue paper described the areas of concern addressed during the 
workshop:   
Delegates recommended inserting additional Maritime Security 
Operations/Maritime Interdiction Operations (MSO/MIO) objectives 
into existing bilateral and multilateral exercises in the region 
including [the annual military] CARAT exercise (Malaysia, Thailand, 
 81
Singapore, Indonesia, and U.S.). Offshore facility protection 
objectives could also be added. Regular Civil Military Operations 
should be conducted along the patrol routes to establish 
government presence along the less developed areas of each 
country. An expanded Multilateral Maritime Defense Cooperation 
will be required, especially for those countries that share common 
sea borders, in order to be able to counter the transnational crime, 
alien smuggling, drugs, and terrorism. 
…[the workshop] described five Southeast Asia maritime security 
challenges:  piracy, maritime terrorism, transnational criminal 
trafficking operations, refugees and illegal migration, and protecting 
energy routes…The globalized, hi-technology world order not only 
poses new security challenges, but also spawns a host of global 
transnational threats, which are increasingly maritime in nature 
(Wohlschlegel, Turner, & Butts, 2004, p.1). 
Littoral support for insurgent activity in Thailand is a threat which requires 
coordination with the Kingdom’s neighboring countries throughout Southeast 
Asia to eliminate.  The proximity of Malaysia and Indonesia, which have 
expansive waterway connections as well as a well-known history of connections 
to transnational terrorism, demands that these nations, along with allies like the 
US, develop a stronger cooperation for maritime security.  In 2004 Thailand, 
along with Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore agreed to joint patrols along the 
Malacca Straits following intelligence “suggesting JI intended on either hijacking 
a vessel and blowing it up in the Straits or steering the vessel into [a] port itself” 
(“Anti-terrorism advisory council newsletter,” 2004, p.4).  To date, however, the 
patrols continue to be primarily conducted by Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Singapore.  Proposals from US officials to establish an American naval presence 
in the region, however, have so far received a cool reception from the nations in 
the region that wish to address the problem locally.   
 The threat goes beyond immediate neighbors as well.  In June 2000, Thai 
officials discovered a partially completed submersible at a shipyard in Phuket.  The 
submersible was owned by a known sympathizer to the Sri Lankan insurgent 
group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  Illegal arms trafficking 
through Thailand, in support of illicit drug trading throughout the region, provides 
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one additional support mechanism for insurgents and transnational terrorists to 
acquire the equipment and personnel that they require for sustained operations.  
Thailand has worked to implement recommendations by the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to strengthen maritime security.  This has included 
the installation of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) on newly built ships and 
other tracking measures.  At APEC and ASEAN summits in 2003 and 2004, 
Southeast Asian leaders, along with the US, have recommended and approved 
multilateral security measures for sea ports as well as several other counter-
terrorism maritime shipping initiatives.  The US and Thailand also exercise 
maritime interdiction activities during the annual Cobra Gold training exercises. 
Throughout all of Southeast Asia, Singapore and Malaysia are the only two 
nations that have coast guards.  Considering the fact that Thailand has over 1,999 
miles of coastline and a known history of illegal transnational maritime operations, 
development of a Thai Coast Guard to protect and monitor the littoral activities in 
and out of the Kingdom seems both practical and necessary. 
The issue of maritime security remains one in which the Kingdom must 
build a greater internal capacity for government and international cooperation to 
suppress transnational terrorist activities through and along the Kingdoms 
extensive coastlines.  For its part, the US must continue to promote multilateral 
cooperation for security with Thailand and its regional neighbors.   
 
8. Military Options 
Among Thai military and police forces, assignments to the southern 
provinces have historically been given to underachieving or less politically-
connected officers who are not deemed worthy of assignments in other more 
prestigious, important parts of the country.  This is a double edged sword for the 
Thai government:  Although substandard officers assigned to the south 
intentionally do not receive the recognition that other officers get in more 
prominent locations, these less competent officials further exacerbate the 
problems associated with the Islamic insurgency there.  It would seem 
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appropriate that, given the seriousness of the insurgency in the south, the most 
capable and talented security officials in the country should be employed in the 
south. 
According to a March 2004 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment article 
titled “Executive Summary: Thailand,” the rivalry between the police and Royal 
Thai Army (RTA) over which authority should oversee the south’s security 
operations has actually resulted in offshoot parts of the RTA supporting violence 
in the region.  “Rogue RTA elements, angered by the loss of budget and perks 
implicit in the dissolution of CPM-43 (a civilian-police-military security command 
controlled by the RTA's 4th [Southern] Army Region), were accused of 
reactivating and paying surrendered ex-separatists to undertake hits” (“Executive 
Summary: Thailand,” 2004). 
In March 2004, Thailand’s national police chief and the southern regional 
army commander were fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the 
Muslim-dominated south.  The Thai government was again reacting to increased 
domestic pressure to address the problem of Muslim unrest within the country’s 
borders.  In early March 2005, A Tak Bai investigation panel announced that 
three senior army commanders in the south would be removed from their 
positions as punishment for the incident which resulted in 78 deaths in October 
2004. The practice of hiring and firing police and military officials is a routine 
affair that usually occurs after a major violent incident in the south.  It is often 
done to give the Thai people the impression that somehow a new officer in 
charge will solve the problems of insurgency in the south. While ineffective 
attempts to put more competent individuals in charge occur often, the violence 
continues unabated.   
In an April 2004 Bangkok University poll of over 1,000 Muslims, the Thai 
military ranked first as the state agency causing the most problems for the 
southern people, followed by the police, local administrative organizations, and 
finally village headmen (“City Muslims don't see eye to eye with 'eye for an eye' 
policy”, 2004). 
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Today, Thailand is fully engaged in military-to-military cooperation with the 
US.  The Thais and the US “have a vigorous joint military exercise program, 
averaging some 40 joint exercises per year” (Arkin, 2005, p.219).  It is in the area 
of developing a more effective and professional counterinsurgency capability, 
however, that Thailand could benefit most from a re-evaluation of training and 
assistance programs provided by the US military.  Today, US Army Special 
Forces (SF), or Green Berets, rotate regularly through Thailand in order to train, 
advise, and assist the Thai military and Border Patrol Police during Cobra Gold 
exercises, Joint and Combined Exchange Training (JCET), Counter-Drug 
training, Counter-Terrorism training, Joint-Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and other small-
unit exercises in support of US-Thai security interests.   
The location of US military and Other Government Agency (OGA) 
personnel and training, with regard to the southern insurgency, however, is a 
topic of debate.  There have been conflicting views among US agencies as to 
whether or not US personnel - CIA, Special Forces, and others – should be 
directly used in the south to assist the counterinsurgency.  While there are many 
benefits that can be gained by conducting operations and training security forces 
in the actual region where the insurgency exists, such activities have the 
potential to inflame the situation as well.  The reason some argue for a cautioned 
engagement strategy is that, as analyzed by US and Thai academic, military, and 
government officials, there is a growing conspiracy theory in the south that US 
agencies – the CIA and Special Forces, among others – are somehow inciting 
the violence in order to justify bringing the War on Terror to southern Thailand 
(Pathan, D., 2004; interview with anonymous US government agency officials in 
Bangkok, Thailand, September 12-17, 2004; and Wattanayagorn, 2004).  When 
analyzed, the concept behind such a conspiracy theory is quite effective for the 
insurgents:  If US agencies are overtly introduced to the south, such action 
reinforces the conspiracy theory.  In the mean time, fear of confirming the 
conspiracy theory (along with other reasons, such as risk aversion) prevents US 
intervention.   
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In November 2004, a former commander of the Thai military contingent in 
Iraq returned to Thailand and was sent to the southern provinces to explain to 
Muslim leaders why Thai troops deployed to Iraq.  Colonel Montree Umaree said 
that he would create an understanding of the troops’ mission there and explain 
that the humanitarian goals of the contingent were not to “help the US Army” 
(Nanuam, 2004k).  The Colonel noted that many Muslims in the South did not 
understand why the government decided to send troops to Iraq. 
The Thai government, with the cooperation of the US, has to this point 
rejected the option of sending any direct US military or other-agency personnel to 
the southern provinces.  US Army Colonel Barry Shapiro, former Transnational 
Studies Department Chairman at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in 
Hawaii describes reason behind the Thai government’s decision:   
Thailand has long hosted Cobra Gold (and other exercises) and 
requested U.S. military support to counter-drug efforts because all 
were seen as necessary to Thai national security, and raised little 
domestic opposition. But an effort [such as introduction of US Army 
Special Forces] in the Southern three provinces is more likely to 
achieve the opposite effect of what [the US] hope[s] for. The 
complex problems that combine to create the conditions in 
Southern Thailand have been around a long time. What is new is 
the dimension of globalization: the connections between a militant 
Muslim extremist in Pattani and Riyadh may be debatable, but that 
their actions and concerns are seen and felt by Muslims across the 
world in real-time is undeniable. Direct involvement of U.S. forces 
would only enhance the dangerously popular perception of a U.S.-
led war on Islam, a perception we urgently need to turn around. 
Thai leaders and policy makers have been worthy allies both before 
and after 9-11. They have contributed in many ways to the Global 
War on Terrorism despite public reservation and protests from 
Muslim southerners. "Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global 
Terrorism and Work to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our 
Friends. Work with others to Defuse Regional Conflicts." These 
words come straight out of our National Security Strategy 
document. I spent a year in Afghanistan where the direct approach 
was and remains necessary, but the situation in Southern Thailand 
is far removed from that set of circumstances. Thailand knows well 
that  counterinsurgency  is  only  successful  when  the  host  nation  
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takes full ownership of the effort. [The US] must not make it difficult 
for our friends and allies to do so (personal communication, August 
24, 2004). 
While there is a definite need for close military-to-military and other-
agency training operations, including Special Forces, it would appear that for 
now, such missions are better suited to occur in regions of Thailand other than 
the south.   
It may be possible, however, to locate such personnel and activities in the 
southern provinces at a later time.  Because of their specialized cultural, regional, 
and language skills, Special Forces have the ability to work among indigenous 
populations in the most challenging political and physical environments.   
Because of the benefits that these forces can bring to a region, such as creating 
a more responsible security force and a more stable environment to live in, 
Special Forces have demonstrated in the past – in the Philippines and 
Afghanistan, for example – that they are capable of overcoming the cultural 
mistrust that may initially exist between indigenous Muslim populations and SF.  
The move to employ Army Special Forces to the south should, at a minimum, be 
planned for and kept as one option for Thailand and the US to act upon in the 
future. 
Aside from a direct engagement strategy in southern Thailand at the 
present time, a more permanent SF presence elsewhere in the country would be 
effective in assisting the Kingdom to train police and military personnel in 
counterinsurgency operations aimed at gaining trust, support, and most 
importantly - intelligence - from the local population.  Dependent, of course, upon 
Thai cooperation for such action, a more permanent SF presence in Thailand 
could involve forward basing of SF units in country - very similar to the permanent 
basing of Green Berets in the Kingdom during the Vietnam era.  SF units would be 
permanently assigned to advisory roles among Thai military forces throughout the 
country.  Additionally, at a strategic level, assigning Special Forces liaison 
personnel among key government agencies and military organizations in Bangkok 
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and other key cities would facilitate increased coordination and action channels 
between Thai, US, and other Southeast Asian national agencies.   
By basing US Special Forces in Thailand, with the Thai government’s 
support, the US would also improve its ability to respond to other War on Terror 
contingencies throughout Southeast Asia. 
 
C. CONCLUSION 
The areas of emphasis discussed in this chapter outline some of the 
major initiatives that are currently being focused on by Thailand, the US, and 
other Southeast Asian nations. What becomes evident by examining current 
Thai, US, and regional policies and initiatives listed in this chapter is the 
importance of a multifaceted counterinsurgency strategy.  Unfortunately, the 
majority of Thailand’s emphasis today is on security force operations alone.  
Instead of such a narrowly focused strategy, the next chapter in this thesis will 
recommend a more expansive solution strategy encompassing several 
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VI. RECOMMENDED SOLUTION STRATEGY 
Any successful counterinsurgency depends on timely and accurate 
intelligence.  Without intelligence, all other tools and power that a nation or 
coalition might have can not be focused and implemented in an effective manner.  
While it should be understood that timely and accurate intelligence is the primary 
requirement to implementing strategy, it is equally significant to accept that in an 
insurgency, the population of a state or region is the conduit through which such 
intelligence is gathered. 
A great deal of this thesis is admittedly focused on the internal insurgency 
in the south of Thailand.  Detailed throughout this thesis, however, is the 
realization that the transnational and internal threats in Thailand are related in 
many ways.  This chapter provides recommendations for a solution strategy that 
at some points is directed toward only one threat or the other, but in most cases 
directly affects both. 
 
A. UNDERSTANDING THE POPULATION  
…authorities say they still have no clear picture of who is instigating 
the violence…Security officers and Muslim community leaders say 
they are baffled and are finding it almost impossible to fight, let 
alone negotiate, with the phantom enemy (Barton, 2004). 
As evidenced throughout this thesis, an important problem with 
implementing an effective counterinsurgency strategy in Thailand is a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the people involved with both transnational 
terrorism and insurgency there.  After decades of militant separatism and more 
than three years since a global Islamic insurgency swept the world following 
September 11th, the Thai government to this day does not understand the basic 
social dynamics behind the threats in the Kingdom.  Since the outbreak of 
violence in January 2004, Bangkok has blamed the violence on drug addicts, 
radical Islamic school teachers, gun smugglers, corrupt politicians and security 
forces, separatists, bandits, and criminal gangs.  Fundamental questions still 
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exist about who is in charge, how many insurgents are there, what is the role of 
external support to the insurgency, do members of one particular insurgent group 
overlap into other groups, and what are the critical personal ties and relationships 
that allow for the insurgency to continue uninhibited?  Sirichai Thanyasari, a 
senior Royal Thai Army officer stated in November 2004, “I admit I don’t know 
who the enemy is but I will try my best to get him” (McGirk, 2004). 
In order to conduct an effective counterinsurgency that embraces the 
population that chooses to either support or reject the violence in the south, the 
government must understand that population. A basic government analysis of the 
social networks that exist among the radical Islamic organizations in the south is 
equally important.  It seems that when targeting militants, the Thai government 
sees all militants as the same.  Analysis of the personalities and relationships 
within insurgent groups can help reveal who are the leaders, operators, and 
supporters of the insurgency.  Social analysis also reveals where the critical 
communications bridges and gaps exist that can be taken advantage of by 
government agencies.  Understanding the social networks that fuel an 
insurgency can be very useful in developing a proper counterinsurgency strategy.  
While leaders of fundamentalist organizations may be motivated by ideological 
principles which are difficult to change, operators and supporters of the 
insurgency may have less founded motivations that can be manipulated with 
creative incentives.  Such manipulation and pseudo-cooperation with supporters 
and operators can often lead to the gathering of valuable information and 
intelligence needed for effective counterinsurgency operations. 
Simultaneously, the government has not realized the importance of 
mapping out the interpersonal dynamics that allow transnational terrorist 
organizations such as JI to enter the Kingdom and establish legal and illegal 
associations with Thai nationals who potentially support terrorist activities.   
Network analysis can help the Thai government better understand the 
personal dimensions involved with domestic threats, transnational threats, and 
any possible links between the two.  Social network analysis is also a useful tool 
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for understanding the friendly population that does not support radical Islam but 
may be influenced by it in the future.  Mapping out and analyzing the social 
networks that have been developed over space and time among suspected 
individuals inside and outside the Kingdom may allow the Thai government to 
gain valuable information that can be translated into a national solution strategy 
that prescribes practical measures, instead of abstract ideas, to achieve success 
in combating both the insurgency and transnational terrorism. By understanding 
the concerned populations and communities involved, the government can then 
commit the appropriate time and resources aimed the population, the support 
mechanisms that connect the population to insurgents/terrorists, or the 
insurgents/terrorists themselves.   
While the nature of the violence in the Thai south may have shifted from 
separatism to a form of Islamic revolution, analysis of old ties and relationships 
can still provide useful information relevant to today’s radical Islamic activities in 
the country.  Social ties created over several decades of Islamic secessionist 
movements in the south, to include networking that has occurred between 
insurgents in Thailand and international support elements over the years, can be 
useful in determining possible links to the new transnational threats that operate 
in the Kingdom. 
 
B. FOCUSING EFFORTS ON THE POPULATION   
In “Theories of Terrorism:  Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” 
Martha Crenshaw (1988) says that, “with regard to creating opportunities for exit 
[from terrorist organizations], governments would be advised to consider the 
wisdom of severe legal penalties for membership in certain underground 
organizations” (p.25).  The Thai government, in fact, has attempted on several 
occasions a more lenient policy toward suspected insurgents who turn 
themselves in to authorities.  In July of 2004, the government did just that.  July 
11, 2004 was the deadline set by the government for suspects to report to 
authorities under a new amnesty program.  Those who surrendered would be 
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admitted to regional army camps for re-education and behavioral reform before 
being released.  Those suspected insurgents who did not surrender would be 
pursued, interrogated, and detained for seven days under martial law.  They 
would then be handed over to police and tried in civilian criminal courts.   
Between 100 and 150 suspects surrendered to police prior to the deadline. 
While the July 2004 policy seemed like a productive tool to help end the 
violence in the south, government policies and tactics over the years have 
traditionally been less accommodating.  As a result of the harsh tactics more 
commonly used by southern security forces, the price of exit from insurgent 
organizations in southern Thailand is potentially greater than the price of staying.  
As Crenshaw (1988) has said, “Increasing the costs of joining a terrorist 
organization may restrain some prospective entrants, but establishing high 
entrance fees also inhibits exit.  Offers of amnesty can further motivate exit as 
well as create suspicion and distrust within the organization” (p.25).  In addition 
to no longer fearing security force pursuit, offers of monetary reward for turning in 
other insurgents is an additional incentive to those considering surrender.   
The problem with amnesty programs is the motivation for the violence in 
the first place.  Understanding the insurgent mechanism in southern Thailand 
reveals that the motivation for some is an ideological one.  And unlike separatists 
of the past, the Thai Muslims of today are not necessarily in pursuit of a separate 
state that can be achieved by redrawing boundaries.  Many Malay Muslims in the 
south, influenced by the relative success of today’s global insurgency, have 
concluded that violence is a tool that can help achieve a desire for recognition of 
their Muslim identity in a country dominated by Thai Buddhism.  A situation such 
as this is one in which Crenshaw admits that an amnesty policy that offers 
rewards for surrender may be less effective.  As Crenshaw (1988) notes, “the 
government may find it difficult to find satisfactory substitutes [such as monetary 
reward or other incentives] unless non-violent organizations with identical 
purposes exist” (p.25).  In the case of Thailand, no such substitutes exist, and in 
that regard, the creation of a government-sponsored substitute organization that 
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peacefully promotes Malay Muslim identity is something that should not be 
dismissed.  In the interim, Crenshaw (1988) suggests targeting the 
terrorist/insurgent organizational system:  
It would probably be easier to affect recruitment (remembering that 
not all organizations are equally dependant on steady supplies of 
new members) and support functions by influencing the attitudes of 
sympathizers than by directly undermining the loyalty of 
indoctrinated activists.  The incentive structures for sympathizers 
are probably weaker than for active members (p.26). 
 Regardless of the flaws in amnesty programs when ideological values 
such as religious identity and culture are involved, the Thai government should 
not abandon attempts at using such tactics.  While a percentage of the militant 
population is undoubtedly incapable of persuasion by material rewards, a certain 
percentage can most likely be “bought”.  Considering the well-known levels of 
unemployment, economic underdevelopment, and hardship that many in the 
south experience, monetary incentives for surrender to authorities is likely to 
produce some useful results.  Even in situations where the individual who 
surrenders may not be of much importance, he may have information on others 
who are more influential in insurgent organizations.   
 For those who can not be influenced by monetary or other incentives, as is 
usually the case with key leaders in terrorist and insurgent organizations, the 
government must find alternative approaches to dismantling the militant 
infrastructure.  Donatella Della Porta (1995), author of Social Movements, 
Political Violence, and the State:  A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, 
examined the “downward spiral” that underground organizations can experience 
and governments can exploit.  In general, Della Porta explains that as 
organizations become more clandestine as a result of increased government 
pressure, the group inherently becomes more cut off from the people it requires 
for recruiting and resources.  Because of the increased need for secrecy, the 
underground organizations, such as those in southern Thailand, can not afford to 
trust everyone for fear of becoming exposed to government security forces.  Over 
time, the underground organization, according to Dell Porta, becomes less 
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concerned with propaganda aimed at the people (external focus) and more 
concerned with simple survival of the organization (internal focus) because 
resources are scarcer.  A component of this internal focus is on maintenance of 
the organization:  dealing with dissent and fissures among the members.  As time 
continues, the group adjusts its limited assets from changing government policies 
to attacking the government directly.  This often takes the form of robbing banks, 
killing government employees, killing “non-combatants” such as tourists and 
business people, etc.  If one looks at the situation in the Thai south today, this 
“downward spiral” that Dell Porta describes seems like a very appropriate 
description of events.  In the end, Della Porta explains that members of the 
underground organizations look more like criminals and less like political 
activists.  They become stigmatized, isolated, paranoid, and put up more barriers 
between them and the people that they originally intended to influence.  This 
process is the “downward spiral” that Dell Porta describes (pp.113-135). 
 In the Thai south, it would seem that many of the insurgent organizations 
have gone the way of isolation and inward focus since many southern Muslims 
witness violence but with no legitimate purpose.  Unfortunately, the Thai 
government has not taken advantage of this situation.  While the insurgents 
continue to embrace reckless violence, the administration must implement an 
effective civil affairs (CA) and psychological operations (PSYOP) campaign that 
establishes the government’s role in protecting and supporting the people while 
simultaneously highlighting the insurgents’ use of indiscriminate terrorism aimed 
at innocent people.  The government, however, has instead continued along with 
an unrelenting use of military force with little or no effective CA/PYSOP.  The 
result of this ineffective strategy has been further alienation of the Malay Muslim 
population along with a complete misunderstanding of the insurgent mechanism 
in the south. 
Usually after months and/or years of violence and insurgency in a region, 
the government can identify some semblance of insurgent organization and 
infrastructure information.  Since January 2004, when the most significant 
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violence in the south started, the Thai government has remained incapable of 
understanding the insurgent organizations that cause violence on a daily basis.  
Since early 2004, there have been widely varying claims by government officials 
about the sources of leadership, funding, resourcing, recruiting, and ideology 
behind the violence in the south.  The organizations appear to be very much 
isolated.  If Della Porta’s model is correct, this insurgent organization isolation 
would indicate that the local population is just as isolated from the militants as the 
government is.   
 As a result of Della Porta’s analysis, it then seems reasonable that the 
Thai government must continue to exert pressure from the security forces onto 
the population in the south in order to keep the militants underground and 
struggling.  A critical caveat to such a claim is that the government must achieve 
a level of Muslim cultural awareness, and adherence to accepted human rights 
standards, while attempting to drive the insurgents underground.  If cultural 
awareness is not achieved, the government can not identify with the local 
population that potentially supports the insurgency.  Occasional amnesty 
programs, like those described by Crenshaw, also have their place.  A 
combination of strategies that involve granting leniency and driving the south’s 
militant organizations further underground will help to keep insurgents relatively 
ineffective.  While violence in the south has claimed more than 600 lives since 
January 2004, it has at least remained isolated to the southern provinces for the 
time being.   
 And so an interim conclusion that can be drawn is that the Thai 
government is doing what it should be to prevent the growth of militant Islamic 
organizations by continuing to drive them underground with security force 
operations.  The lingering problem, however, is how to actually eliminate the 
existence of the organizations so that stability can be restored, all while 
respecting the culture and rights of the local communities?  
As is the case with any successful counterinsurgency effort, the answer to 
this question is found among the people.  Dr. David Tucker of the Naval 
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Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA, has deconstructed Crenshaw’s “Theories 
of Terrorism:  Instrumental and Organizational Approaches” into a simple 
equation that proves useful here.  The equation is simply Entrepreneurs (terrorist 
leaders) plus mobilizable resources (people, money, weapons, etc.) plus 
legitimate ideas equal a terrorist organization (Tucker, 2004).  It is often difficult 
for any government to obtain intelligence that is accurate and timely enough to 
target actual insurgent leaders.  What is more productive and cost beneficial is to 
focus government efforts on the people, or “mobilizable resources” that are 
critical to both the insurgents and the counter-insurgents.  Without such 
mobilizable resources, the terrorist organization becomes increasingly isolated, 
ineffective, and eventually disintegrates.  If the organization does not disintegrate 
but falls below the threshold of effectiveness, then the government has more 
than likely achieved all it needs to eliminate real problems.    At no time will a 
government be able to completely eliminate dissent among its population.   
However, once the insurgent organization is forced below its threshold of 
effectiveness, the government must continue to monitor and enforce policies that 
will maintain or continue to weaken the insurgents’ position. 
Dr. Gordon McCormick of the Naval Postgraduate School has developed 
a counterinsurgency model that depicts the correlation between the key actors in 
an insurgency (Figure 4.).  The model, dubbed the “Mystic Diamond,” includes 
the population of a state (the Malay Muslims of southern Thailand), the state (the 
Thai government, or the counterinsurgents), the counter-state (the Thai 
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Figure 4.   The “Mystic Diamond” Counterinsurgency Model by  Dr. Gordon 
McCormick (2004).  
 
From the model it is understood that the most effective strategy for the 
insurgents is to first focus effort on the population to gather support, then target 
the connections or conversion mechanisms that link the population to the 
government, and finally the government itself.  This strategy, in this order 
respectively, is depicted as actions 1,2, and 3 in Figure 4.  Similarly, the most 
effective strategy for the state is to first focus effort on the population  in order to 
gain support, then target the links that allow the population to support the 
insurgents, and finally to target the individual insurgents themselves.  This 
strategy is depicted as actions A, B, and C in Figure 4.   
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As is often the case in insurgency, both sides do not apply their optimal 
strategy.  Instead of a “1,2,3” strategy, insurgents often apply a “3,2,1” strategy 
by focusing their attacks directly on the government and symbols of the 
government.  As Della Porta explained, such a strategy does not fare well with 
the population as the insurgent organization begins to look more like a criminal 
gang and less like a political activist group.   
Likewise, the government in an insurgency often incorrectly focuses its 
efforts directly on the insurgents and not on the population that provides the 
critical support necessary for the insurgency to exist.  Without accurate 
intelligence gained from a well-informed local population, the government often 
attacks suspected insurgents.  The result is that innocent or less important 
people within the insurgent organization get hurt or killed.  The outcome of such 
a defective strategy is reinforcement of the insurgent organization and its 
propaganda. 
In southern Thailand today, these ineffective, reverse strategies (“3,2,1” 
instead of “1,2,3” by the insurgency, and “C,B,A” instead of “A,B,C” by the 
government) on the part of both the government and the insurgents are 
evidenced on nearly a daily basis.  Insurgents are continuously blowing up 
government-related facilities and people, and the security forces are constantly 
detaining or killing suspected insurgents.  Neither side is effectively focusing their 
efforts on the population.  The result for the insurgents is a lack of growth, 
support, and effectiveness.  The result for the government is continued violence 
and reinforcement of a defective counterinsurgency effort that costs the 
government scarce resources. 
A strategy that incorporates well-planned security operations and amnesty 
programs is effective.  The most important component for the Thai government 
strategy, as seen in McCormick’s model, is a deliberate focus on the Malay 
Muslim population and not on individual insurgents.  Incidentally, this focus does 
not revolve around the injection of money into the region or allowing Muslims to 
speak their own language or pray in public.  While such accommodations help 
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the situation, they are generally regarded by the population as the types of things 
a government is supposed to do anyway. More to the point, the Thai government 
must rise above its own self interest and make a genuine shift from a national 
unity that fundamentally accepts only the Buddhist culture to one that 
acknowledges and allows for the embracing of Malay Muslim culture as well.  
Only then will the government truly identify with and win the support of the 
“mobilizable resources” that Della Porta describes.  Without the support of the 
people, the insurgency can no longer function.  Such efforts on the part of the 
government take time but must nevertheless be pursued indefinitely in order to 
achieve success in the south.   
 
C. THREAT GROWTH AND REDUCTION FACTORS:  ELIMINATING THE 
THREATS 
As demonstrated in this thesis, there is not a distinct line between the 
domestic and the transnational threats present today.  Some specific policies, 
however, are necessarily directed more toward targeting one or the other of the 
two threats.  This thesis has shown that there is a need for reform of both Thai 
and US policies dealing with intelligence operations, illegal document production, 
weapons and drug smuggling, immigration procedures, police and military 
strategies, anti-corruption, and money laundering.  Recommended Thai and US 
solution strategies have so far been identified that, if implemented, will reduce 
the threats of insurgency and transnational terrorism in Thailand.  Other 
government activities and policy deficiencies identified in this thesis have the 
potential to stimulate further insurgency and terrorism if not addressed properly.  
This growth and reduction of threats occurs within the unique context of 
Southeast Asian regional influences, Thai-Muslim cultural idiosyncrasies, Thai-
Buddhist cultural idiosyncrasies, and western influences.  Put into practical 
terms, if the growth of internal Islamic insurgency in southern Thailand continues 
to flourish, such growth makes the opportunities for transnational intervention 
greater by way of an increased support base among the disenfranchised Muslim 
population.  More specifically, if the actual number of southern insurgents grows 
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from a jihadi motivation or continued dissatisfaction with the Thai government, 
the transnational target recruiting population that already has a militant, 
impressionable outlook increases as well.  A summary model of the effects of 
these threat “growth” and “reduction” factors, which have been described in detail 





























































































































Figure 5.   Threat Growth and Reduction Factors 
 
Only after significant government reform and implementation of the threat 
reduction factors described in Figure 5 will Thailand a) no longer exist as a safe 
haven for transnational terrorists and their infrastructure and b) eliminate the 
internal insurgency that exists in the southern provinces. 
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D. A NEED FOR STRATEGY CHANGE  
In order to apply the initiatives discussed in this chapter, there must be an 
acceptance by Thailand, the US, ASEAN, and all other interested parties that 
current anti-terrorism/counterinsurgency policies in the Kingdom need 
reevaluation.  It is unfortunately very difficult for any organization to accept the 
need for strategic innovation.  In her work Innovation:  Decision Points in the 
Trajectory of Terrorism, Martha Crenshaw (2001) states, “…strategic innovation 
requires both a new goal and a new way of relating operations to that goal.  
Thus, it is logical to expect that strategic innovation is the exception; it will occur 
rarely.” 
To date, the Thai approach to dealing with the southern insurgency in the 
south has remained focused on direct action aimed at killing or capturing 
insurgents.  Nowhere in the execution of security and stability operations has 
consideration been given to destroying the insurgent/terrorist support base with 
anything other than military and law enforcement measures.  Reinforcing failure, 
or at least a lack of success, is obviously counter-productive, yet it is still 
occurring in the Kingdom today.  The ineffective solution strategy implemented 
by the Thai government includes the continuous cycle of hiring and firing of 
military commanders and establishing countless government committees and 
forming new military task forces.  While Crenshaw (2001) focuses her analysis of 
innovation on terrorist strategy, the same measures of analysis can be applied to 
Thailand and its allies’ strategic innovation, or lack thereof.  It is arguable that 
Thailand may not have an actual national strategic goal for dealing with terrorists 
and insurgents.  However, observation of government activities throughout 2004 
shows that the implicit strategic goal of the Thai government is to kill or capture 
militants in order to create a stable and secure environment.  Despite occasional 
accommodation and amnesty programs, it is also generally accepted through 
observation of government operations that the goal of the Thai security forces is 
not to understand the motivation of, or to reform, those who incite violence.   
In accordance with Crenshaw’s (2001) writing, the three areas of concern 
in a situation such as this are strategy, operations used to accomplish that 
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strategy, and the measurements of effectiveness (MOE) used to determine 
whether or not the strategic goal is being accomplished.  Applying the model to 
the problems in Thailand, it is clear that the government’s strategic goal today is 
the same today as it was when separatists were active in the 1980s and 1990s.  
It is also the same as it has been since the violence erupted in the south in early 
2004:  to kill and capture the individuals who are causing the violence.  The MOE 
used to determine whether or not the strategy has been successful is the number 
of insurgents/terrorists that have been killed/captured.  The operation used to 
accomplish the strategic goal has been conventional military action.  Since 
insurgents remain at large and still able to instigate violence, Thailand reinforces 
the conventional effort (the operations) in order to raise the number of insurgents 
killed/captured (the MOE) so that the strategic goal of eliminating 
terrorists/insurgents can be met.  As Crenshaw (2001) says, if the strategic goal 
is not met, the tendency is to increase the number or intensity of the same type 
of operations, measured by the same MOE, without reevaluating the 
appropriateness of the strategic goal.  
Applied to the Thai model, once the Thai government (implicitly) decided  
on its strategy to eliminate insurgents/terrorists, the operations and MOE to 
accomplish that strategy were created.  The message that Crenshaw (2001) 
conveys is that regardless of whether or not the strategy used is the optimal one, 
changes are more often only made to operations and MOE while strategic 
innovation is not considered.   Simply stated, the Thai government should re-
evaluate its strategic goal of eliminating insurgents/terrorists.  While this strategy 
is not stated anywhere as an official one, it is in fact the one routinely 
demonstrated through new legislation and security force operations.  Operations 
have, therefore, become those that target insurgents/terrorists, with an MOE that 
is the number of insurgents/terrorists eliminated.  This MOE and operations to 
support it are likewise not stated in any official government policy but implicitly 
expressed by security force action that either detains or eliminates those people 
who are associated with violence in the Kingdom.  Unfortunately in Thailand and 
 103
other places associated with the US Global War on Terror (GWOT), the strategy, 
operations, and MOE are all associated with numbers killed/captured and not 
with whether or not the insurgency is growing or diminishing.  Since Thailand is in 
fact dealing with both transnational insurgents, such as Hambali, and “domestic” 
insurgents in the south, a more appropriate strategy would be one that targets 
the growth of insurgency rather than individual insurgents.  The killing of some 80 
protestors during the 2004 Tak Bai incident, for example, more than likely 
motivated a portion of Thai Muslims to either support the insurgency or at least 
reject supporting the government. 
By adapting the general theme of Martha Crenshaw’s work, the Thai 
government should at least consider a new strategic goal since violence and the 
potential for transnational influence in Thailand are problems that remain 
unsolved.  Instead of the current strategy that focuses on insurgents/ militants/ 
terrorists being killed or captured, the Thai (and GWOT) should more fittingly be 
focused on whether the insurgency increases or decreases as a result of 
government action and policy.   
 
E. PRACTICAL MEASURES TO BE TAKEN NOW 
The theories and models discussed to this point are critical to the 
development of an overall, comprehensive, national solution strategy.  Such a 
strategy, which does not exist solely on the foundation of direct action used by 
security forces focused on killing/capturing insurgents, does not exist at this time 
in Thailand.  Despite rhetoric there is presently no published, agreed-upon, 
overarching counterinsurgency/counter-terrorism strategy in the Kingdom of 
Thailand.  For a country that is currently engaged in a full-blown – albeit localized 
– insurgency that has taken more than 600 lives in less that a year and a half, it 
seems reasonable that a national strategy is necessary.  The drafting and 
development  of such a strategy that all government agencies agree upon would,  
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at a minimum, force a cooperation of government agencies that to this point are 
not coordinated.  The models presented so far in this chapter can assist in 
developing such a strategy. 
Some of the obstacles to be overcome so that a comprehensive national 
counter-terrorism/counterinsurgency strategy in Thailand can be successful will 
no doubt take time.  A strategy that intends to eliminate money-laundering and 
corruption among government officials, for example, may take decades to realize 
success (if it is possible at all).  There are, however, some objectives, such as 
gathering better intelligence and improving immigration policies, which can be 
implemented expeditiously with relatively practical measures.  Some of the 
actions recommended below speak directly to several of the “Threat Growth and 
Reduction Factors” highlighted in Figure 5.  Recommended actions include:  
  
1. Internal Insurgency 
• Recruit military, paramilitary, police, and government officials 
specifically from the local Malay Muslim population in the south 
(This will admittedly require a change in government recruitment 
policy). 
• Improve government-sponsored employment training and 
education to enable Malay Muslims to be competitive with Thai 
Buddhists in Thai society.  
• Use local Islamic leaders to develop and support government-
sponsored regulation of Islamic schools (Pondoks). 
• Give local Muslim leaders in the south more authority in 
determining where development funding can best be used. 
• Include Malay Muslim history in all school history curriculums 
throughout Thailand. 
• Emphasize a Thai nationalism that embraces all religions and 
cultures of all Thai citizens. 
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• Give greater emphasis to southern Muslim human intelligence 
sources. 
• Develop more efficient joint cross-border security practices with 
Malaysia.  This implies improving the currently strained diplomatic 
relations between Thailand and Malaysia. 
• Release the development funding for the south that has been 
withheld. 
• Aggressively pursue the elimination of government and military 
corruption. 
 
2. Transnational Terrorism 
• Reduce US, Thai, and ASEAN restrictions on intelligence sharing.  
This must include information regarding the activities, finances, 
travel, and networks of known and suspected terrorists. 
• Conduct a multi-lateral Information Operations campaign that is 
both offensive and defensive in nature.  The goal should be to 
protect and develop friendly information management while 
monitoring and, when necessary, taking aggressive action against 
terrorist information activities. 
• Emphasize greater cooperation and inter-agency work with Islamic 
Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Indonesia.  These 
countries have a great deal of experience with Islamic 
fundamentalism that can benefit Thailand. 
• Create forward staging of US Special Operations Forces to better 
develop Thai and Southeast Asian counterinsurgency capabilities 
and interagency cooperation. 
• Re-evaluate immigration laws, and airport enforcement of such 
laws, which currently allow easy transit through, and stopping in, 
Thailand.  
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• Develop more effective multi-lateral maritime security initiatives 
locally as well as among Southeast Asian and other ally nations.  
 
F. CONCLUSION 
This solution strategy chapter inherently demonstrates the importance of 
using all instruments of national power and statecraft to reduce the effects of 
insurgency and terrorism.  The practical measures listed here can and should be 
taken to address the immediate problems in Thailand today.  At the same time, a 
well thought-out, long-range national strategy, coordinated with regional and 
other ally nations such as the US, must be developed for lasting security to be 
possible.   For the US, the priority must be to use all elements of national power 
to develop more effective multi-lateral security initiatives throughout Southeast 
Asia.  Individual countries in the region, such as Thailand, simply do not have the 










Islamic fundamentalist activities in Thailand today involve both internal 
and transnational insurgents who are willing to use terrorism among other tactics 
to achieve greater ideological aspirations.  The Thai government remains in 
denial and has chosen to not acknowledge that the problems in the Kingdom are 
related to a global Islamic insurgency that involves much more than the relatively 
simple remnants of a secessionist movement from the past.  The combination of 
Thai Buddhist nationalism and a lack of a comprehensive national counter-
insurgency strategy have contributed to inadequate, poorly thought-out, short 
term fixes that do not address the dynamic requirements necessary for 
eliminating internal and transnational Islamic extremism.  Similarly, a force-on-
force approach used by military, police, and paramilitary organizations, especially 
in the Muslim-dominated south, does not address numerous demands that a 
successful counter-insurgency requires.  Direct action on the part of security 
forces is unquestionably necessary at times, but it should not be the standard.  
While the Thai government occasionally turns to initiatives other than those 
focused on security force operations, direct action targeting militants remains the 
Thai government’s primary device for confronting instability in the Kingdom.  
Also demonstrated in this thesis is the reality that the United States has a 
long-standing, established interest in supporting Thailand’s security and 
prosperity.   This interest spans the entire spectrum of foreign relations, including 
diplomatic cooperation, intelligence sharing, economic partnerships, and military 
engagement strategies.  It is because of these commitments that the US should 
re-evaluate policy deficiencies and do all that it can to strengthen this very 
important and influential ally in Southeast Asia. 
Regional cooperative efforts such as those outlined by ASEAN and APEC 
are necessary tools to stop the threat of insurgency and terrorism in Southeast 
Asia.  Building trust, which has been a missing ingredient among neighbors in 
Asia for centuries, is required for the effective communication and use of 
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intelligence activities.  Before any cooperative efforts can be successful, 
however, the individual nations that comprise these forums must first address the 
internal obstacles to progress.  Thailand for example, like many developing 
nations, must accept and do everything it can to eliminate the realities of 
corruption, inter-agency rivalries, and other illicit activities that take place within 
and among its government entities. 
See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna from the Institute of Defense and 
Strategic Studies in Singapore have pointed out that a US-like solution that 
focuses on military power is not the correct method to resolve problems involving 
militant Islamic activity, especially in Southeast Asia:   
[By] adopting a ‘top-down’, macro-analytical approach to the 
regional war on terror, some of these [US] efforts apply a universal, 
‘one size fits all’ paradigm across geographical and cultural 
domains. Second, they tend to gloss over or ignore the complex 
multi-layered contexts within which Southeast Asian governments 
have had to combat terrorism. Third, and as a direct consequence 
of the foregoing, these studies funnel analysis toward the alleged 
deficiencies of regional and national state responses in Southeast 
Asia at the expense of other equally important dimensions (p.92). 
Along the lines of Tan and Ramakrishna’s vision of a broad, bottom-up 
strategy, this thesis recommends emphasis on many different aspects of social, 
economic, military, and political policies to confront the problems in Thailand.  As 
demonstrated throughout this paper, there is a need for a Thai strategy change in 
confronting both the insurgency and transnational terrorism.  This change must 
be initiated unilaterally by the Thais and supported by the international 
community.  Unfortunately, making a change in national strategy is easier said 
than done.  Nevertheless, when continued violence is the result of government 
counterinsurgency and counter-terrorist policies, it becomes evident that policy 
failure is being reinforced.  To compound matters worse, the rapid growth of 
Islamic terrorism around the world since 9/11, coupled with increased 
international attention given to Thailand’s southern insurgency, makes the 
situation in the Kingdom ripe for the introduction of more aggressive transnational 
terrorist operations.   
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By accepting current policy deficiencies and implementing the courses of 
action recommended in this thesis, the US and Thailand will both contribute to a 
greater Southeast Asian security.  If action such as that described in this paper is 














































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 111
APPENDIX A. NASH ARBITRATION (GAME THEORY) APPLIED 
TO THAILAND’S SOUTHERN INSURGENCY 
(Model created by J.C. Lumbaca) 
There are three basic strategies available to the Thai government:  
continue to use heavy-handed military force that targets insurgents in the south, 
attempt to implement southern development and reforms to eliminate the 
legitimate Muslim grievances of the disenfranchised population, or use some 
combination of the two. 
Currently martial law is in place in the southern three provinces of 
Thailand.  The military and police have often been criticized by the local 
population for the use of excessive force against innocent civilians.  Whether this 
allegation is true or not, the perception that it is true exists in the south.  
Consequently, the unrest and violence continues.  More in line with effective 
counterinsurgency operations (such as in the Malaya emergency), a more 
beneficial strategy would seem to focus government efforts on the population, 
thus gathering intelligence and making it easier to target legitimate insurgent 
personnel.  Often a country will instead focus efforts on targeting the insurgents 
themselves without proper intelligence, thus targeting the wrong people, and 
perpetuating the violence.   
The insurgents on the other hand have the option to either continue the 
insurgency/violence or cooperate with the government.  Between January 2004 
and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout 
Thailand’s Deep South. If the insurgents end the violence before government 
reform actually happens, the insurgents run the risk of having the government 
continue to neglect the south’s underdevelopment. 
This model does not attempt to predict exactly what will happen if the 
government or the insurgents choose a certain course of action.  Instead, the 
model provides a mathematical model of outcomes that would likely happen if the 
government and insurgents behave as rational actors.   
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THE MODEL 
Both the government and the insurgents want to maximize their gains in 
the south of Thailand.  Ordinal numbers from one to four have been assigned to 
the options available to each side.  The numbers indicate one being the worst 
option, four being the best option.  The numbers one through four are not 
weighted, meaning that a four is not necessarily two times better than a two.  
Decisions made by each side are made over time, with the ability to observe and 




Assumptions:      
1.  Both sides are rational actors 
 2.  Both sides want to end the violence(The caveat is that the 
insurgents want to end the violence as long as the south receives the 






































Assigning Values To Each Course Of Action (COA) 
The first number in each cell of the table represents the value for the 
government COA, and the second number represents the value for the insurgent 
COA.  Example, the upper left box, which contains the numbers “2,1” represents 
a “2” for the government and a “1” for the insurgents.  The ultimate goal of each 
side, including the insurgents, it to somehow end the violence AND “get” what 
each side wants. 
 
4,4 (P,C):  The government commits to population support/southern 
development and the insurgents coordinate with the government for reform.  
Violence ends and reform takes place.  This is the best case for both sides. 
2,1 (T,C): The government continues to use military only tactics to target 
the insurgents, and the insurgents cooperate with the government.  This is the 
worst case for the insurgents because they continue to be targeted while 
attempting to cooperate with the government.  The government maintains the 
image of a heavy handed force, no southern development occurs, and insurgents 
will most likely return to violence after they see that the government is not 
responding.   
1,2 (T,V): This is the worst case for the government.  Violence continues 
on both sides and no southern development occurs.  The insurgents do not 
receive any southern development and reform from the government, but they are 
at least not getting completely overrun because they are maintaining defensive 
and offensive operations. 
3,3 (P,V): Although the government is confronting a continued insurgency 
waged by the insurgents, the government is also making legitimate moves to 
support the population/develop the south.  As the southern development 
continues, the population will likely experience improvements in security and 
living standards, and the insurgency will most likely loose any support 
mechanisms it has.  The insurgents maintain a militant posture (at least initially) 
to protect themselves and ensure that the government continues with its 
development, but over time the insurgents potentially realize that development 
and recognition is actually happening (which is what they really want), and so 





1. Dominant strategies: 
Dominant strategy for the Government is Population Support/Development 
of the south (P).  The insurgents do not have a dominant strategy 
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The security level discussed here is a hypothetical approach to the problem 
assuming that each side will try to minimize the other side.  In reality the two 
sides are not trying to minimize the other but rather maximize themselves.  If the 
insurgents try to minimize the government outcome, the worst that the 
government can do is a “3”, and the insurgents remain at a “3” as well.  So the 
government has a definite advantage, because even if the insurgents try to 




If the government focuses on minimizing the insurgency (minimax strategy in 
table above), then the insurgency can be reduced to a “2”.  Such a strategy will 
definitely hurt the insurgency, but it would be at great cost to the government, 
bringing the government to a “1” in the process.  The conclusion is obviously that 
the best strategy for the government is to not focus on targeting the insurgents by 
military-only means (Strategy T).  Instead, the government should adhere to its 
dominant strategy (Strategy P) which will at worst achieve a 3, and at best 
achieve a 4 for the government.  Unfortunately at this time, and since 9/11, the 
government has not chosen its dominant strategy (P) but instead has chosen its 





Threats and Promises: The government has a dominant strategy.  The 
insurgency does not have a dominant strategy.  If the insurgents play strategy C, 
they risk the chance of being reduced to a level 1.   
The government has a good first move:  strategy P.  Then, if the 
insurgents act rationally, 4,4 is achieved.  C is the rational insurgent choice to the 
government’s P strategy. 
The subsequent analysis looks at the applicability of a threat or a promise 
from either side, if the other side moves first. 
Dominant Strategy:  
Gov’t:  P 
Insurgents:  None 
NE:  4,4 / P,C  - this is the likely outcome. 
 
First Moves: 
Gov’t:  If P (pop. support), then C (insurgent cooperation)(4,4) 
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Insurgents:  If C (insurgent cooperate with gov’t), then P (pop. support)(4,4) 
  If V (insurgent violence), then P (pop. support) (3,3) 
 
Analysis from Government Point of View:   
Government wants to move first:  chooses P, then insurgents choose C 
(4,4) 
If insurgents move first, then government wants insurgents to choose C 
first.   
Threat: 
If V, then T (1,2).  Contingent on V, Hurts insurgents, hurts government, 
YES:  qualifies as a valid threat, eliminates (3,3).  This is actually what is 
happening in reality at this time.  While it does hurt the insurgency, it really 
hurts the government.  The result is a very bad situation for both sides, 
and continued violence.  Rather than playing its dominant strategy (P), the 
government is continuing with (T). 
Promise 
If C, then T (2,1).  Hurts gov’t, hurts insurgents, NO:  does not qualify as a 
valid  promise 
 
Analysis from the Insurgents Point of View: 
 Ideally, the insurgents want to move first, choose C, then government P 
(4,4).  The problem is that if the insurgents do not trust the government, the 
insurgents risk being reduced to a 1 if they choose C and the government then 
chooses T.  Choosing C as a first move is a rational choice for the insurgents 
only if they believe that the government will play its dominant strategy.  
If government moves first, insurgents want the government to choose P, 




If T, then C (2,1).  Contingent on T, hurts insurgents, helps government, 
NO:  does not qualify as a valid threat 
Promise 
If P, then V (3,3).  Hurts insurgents, hurts government, NO:  does not 























There is only one point at which both sides would end up at if negotiations began 
with a start point of each side’s security level.  That ending point would be the 





OVERALL MODEL CONCLUSION: 
The government has a dominant strategy:  to develop the south and focus on the 
population rather than a strategy that solely targets insurgents.  The insurgents 
do not have a dominant strategy.  In reality today, the Thai government is, 
unfortunately, not optimizing its possible outcome and it is not playing its 
dominant strategy.  Instead, the government is, like the US in Vietnam, focusing 
only on the insurgents and not on the population.  While it may seem intuitive for 
the government to follow a strategy of targeting insurgents, this model shows that 
the cost to the government in doing so far outweighs the possible benefits.  
There could be many reasons for the government not playing its optimal strategy, 
one being that the government simply does not know what its optimal strategy is.  
This model has provided a mathematical representation of a strategy that could 
benefit both the government and the population.   
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APPENDIX B. CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 
     1971 
• “Abu Bakar Ba’aysir, later dubbed the Asian Osama bin Laden, and his 
partner Abdullah Sungkar, open the Pondok Ngruki Islamic boarding school in 
Solo, Indonesia, which later becomes Jemaah Islamiah’s first source of recruits.  
Although the clandestine organization doesn’t use the name Jemaah Islamiah for 
more than a decade, at some point in the 1970s its leaders begin creating their 
first network of cells and study groups” (Ressa, 2003, p.xiii). 
 
           1985 
• “Abu Bakar Ba’aysir and Abdullah Sungkar flee Indonesia during a 
crackdown by Suharto, and settle in Malaysia, bringing the leadership of Jemaah 
Islamiah with them.  Sungkar begins sending Indonesian Muslims to fight the 
continuing war in Afghanistan, and he travels there himself to meet Osama bin 
Laden.  Jemaah Islamiyah is co-opted by al-Qaeda, which begins training and 




• The call to Jihad, the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan is highly 
appealing to Muslims from SEA.  Thousands of Muslims from the Philippines and 
hundreds more from Indonesia, Thailand, and Singapore go to fight.  “When they 
return home, they bring back radical ideas – and terrorist techniques – they 
learned from the camps of Afghanistan” (Ressa, 2003, p.12) 
 
1994 
• March 11.  Osama Bin Laden operatives plan to blow up the Israeli 
embassy in Bangkok.  The plan goes awry and is not executed (Abuza, 2003 b, 
p.171).  The driver of the truck gets into an accident en route to the attack.  Three 
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Iranians are arrested in connection with the incident (“How long can Bangkok 
dodge the militant bullet?” 2004). 
• December 10.  Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the 1993 World Trade 
Center bombing, builds and explodes a bomb on Philippine Airlines flight 434 
traveling from Cebu, Phillipines to Tokyo.  This bombing is a practice run for 
Yousef’s larger plan, codenamed Operation Bojinka, to bomb 11 US airliners as 
well as assassinate the pope.  Yousef returns to Cebu to build the required bombs 
for Bojinka, but during the process of assembling the explosives, a fire erupts in 
his apartment (Ressa, 2003, p.xv).  Yousef immediately flees the country to 
Thailand.  (He later proceeds on to Pakistan, where he is captured and extradited 
to the US (Abuza, 2003b, p.106). 
 
1996 
• JI divides up SEA into regional “commands”, called Mantiqis.  Mantiqi 1 
includes Malaysia, Singapore, and southern Thailand (Ressa, 2003, p.75). 
 
1998 
• Thai and Malaysian authorities conduct a massive crackdown on militants.  
Thai authorities net several key PULO and new PULO leaders.  After the 
operation, more than 900 Thai insurgents are given amnesty and put into 
government rehabilitation programs, all in return for the insurgents’ promises to 
support peaceful national development (Crispin, 2004a).  
 
1999 
• Nik Adli Nik Aziz, leader of the KMM (Kampulan Mujahideen Malaysia – a 
homegrown extremist organization operating under AQ’s umbrella in Malaysia) 
purchases a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including 24 pounds of 
explosives.  Aziz is “committed to waging a violent jihad against the Malaysian 
state, which he consider[s] to be secular and oppressive” (Abuza, 2003b, p.125).  
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• October 1. Burmese dissidents seize the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok 
taking 89 persons hostage, including one U.S. citizen.  
 
2000 
• January.  Ten armed Burmese dissidents, linked to the takeover in 1999 of 
the Burmese Embassy in Bangkok, take over the Ratchaburi, Thailand provincial 
hospital. Thai security forces storm the hospital, safely free all the hostages, and 
kill all hostage takers.  Separately, Burma sentences to death one terrorist 
involved in the 1999 Embassy takeover (“Patterns of global terrorism report - 
2000,” 2001). 
• February.  Security forces deal a sever blow to the New PULO when they 
kill its leader, Saarli Taloh-Mayaw.  Authorities claim that the leader was 
responsible for 90 percent of the terrorist activities in Narathiwat Province 
(“Patterns of global terrorism report - 2000,” 2001). 
• April.  Police in Pattani arrest the deputy leader of the Barisan Revolusi 
Nasional (BRN) insurgent organization. 
• June.  A Thai criminal court orders Yoshimi Tanaka, detained in Thailand 
and a member of the radical Japanese Red Army Faction, to be extradited to 
Japan for the 1970 hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight.   
• June.  Thai officials discover a partially completed submersible at a 
shipyard in Phuket.  The submersible is owned by a known sympathizer to the Sri 
Lankan insurgent group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).  
• December.  Thai officials discover an unclassified paper by Canadian 
intelligence published in December that outlines the LTTE’s use of front 
companies to procure weapons through Thailand.  The Thai government publicly 
pledges to halt the use of Thailand as a logistics base by the LTTE (“Patterns of 




• June 19.  Thai authorities avert an attempted bombing at the Vietnamese 
Embassy in Bangkok when they find and disarm two explosive devices that failed 
to detonate. Three Vietnamese males are taken into custody: one is charged with 
illegal possession of explosives and conspiracy to cause an explosion in 
connection with the incident, the others are released after it is determined there is 
insufficient evidence to link them to the crime. 
• April 7.  The Hat Yai, Thailand train station is bombed resulting in the death 
of one boy, injuries to several passengers, and severe property damage. 
• Post September 11.  Thai financial authorities began investigating financial 
transactions covered under UN resolutions to freeze AQ and Taliban assets.  
• November.  An unexploded truck bomb is found next to a hotel in southern 
Thailand (“Patterns of global terrorism report - 2001,” 2002). 
• December.  A rocket-propelled grenade is fired at a multistory building 
housing a Bangkok ticketing office of the Israeli El Al airline. 
• December.  In an effort to prevent terrorism and crime, immigration officials 
announce initiatives to expand the list of countries whose citizens are required to 
obtain visas before they arrive in Thailand (“Patterns of global terrorism report - 
2001,” 2002). 
• Mid-December.  AQ’s military chief, Mohammed Atef, is killed by the US air 
strikes in Afghanistan (Ressa, 2003, p. 181).  Also at this time, Faiz bin Abu Bakar 
Bafana, one of JI’s leaders, is arrested (Abuza, 2003b, p. 155).  While these 
incidents occur, JI is planning major suicide truck bombings against hard targets in 
Singapore.  The explosives for the bombings are to come from the Philippines, 
through Indonesia, and into Singapore.  However, a botched robbery in Malaysia 
tips off authorities to terrorist cells planning the Singapore attacks.  The crackdown 
by Singaporean authorities on JI has begun and so Hambali immediately takes 
action.  “The word among the operatives in the area [is] to get to Thailand as 
quickly as possible” (Ressa, 2003, p.181).    
• Late December 2001, early January 2002.  Mohammed Mansour Jabarah, 
a Canadian-Kuwaiti AQ recruit trained by Hambali and used in the planning and 
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coordination for the planned Singapore bombings, gets an emergency message 
from Hambali.  Upon getting the e-mail from Hambali titled “problem,” along with 
the order to flee to Thailand, Jabarah departs for Bangkok.  Jabarah gets to the 
Kingdom and meets with Hambali at the Chaleena Hotel in Bangkok.  Hambali 
tells Jabarah to get out of Southeast Asia before the authorities capture him 
(Ressa, 2003, p.182).  
• December.  Mas Slamet bin Kastari, alias Edi Haryanto, militarily-trained in 
Afghanistan and head of the Singapore arm of JI, travels to Bangkok for meetings 
with Hambali to discuss airplane hijackings.  Edi is then sent off to recruit and 
select personnel in Bangkok and Pattaya, Thailand, for the hijacking missions 




• With the crackdown on JI in Singapore, the bombings planned for the city-
state are abandoned.  JI will settle for hitting soft targets in other countries for the 
time being.   Hambali holds meetings in Thailand in mid-January with several 
operatives.  The leader discusses carrying out attacks against bars, cafes, and 
nightclubs frequented by western tourists in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the PI, 
and Indonesia (Ressa, 2003, p.182).  It is in southern Thailand that Hambali calls 
together a meeting that plots the genesis of the Bali Bombings (Ressa, 2003, 
p.216). 
• April.  After AQ leader Abu Zubaydah is captured in Pakistan, the CIA ships 
him to Thailand to be interrogated at a secret facility (Arkin, 2005, p. 218). 
• May 1.  Administrative structures known as Civilian-Police-Military Task 
Force 43 and the Southern Provincial Border Administrative Command, a military-
led security agency, are dissolved by PM Thaksin (Funston, 2004).  The PM 
announces that stability had been restored.  “Some Muslim Thai leaders say that 
the policy shift closed down an important channel of communication with Thai 
officialdom” (Crispin, 2004a).  According to Makata Ma, president of the Islamic 
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Association of Narathiwat, the Muslims in the south used to have a venue to 
present their problems and find joint solutions.  Now, Ma says, “we’re under 
martial law.  Now we’re scared to speak” (Crispin, 2004a).  According to a Thai 
Army source speaking with the Bangkok Post in February 2004, the end of the 
command has “given insurgents more freedom to stage clandestine movements in 
the remote south.” Insurgents are able to strengthen their operations while 
providing arms training to more than 3,000 local youth (Nanuam, 2004a).   
• June.  Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) raiders attack the offices 
of a national park in Yala Province’s Than To District making away with 17 HK-33 
assault rifles, 16 shotguns, and 1,400 rounds of ammunition.  It is not clear if the 
weapons are going to be sold on the black market, moved across the borer to 
support Malaysian insurgents, or kept to build up the GMIP stockpile (“Thailand 
faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).  
• August 1.  The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, the Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
Malaysia, the Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of 
Singapore, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member 
countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the US sign 
the Joint Declaration on Combating Terrorism.  The agreement affirms all 
participating nations’ increased determination to coordinate and counter terrorism 
using all elements of national power. 
• August.  Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) operations chief 
Manase Jeh-da (aka Nasae Saning) is arrested in Trengganu state, northeast 
Malaysia.  He is handed over to Thai authorities.  Jeh-da has been on Thai wanted 
lists for years and carried a bounty of US$4,900 (“Thailand faces up to southern 
extremist threat,” 2003).  
• August 28.  Based on information from the captured GMIP operations chief 
Jeh-da earlier in the month, police raid a house in Pattani in search of weapons.  
The house is owned by the head teacher of a private Islamic school.  In the house 
police find Mahama Mae-roh, another GMIP group leader. Mae-roh, who had 
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served four years in the army and had specialized training as a marksman, shoots 
dead a police sergeant and then kills two senior officers, including Pattani police 
chief Colonel Manit Rattanawin. Mae-roh is then killed by police reinforcements.  
Later the same day, Jeh-da is killed by police in another district of Pattani 
(“Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003).  
• October 12.  JI executes its first major terrorist attack when it explodes 
three bombs in Bali that kill over 200 people.  Coordination for the bombings were 
made earlier by Hambali and his operatives during meetings in Thailand in 
January. 
• December.  Following media reports that there are terrorist operatives in 
Thailand, the Thai information ministry disputes the claims.  Reports of terrorists in 
Thailand are made by CNN Jakarta’s bureau chief, Maria Ressa.  The Thai 
government believes that Thailand’s intelligence counterparts in other countries 
would surely have shared such information if it were true. Ressa reaffirms to the 
Thai government that her information came from reliable sources, including the 
FBI (Ressa, 2003, p.216).  PM Thaksin adamantly denies the claims of terrorists 
operating in Thailand and claims that the western countries making such 
accusations are reckless in creating such misinformed, negative statements.   
 
2003 
• March 11.  Wan Min bin Mat, a JI member is arrested and interrogated in 
Malaysia.  During his interrogation, bin Mat maps out JI’s overarching goals, 
proclaiming that once a pure Islamic state in Indonesia is achieved, members will 
proceed toward a larger Muslim domination of the region encompassing Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and the Phillipines to establish the Islamic 
caliphate (Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia:  damaged but still dangerous, 
2003, p.1). 
• April.  Two plainclothes police officers are beaten to death in Narathiwat 
Province by an angry mob (“Coherent policy needed for the south,” 2004). 
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• April.  Attacks on a Thai Marine civil-development unit in Narathiwat 
Province result in five Marines killed and over 30 M-16 rifles seized by attackers 
(“Coherent policy needed for the south,” 2004). 
• May 16.  Based on information from Singaporean authorities, Thailand 
arrests Singaporean Arifin bin Ali, alias John Wong Ah Hung, and three Thais, all 
alleged members of JI.  The arrestees were allegedly planning to bomb the 2003 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit which is to be attended by US 
President George W. Bush.   Arifin says that he has been hiding in Thailand since 
2002, and that he is “involved with a group of like-minded individuals in planning 
terrorist attack against certain targets in Thailand” (Ressa, 2003, p.217).  Between 
Singaporean and Thai authorities, the two determine that JI is planning attacks 
against five embassies in Bangkok as well as two beach resorts in Pattaya and 
Phuket, Thailand.   
• May 30.  Cambodian authorities arrest two Thais and one Egyptian on 
suspicion of having links to JI.  Cambodian authorities also order the expulsion of 
28 teachers, some of them Thai, for suspected links to JI (Raman, 2004). 
• June.  Following the May 16 arrests of JI operatives in Thailand, PM 
Thaksin reverses his earlier statements and finally admits JI has “a cell in his 
country with ambitious plans” (Ressa, 2003, p.217).  
• July 3.  Five policemen and one civilian are killed in simultaneous raids by 
armed insurgents in three districts of Pattani Province.  The attackers withdraw 
with captured weapons and body armor (“Thailand faces up to southern extremist 
threat,” 2003). 
• June 13.  Thai national Narong Penanam is arrested in Bangkok after trying 
to sell what he believed to be uranium to undercover Thai and US agents.  The 
material seized is cesium-137, a radioactive by-product of nuclear power plants.  
The material is believed to be from Russian stockpiles, taken into Thailand by way 
of Laos (Ressa, 2003, p.218). 
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• July 28.  A Mujahideen Islam Pattani leader, Mahamae Maeroh, kills a 
Muang Pattani police chief and four other local officers (Ngamkham and Harai, 
2004). 
• August 5.  JI conducts its second largest attack since Bali when it bombs 
the J.W. Marriott hotel in Jakarta.  12 people are killed and hundreds wounded. 
• August 11.  Hambali (Nurjaman Riduam Isamuddin), JI’s operations chief 
and main link to AQ, is captured in Ayuthya, Thailand.  Considered the most 
wanted man in Southeast Asia at the time of his capture, Hambali is the only non-
Arab (he is Indonesian) sitting on AQ’s leadership council. 
• August 28.  Three policemen in Pattani Province, including two senior 
officers, are shot dead during a raid on a house in search of weapons (“Thailand 
faces up to southern extremist threat,” 2003). 
 
2004 
The January 4, 2004 raid on a southern Army depot is generally cited as the 
starting point for a great upsurge in violence in the south.  Between January 2004 
and early 2005, more than 600 people were killed in incidents throughout 
Thailand’s Deep South. The attacks included bombings, arson attacks, 
kidnappings, and assassinations aimed at civil administrators, security force 
personnel, tourists, and Buddhist religious leaders.  Not all of these killings, 
bombings, and arson attacks are listed here because of the sheer number 
involved.  While most of the killings are insurgent related, many are not.  The 
nature of Thai society, with its pockets of corruption, mafia, black-market trading, 
drug smuggling, and other illegal activities lends itself to occasional murders 
throughout the country that are not in any way related to insurgency.   Because of 
the insurgency and continued violence in the south however, the media readily 
sensationalizes almost every killing in the southern provinces as 
insurgents/terrorists/separatists attacking the government and symbols of the 
government.  Such claims may or may not be true in each case. 
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• January 4.  The largest attack on Thai soil in years occurs.  In the southern 
province of Yala, over 100 southern insurgents attack the Thai 4th Army Engineer 
Depot.  After separating Muslim soldiers from Thai soldiers, the insurgents kill four 
Buddhist soldiers.  Two of the soldiers have their throats slit.  Weapons are also 
stolen and more than 21 schools are torched.  PM Thaksin accuses the insurgent 
organization Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP) of responsibility.  Deputy 
Prime Minister Chavilat Yongchaiyudh believes that the attackers were possibly 
aided by someone inside the military’s armory.  The weapons stolen include some 
300 assault rifles, 40 pistols, and two machine guns (Crispin, 2004a).   
• January 4.  PM Thaksin announces that he intends to build a security wall 
along the Thai/Malaysian border to hinder “terrorists” from attacking targets in 
Thailand and then retreating across the border to the Malaysian jungles (Crispin, 
2004a). 
• January 5.  PM Thaksin announces martial law in the southern Narathiwat, 
Yala, and Pattani Provinces.  3000 troops are dispatched to the region.  The 
martial law gives freedom for the military to search homes and detain suspects 
without any charge.  According to the article titled “Thailand Islamic Insurgency” 
(2004), key leaders of the Gerakan Mujahideen Islam Pattani (GMIP), the Barison 
Revolusi Nasional (BRN), and both the old and new PULO are now being closely 
followed in connection to the January 4th attack.   
• January.  The Thai government launches investigations into the operation 
of independent Muslim schools (called “ponoh” or “pondok”) in the south.  As a 
result of Saudi funding, many of the ponohs now teach the extremist Wahabi 
brand of Islam.  Like their Pakistani ponoh counterparts, the schools in Thailand 
are now suspected of serving as Muslim recruitment centers.  According to the 
Bangkok Post, as many as “700 Thai youths have trained in secret military camps 
on southern Thailand; others have visited Taliban camps in Afghanistan” (Brown, 
2004).  The Thai government additionally asks authorities in Jakarta to monitor 
Thai Muslim students in Indonesia to detect any links with terrorists. 
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• January.  PM Thaksin declares that it will take three years to stabilize the 
south.  The Thai government announces that it will spend approximately US$300 
million to help the southern region.  It is unclear, however, what portion of the 
money will be spent on economic growth versus tightening security in the area 
(Crispin, 2004a). 
• January 13.  Thailand and Malaysia start joint border patrols to locate and 
deter insurgents from crossing the border after conducting attacks. 
• Select January incidents:  Three Buddhist monks are killed, two others are 
brutally injured.  This is the first time that monks have been targeted in the region’s 
history. 
• February.  Terrorist suspect Usman Pohmareeso is arrested in Rangae 
district, Narathiwat Province.  Acting on intelligence from Malaysian authorities, 
about 30 policemen moved in on Pohmareeso at the Thai-Malaysian border 
checkpoint in Sungai Kolok district.  Usman is suspected of shooting dead a 
village head in Rangae on May 1, 2003. Authorities continue hunting another 
Rangae native, identified only as Pohsoo, believed to have joined Usman in the 
murder (Ngamkham and Harai, 2004). 
• Select February incidents:  An armed group shoots and kills Police 
Sergeant Major Sayan Khongthon in the Raman district of Yala Province.  Some 
witnesses report seeing women among the insurgents involved in the killing; A 
border patrol officer is shot and wounded in Yala’s provincial capital.  The officer 
says his assailant is a woman. 
• March 3.  Subay Useng, member of the Mujahideen Islam Pattani, is 
arrested in Yala Province for his connection to bomb blasts in the south.  He is 
held on initial charges of treason, illegal possession of weapons and bombing a 
railway track in Yala’s Raman district in August 2002.  The Bangkok Post reports 
that Useng is a “bomb expert who probably trained overseas” (Ngamkham and 
Harai, 2004). 
• March 12.  Somchai Neelapaijit, chairman of Thailand's Muslim Lawyers 
Association, goes missing after leaving his home for a meeting in Bangkok.  The 
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Thai government investigates the disappearance of the top Muslim lawyer who is 
representing JI terror suspects on trial for allegedly plotting bomb attacks in the 
Kingdom.  (To date, Neelapaijit has not been found.  In April 2004 four high 
ranking police officials surrendered to authorities after arrest warrants were issued 
against them for involvement in the lawyer’s abduction.  The police officers 
maintain their claims of innocence) (Crispin, 2004b). 
• March.  Thailand’s national police chief and the southern province regional 
army commander are fired for failing to control the growing unrest in the Muslim-
dominated south.  The announcements are made after unidentified arsonists set 
fire to 40 sites in two provinces and another village headman is fatally shot.   
• March 23.  Bersatu insurgents explode a bomb near a meeting between 
Interior Minister Broken Bhalakula, Defense Minister Gen. Chetta Thanajaro, and 
security officials in Narathiwat province. After the attack, Thanajaro reports that the 
government needs to regain the confidence of the people in the South, where he 
says Jemaah Islamiah could be involved.  "We consider the blast to be a direct 
challenge to state authority. The government wants to denounce the perpetrators 
of the bomb attack who are trying to worsen the situation," says government 
spokesman Jakrapob Penkair (“Thai army eases southern presence,” 2004). 
According to a Thai military intelligence source, the Bersatu insurgent movement 
is responsible for the bombing.  The source claims 12 Bersatu insurgents, one of 
them a woman, arrived in Pattani province from Malaysia on March 22, split into 
two groups of six, and emplaced the two bombs.  The first bomb exploded injuring 
one person, the second was located and diffused (Boonyakaj, 2004).  
• March 26.  Security in the south is tightened after the Thaksin Task Force, 
attached to the 4th Army, announces that international and local terrorist groups 
are planning attacks on state property in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala.  According 
to the announcement, the potential targets include government buildings, public 
parks, bridges, railway stations, schools, telecoms relay stations and highways.  
• March 27.  A bomb attached to a motorcycle explodes outside a bar in 
Sungai Kolok, a border town in Narathiwat Province.  Twenty Thais and, for the 
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first time, eight Malaysian tourists are injured.  Thai law enforcement officials 
report that the bomb was made of Power Gel, a commercial plastic explosive 
commonly found at mining and construction sites and used in other bombings in 
the region.  
• March 29.  Udom Charoen, director of the National Buddhism Bureau, 
reports that more than 20 Buddhist temples in Pattani and Narathiwat provinces 
are without monks.  After temple buildings were set ablaze and monks injured by 
unknown assailants, many monks have deserted their temples in the southern 
provinces (“Monks abandon temples in Pattani and Narathiwat,” 2004). 
• March 29.  Arsonists set ablaze five targets – a police checkpoint, a forestry 
department office, a forestry official’s home, and two warehouses in Pattani 
Province (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b). 
• March 29. A bomb is located at a southern border gate office located 2 
kilometers from Sungai Golok, the town where two days earlier a bomb exploded 
injuring 28 people including tourists (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b). 
• March 30.  The Thai government announces the creation of the Southern 
Border Provinces Peace-Making Division.  The new division, much like the 
Civilian-Police-Military Task Force 43 disbanded in 2002, is to be tasked with 
“coordinating police, military and Interior Ministry operations and all the intelligence 
work in the southern border provinces” (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 
2004b). 
• March 31.  After tying up two security guards, ten masked men armed with 
assault rifles steal 1.4 tons of ammonium nitrate (commonly used as fertilizer but 
also easily used as an explosive), 58 sticks of dynamite, and 180 detonators from 
a mining quarry in Yala Province (“Explosives stolen in Thai raid,” 2004).  
Authorities later report that the attackers included Thais as well as Indonesians.  
One of the Indonesians is identified as being a relative of JI operations chief 
Hambali (Pathan, M.A., 2004a). 
• Select March incidents:  A Thai police officer is shot in the southern 
province of Songkhla; armed attackers storm a local rubber wood processing plant 
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in Bannangsata District, killing a 50-year-old male worker and wounding a police 
officer who arrives on the scene (“Asia-Pacific daily news summary,” 2004a); 
police Sergeant Major Surapol Prabpairee from Yala Province dies from wounds 
suffered when a teenager shoots him while directing traffic on March 22 (“Asia-
Pacific daily news summary,” 2004b). 
• April 5.  A bomb explodes in Yala Province outside the residence of the 
Bannang Sata district chief (Pathan, M.A., 2004b). 
• April 7.  Thailand’s embassy in Sweden receives a letter threatening the 
Kingdom with attacks, similar to those in Spain, in retaliation for Thailand sending 
troops to support US efforts in Iraq (Ashayagachat, 2004b). 
• April 9.  The US, Australia, and Britain warn their citizens to stay away from 
the southern Thai provinces during the mid-April water festival Songkran.  
According to an article in The Nation titled “Thaksin plays down West travel 
warnings,” the US State Department warns, "The far south of Thailand has 
experienced incidents of criminally and politically motivated violence, including 
incidents attributed to armed local separatist or extremist groups".  Shortly after 
the US issues its warning, Britain’s foreign office warns that its citizens “should be 
especially vigilant in public places, particularly tourist sites, large resorts and 
hotels favoured [sic] by Westerners, and in airports, on public transport and in 
nightclubs, bars, restaurants, shopping centres [sic] and places of worship.”  In 
response, PM Thaksin, concerned with the impact on the tourist industry says, 
“The warnings are understandable and common. The warnings would more or less 
affect the country’s image and tourism.  We have to admit that the southern 
violence has affected tourism because the problems are still going on.” 
• April 9.  Hours after the US, Britain, and Australia issue travel warnings to 
their citizens in Thailand, two bombs explode in the south.  One bomb explodes 
opposite a police station in Narathiwat Province and one explodes at the gate of 
an apartment complex housing police and customs officials. 
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• April 19.  Train service between Hat Yai and the southern Thai-Malaysian 
border town of Sungai Kolok is suspended indefinitely after the third attack on 
railway employees leaves several dead.   
• April. South Korean and Pakistani embassies in Bangkok, along with six 
other missions, receive threats for supporting US operations in Iraq 
(Ashayagachat, 2004c). 
• April 26.  Leaflets urging Islamic leaders to stop cooperating with police are 
found in Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces.  The leaflets, depicting a Muslim 
religious leader handing an envelope to a uniformed policeman, carry a message 
in Thai calling on Islamic leaders to stop giving information about the southern 
unrest to police authorities (“Leaflets urge Muslims not to cooperate,” 2004). 
• April 27.  The Interior Ministry announces that teachers and village heads in 
Yala, Pattani, and Narathiwat Provinces are now permitted to carry guns for self-
protection.  Government officials will be given guns on loan while teachers will 
have to arm themselves (“Teachers told they can now carry guns,” 2004). 
• April 27.  The Pattani Liberation Front sends letters that threaten to kill the 
Thai ambassadors in Malaysia and Singapore and attack the Thai missions in both 
countries (Ashayagachat, 2004c). 
• April 28.  Over 100 southern Muslim insurgents are killed after they 
simultaneously attacked more than 10 government outposts in Yala, Sonkhla, and 
Pattani Provinces.  After seven hours of shooting, 5 police officers are dead, 17 
insurgents are captured, and 100 are killed, including 32 who were firing from a 
mosque. 
• May 1.  An additional 1,800 police are deployed to the south following the 
April 28 clash between security forces and militants. 
• May 1.  The Fourth Army Region Chief announces that reporters from 
foreign news agencies are barred from entering the military precincts in the south.  
The southern army asks Thai media as well, particularly iTV (Independent 
Television), to avoid showing sympathy for the militants killed during the violence 
in the south (Nanuam, 2004c). 
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• Select May incidents:  Unknown assailants decapitate a Buddhist villager in 
Narathiwat Province and threaten more killings if Muslims continue to be arrested 
in the south. 
• Select June incidents:  Gunmen armed with M-16 rifles kill a policeman in 
Pattani province; four gunmen kill a Buddhist villager and then ambush an Army 
patrol sent to investigate the attack, wounding three soldiers; military and police 
conduct a pre-dawn raid that results in the arrest of five suspected Muslim 
insurgents.  Authorities claim the raid foiled a bomb plot to kill several public 
officials. 
• July 10.  Defense Minister Chetta Thanajaro announces that foreign 
sources have transferred over 100 million Thai baht [about US $4 billion] to 
leading separatists to fund violence in the south.  Thanajaro announces that the 
Thai government will cut off the foreign support and arrest the suspected 
insurgents (Nanuam, 2004d). 
• July 11.  The deadline announced by PM Thaksin for all southern 
insurgents to surrender themselves to police arrives. Those who surrender are 
admitted to regional army camps for re-education and behavioral reform before 
being released.  Those suspected insurgents who do not surrender will be 
pursued, interrogated, and detained for seven days under martial law.  They will 
then be handed over to police and tried in civilian criminal courts.   Between 100 
and 150 suspects surrender to police prior to the deadline. 
• July 12.  Police and soldiers launch raids throughout the south to detain 
suspected insurgents who do not surrender by the July 11 deadline. 
• July 12.  Three soldiers are injured by suspected insurgents in an ambush 
in Narathiwat Province. 
• July 14.  An Army dog sniffs out and finds the first weapon to be recovered 
from the January 4, 2004 insurgent Army camp raid where over 300 weapons 
were stolen.  An M-16 assault rifle is found buried in a durian orchard owned by a 
Muslim religious teacher in Narathiwat Province. 
The rifle is found along with rounds of ammunition, maps of police and military 
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bases in the district, documents about ''Pattani state'' and shirts bearing the 
symbol of Geragan Mujahideen Islam Pattani [GMIP].  There still remains a 
US$2,500 reward from the Thai government for the recovery of any additional 
weapons (“Army recovers stolen M-16 rifle,” 2004). 
• July 15.  The army reports that they are keeping tabs on students from Yala 
Province’s Rajaghat University.  According to officials, the students at the Islamic 
university have suspected links to the southern insurgency, including helping to 
transport weapons used in separatist hit-and-run attacks.  Of the hundreds of 
suspected insurgents who turned themselves in by the July 11, 2004 deadline, five 
are students from Rahaghat University (Nanuam, 2004e).   
• July 17.  Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra announces that a War on 
Corruption will launch on October 3, 2004.  With elections just around the corner 
from the October 3 date, critics charge that Thaksin promised an end to graft three 
years ago when he was elected, and that this announcement is aimed only at 
assisting his re-election (Tunyasiri and Suksamran, 2004). 
• July 19.  Thailand signs a multi-million dollar deal with a French space 
company to build the THEOS (Thailand Earth Observation System) satellite.  This 
is the Kingdom’s first satellite, scheduled for launch in mid-2007.  Although the 
images will not be as magnified as the ones Thailand currently purchases from US 
commercial satellite companies, the photos from THEOS will be viewed much 
faster and at less cost than the ones bought from the US.  In addition to providing 
information on surveys, agriculture, and natural resources, "It will be used for 
monitoring the country for defensive purposes and also for intelligence,” said 
General Vichit Satharanond, the head of the Royal Thai Army Military Technology 
Centre.  “If we let the people in the south know we have this, they will start to 
worry” said Satharanond (“Thailand signs deal with French company for spy 
satellite,” 2004). 
• July 19.  Defense Minister General Chetta Thanajaro dispatches aides to 
Malaysia to coordinate the tracking down of insurgents between Thailand and 
 138
Malaysia.  The team is also scheduled to meet with leaders of PULO and Bersatu 
while in Kuala Lumpur (Nanuam, 2004f).  
• July 20.  A Thai intelligence source says that 20 Muslim religious teachers 
are behind the almost daily shootings of security officials in the southern 
provinces.  According to the Bangkok Post, the official claims that the teachers 
carry out the attacks themselves, hoping to win back the support of local Muslims 
after many youths who previously received armed training from the teachers 
defected to the state authorities (Benyakaj, 2004). 
• July 25.  The Central Islamic Committee of Thailand announces that it will 
issue a document to southern Muslims in August 2004 that will correct distortions 
taken from the Koran.  The distortions were found in a book found on a dead 
insurgent in the south.  The committee alleges that the book, called Ber Jihad Di 
Pattani (The Holy Struggle for Pattani), ”distorts” more than 60 points from the 
Koran to mislead militants into making sacrifices for the separatist cause 
(Nanuam, 2004g). 
• July 31.  Army Chief General Chaisit Shinawatra says that his secret 
operation unit, the Army Action Team (ACT), has recovered eight more weapons 
from the January raid on the southern Army camp.  According to the General, the 
ACT spent three to four months mingling with their “sources” in the deep south to 
locate the weapons (Nanuam, 2004f). 
• Select July incidents:  A village chief is shot dead and two policemen are 
seriously wounded in separate attacks; a former border patrol policeman is shot 
dead in Yala Province; a hospital worker on his way to work at Pattani Province’s 
Mayo Hospital is shot dead by motorcycle gunmen; a gunman on a motorcycle 
kills a policeman in Narathiwat Province. In two separate incidents, two counter-
insurgency security officials are shot by gunmen on motorcycles in Narathiwat 
Province; four people are shot dead in two separate attacks in Yala and Pattani 
Provinces; one civilian is shot by two men on a motorcycle; three policemen are 
shot dead while guarding Mai Kai railway station; a man earning extra money 
driving Muslims students home after school is shot three times and killed by two 
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men on a motorcycle in Pattani Province; five people are injured in Narathiwat 
Province when a remote-controlled improvised bomb is detonated (“Suspect in 
southern attacks arrested,” 2004); and two men on a motorcycle shoot a 39-year 
old woman four times in the chest and kill her. 
• August 4.  The Thai cabinet approves an independent panel’s conclusion 
that government forces overreacted and used excessive force in suppressing 
militants holding out inside Krue Se Mosque on April 28, 2004.  The cabinet 
agrees to pay compensation to the families of both militants and security troops 
killed (Phanayanggoor, 2004). 
• August 4.  Three soldiers assigned to protect teachers in Yala province are 
injured by a roadside bomb.  The soldiers were tasked with picking up and 
transporting the teachers to school (Nanuam, 2004h). 
• August 4.  The Thai government and Army will announce that they will 
provide assistance to southern Muslims making the Haj pilgrimage to the holy city 
of Mecca in Saudi Arabia (“Assistance for Haj pilgrims,” 2004). 
• August 15.  Two Chinese nationals selling carpets and blankets in 
Narathiwat are shot by a gunman riding pillion on a motorcycle.  The victims are 
recovering from their wounds. 
• August 17.  The Southern Border Provinces Peace Building Command 
(SBPPBC) is assigned the task of mapping out an action plan to “ensure unity 
among local people and state officials.”  Deputy Prime Minister Chaturon 
Chaisaeng says the action plan is aimed at bringing unity of politics, unity of 
thinking, unity of beliefs and unity of command” (“Action plan to unify local and 
state goals,” 2004).  
• August 19.  Thailand’s Human Rights Commission accuses southern 
security forces of torture, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings in their crackdown 
on Muslim insurgents.  The commission’s reports includes documented cases of 
suspects being “blindfolded, beaten, strangled, electrocuted, humiliated and 
urinated on by official interrogators” (Corben, 2004). 
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• August 19.  Thai intelligence agencies search for the Thai wife of an al-
Qaeda suspect who, along with seven others, is charged in a British court for 
conspiring to “commit murder and use radioactive materials, toxic gasses, 
chemicals or explosives to cause fear or injury.”  Dhiren Barot, a British national of 
Indian origin, moved to Thailand in 1998 where he lived and married a Thai 
woman.  He is the author of documents “describing surveillance of US financial 
buildings during 2000 and 2001.”  The documents Barot authored were found on 
computers and e-mails during July 2004 raids in Pakistan (“Hunt on for Thai wife 
of al-Qaeda suspect,” 2004). 
• August 19.  Pohsu Isma-al, the author of the book Ber Johad Di Pattani 
(Fighting for Pattani State), is detained by Malaysian authorities at Bangkok’s 
request.  He is accused of helping to train southern militants and spreading 
separatist ideology.  Thailand does not pressure extradition and Malaysia is 
reluctant to hand over Pohsu because he holds dual Thai-Malaysian nationality 
(Nanuam, 2004i). 
• August 20.  Two Thai nationals along with two Egyptians remain in 
Cambodian custody for alleged links to JI.  The original trial date, set for February 
2004, was suspended when prosecutors changed the charges against the men 
from kidnap to attempted murder (“Cambodian judge questions two alleged JI 
members,” 2004). (See May 16, 2004 chronology information above for original 
arrest information). 
• August 20.  Mark Roland Lemetti, a British national is found dead in a 
rubber plantation in the south.  He is found near Sungai Kolok, a Thai-Malaysian 
border town.  Police believe he was mugged and killed somewhere else, then 
dumped in the rubber plantation.  His face is smashed and no documents are 
found on his body. He is later identified by a passport found in his hotel nearby.  
Lemetti is believed to be the first westerner to be killed in the region since the 
unrest began (“Briton found dead in Thailand,” 2004). 
• August 21.  A 10kg bomb is located and destroyed minutes before it is set 
to explode outside a Thai Military Bank in Narathiwat Province, near the Malaysian 
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border.  The bomb was made of ammonium nitrate, nails and two types of 
explosives – C4 and Power Gel (“Powerful bomb detonated,” 2004). 
• August 22.  Three bomb blasts injure 11 people when bombs explode at a 
bar and two hotels in Yala Province.  The bombs explode while Yala is hosting 
festivals attended by tourists from Malaysia and Singapore. 
• August 26.  One bomb explodes at a petrol station and two more are 
diffused in Narathiwat Province. 
• September 17.  Judge Rapin Ruangkaew is shot seven times in the head 
and torso.  He is the most senior official to die in the south since the 2004 violence 
started in January. 
• September 30.  Her Majesty the Queen pleas to security forces to 
cooperate and unite in doing their duties for the security and safety of their 
country. 
• October 14.  Gunman attack a royal palace vehicle in Narathiwat.  Twenty  
rounds are fired at the Landrover killing the two occupants. 
• October 21.  The most recent Transparency International Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) released ranks Thailand 64th least corrupt out of 146 
countries listed.  The Kingdom receives 3.6 points on a scale of 0-10, an increase 
of 0.3 from last year.  This is an overall improvement from last years rating of 70th 
out of 133.  Thailand ranks as the 7th least corrupt nation in Asia; Singapore is first.   
• October 22.  Her Majesty the Queen bemoans the government’s failure to 
end the violence in the south.  She notes that improvements in the southern 
quality of life that were created by the three decades that she and the King had 
devoted to developing the south are now replaced by people’s fear of being 
attacked on a daily basis (Nanuam and Tunyasiri, 2004).  
• October 24.  Security forces warn Buddhist monks in the south against 
walking to collect their morning alms for fear of attack (“Army asks monks in the 
South to suspend morning alms collection,” 2004).   
• October 24.  According to Thai military intelligence reports, militants have 
put a 30,000 baht (US$750) price tag on the head of any government security 
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force person killed (“Army asks monks in the South to suspend morning alms 
collection,” 2004).   
• October 25.  Six people are killed by security forces while protesting the 
detainment of Muslims suspected of giving weapons to insurgents.  After more 
than 1,500 Muslim protestors are arrested outside the Tak Bai police station, at 
least 78 people are suffocated or crushed to death after being detained by police 
and packed into trucks for transportation to an army barracks five hours away.   
• October 31.  In an attempt to relieve southern tension, the government 
revokes the curfew in the south and frees hundreds of detained Tak Bai 
protestors. 
• Select October incidents:  A 22 pound bomb is defused in Narathiwat 
before exploding; Malaysians outside the Thai embassy in Kuala Lumpur 
demonstrate against Thai government action in the Thai south;  
• November 2.  Following the October 25 Tak Bai incident, PM Thaksin 
meets with His Majesty the King.  The King tells the PM that the government must 
handle the southern problems “with care” and give the local people a say in 
settling the problems in the south.   
• November 4.  Army chief General Prawit Wongsuwan reactivates 3,000 
Army officers who were left dormant after being put in inactive posts.  This occurs 
amidst a five-year military downsizing that started in 2002 (“Army gives ‘dormant’ 
officers a wake-up call,” 2004). 
• November 4.  Army spokesman Colonel Acra Thiproj announces that the 4th 
Army (responsible for the southern provinces) will train its soldiers in riot control, 
transportation of detained rioters, and unconventional and urban warfare.  The 
decision for the training comes as a result of the October 25, 2004 Tak Bai 
incident where almost 80 Muslims were suffocated to death.  Colonel Acra said 
that “Tak Bai is an important lesson for us.  We have now learned that we have to 
use a gentle approach and cause the least possible loss [of life]” (Nanuam, 2004j). 
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• November 2.  Most schools in the south’s three southernmost provinces 
close as a result of security force warnings that Buddhist teachers and students 
may be abducted. 
• November 3.  Thailand turns down an offer by the CIA to provide anti-terror 
training.  Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudy says that “We don’t want 
any country, ally or not, to interfere with our internal affairs” (“Bangkok turns down 
CIA anti-terror training,” 2004).  This is the first time that the Thai government has 
admitted that the CIA has offered Thailand anti-terror training. 
• November 6.  Buddhist residents in the south request the reinstatement of 
Lt. General Pisarn Wattanawongkeeree as Fourth Army chief.  Pisarm asked to be 
transferred to Army headquarters following Tak Bai. 
•  November 6.  Following research conducted at 88 police stations in 
Bangkok, the National Economic and Social Development Advisory Council and 
Dhurakijbundit University report that corruption among police is “deeply 
entrenched from the bottom ranks to the top and in every section of each station – 
administration, prevention and suppression, crime detection, investigation and 
traffic.” (Thip-Osot, 2004). Reasons listed for the graft are lack on incentives such 
as financial rewards and career advancement, systems that allow corrupt officers 
to escape unpunished, government policies towards brothels and gambling that 
allow officers to cheat, obsession with status, money and lavish lifestyles, and 
“corruption in the promotion system that forces officers to resort to extortion so 
they can find money to buy key positions” (Thip-Osot, 2004). 
• November 9.  The Islamic Committee of Thailand announces that it will 
conduct its own investigation of the October 25, 2005 Tak Bai incident.  The group 
announces that it does not believe that the government’s investigative committee 
will tell the truth (“Islamic committee to undertake its own investigation,” 2004). 
• November 16.  Her Majesty the Queen Sirikit speaks for 45 minutes in an 
unprecedented, televised address to urge the people of Thailand to help the 
government solve the problems in the south.   
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• November 16.  PM Thaksin announces that Thai Muslims in the south are 
receiving support from extremists that they met overseas while studying abroad.  
Thaksin denies that any actual terrorist organization or government is supporting 
the southern insurgency. 
• November 17:  The US Department of Defense provides a five-day anti-
terror training course and equipment worth about US $50,000 to the Royal Thai 
Police Region 8.  The training was designed to prevent a Bali-like situation in the 
southern resort islands (Ehrlich, 2004). 
• November 19.  Thailand denies a UN probe into the October 25, 2004 Tak 
Bai incident.  PM Thaksin states that because the Thai government is conducting 
its own investigation, the UN probe is inappropriate. 
• November 24:  PM Thaksin announces that he will take over the strategic 
planning in the south from Deputy PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh “in a bid to 
streamline the command structure of state agencies working to quell the southern 
violence” (“PM taking control of strategic planning in the deep South,” 2004). 
• November 24:  The deputy governor of Pattani is shot and wounded.      
• November 26:  The PULO website offers a bounty of over 90,000 Tha baht 
(US $2,000) for the killing of governors of senior government officials in the south 
(“Muslim separatist group offers bounty for Thai officials: website,” 2004).  
• Select November incidents:  58-year old Jaran Torae, a Buddhist assistant 
village leader is beheaded as revenge for the October 25 Tak Bai incident; A Yala 
man is found with his throat slit in a rubber plantation; Gunmen open fire on a 
woman and her son in Narathiwat, killing the mother; A Narathiwat sub-district 
official is shot in the arm but survives; Two gunmen break into a house and steal a 
shotgun that authorities had given to a local Pattani man for his work as a defense 
volunteer; A 60-year old Buddhist laborer is beheaded on a rubber plantation in 
Narathiwat; a bomb explodes in Narathiwat that seriously wounds 16; Security 
forces throughout the south try to stop distribution of video CDs that show graphic 
footage of the October 25 Tak Bai incident; five public schools are burned down. 
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• December 5.  50 Thai Air Force planes drop nearly 100 million paper 
origami cranes over the three southernmost provinces in an effort by the Thai 
government to send a message of peace and goodwill to southern Muslims.  The 
birds contained messages written from Thai citizens to those in the south.  The 
event coincides with the 77th birthday of Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej.  Muslim 
leaders in the south seem bemused and say that a political solution is necessary, 
not paper birds (“Off-target airdrop of the week,” 2005, p.6). 
• December 6.  Hours after the December 5th drops, two bombs explode in 
Narathiwat.  Five soldiers are injured.  Another bomb is defused before it 
explodes. 
• December 23.  Malaysia condemns the Thai government for not following 
appropriate intelligence etiquette after the Thai government’s public release of 
photos of alleged militant training camps in northern Malaysia.  The Thai 
government claims that the camps are used for terrorist training while the Malay 
Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) says that Malaysia is “totally unaware of the 
existence of any camps in Malaysia used to train militants as alleged by the Thai 
prime minister.”  The DPM continues to say that following such a public release, 
the militants would surely close the camps, further complicating Kuala Lumpur’s 
efforts to verify Bangkok’s claims (“Malaysia slams Thailand over photos of alleged 
militant camps,” 2004). 
•  December 26. An earthquake in Indonesia generates a tsunami wave that 
collectively kills hundreds of thousands throughout South and Southeast Asia.  
Army Chief Pravit Wongsuvan is optimistic that Thailand’s southern violence will 
ease since Free Aceh Movement (GAM) separatists in Indonesia, which support 
Thai militants, are hit hard by the Tsunami.  Intelligence officers believe that GAM 
rebels have “trained Thai separatists, here [in Thailand] and in Aceh” (“Army 
hopes unrest will ease after Aceh tragedy,” 2004). 
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In addition to thousands of dollars in property damage, roughly 500 people were 
killed in Thailand’s southern provinces in 2004.  The killings involved shootings, 
arson, and bombings. 
 
2005 
• January 14.  Ustad (Muslim religious teacher) Hama Jehta, or Samad 
Luepae, is arrested on treason charges and is accused of being a core leader of 
Muslim militants and involvement in violence in the deep south.  He is among eight 
teachers arrested within two weeks (Benyakaj, 2005).  Arrest warrants are issued 
for 21 religious teachers for treason. 
• January 16.  A bomb explodes outside a noodle shop in Yala Province.  
One person is killed; 47 are injured, including six children. 
• January 20.  Muslim organizations and leaders in the south condemn the 
shooting of a local school bus full of Buddhist students.  The shooting leaves two 
children injured (Nanuam, 2005a). 
• January 21.  Gunmen shoot and seriously wound a political candidate and 
one of his supporters while campaigning in Narathiwat. 
• January 26.  PM Thaksin approves the purchase of four spike-sweeping 
vehicles to be used against insurgents in the southern provinces.  The vehicles, 
which cost 2.9 million baht each (approximately US$73,000), will clear the roads of 
metal spikes that militants often throw on the road when chased by security forces 
(“Spike-sweeping vehicles for South,” 2005). 
• January 26.  PM Thaksin announces that Doramae Kuteh, AKA Chae 
Kumae Kuteh, the mastermind behind the January 4, 2004 army depot raid, has 
been captured by authorities in Malaysia.  Thailand is seeking extradition orders.  
Doramae, considered Thailand’s most-wanted man, is wanted for premeditated 
murder and inciting a guerrilla movement, and has a bounty of five million baht 
(approximately US$125,000) on his head (“Thailand’s most wanted separatist 
arrested,” 2005).  Malaysia and Thailand criticize each other over the handling of 
the issue while determining if Kuteh has Malay or Thai nationality. 
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• Select January incidents: A man is shot by two men on a motorcycle while 
he is waiting for a bus in Pattani; A police officer is shot dead in Songkhla; Five 
people are injured by a mobile-phone triggered bomb explosion in Yala; A food 
shop owner is shot dead and his customer seriously wounded in Narathiwat; A 
police officer is shot dead while on patrol near a local school in Narathiwat; A post 
office worker is shot dead in Yala; A political candidate’s secretary receives a 
death threat for acting as a police informant in Narathiwat (Harai and Pathan, 
2005); A policeman and his informant are shot and wounded by a motorcycle 
gunman in Narathiwat; 3 assault rifles are found in Pattani after informants tell 
security forces of the location of the weapons; A former defense volunteer is shot 
dead in Narathiwat. 
• February 6.  PM Thaksin is re-elected for another term in Thailand’s general 
election.  Thaksin’s Thai-Rak-Thai (Thai love Thai) political party, however, loses 
all of its seats in the southern provinces where people voted en masse for the 
Democrat and Chart Thai parties.  The election demonstrates a clear 
dissatisfaction among the southern population over Thaksin’s handling of the 
continuing violence in the south.   
• February 8.  The army hires motorcycle taxi drivers in the Sungai Kolok 
district of Narathiwat for 4,500 baht (US $112) a month to report on unusual and 
suspicious movements to identify insurgent activity in the southern border tourist 
town (Nanuam, 2005b). 
• February 10.  A bomb is detonated by mobile phone in a Narathiwat 
stadium.  The bomb injures six people but misses the local governor who is 
attending a parade there. 
• February 11.  PM Thaksin demands better cooperation among all agencies 
that work under the Southern Border Provinces Peace-building Command 
(SBPPC).  According to the PM, there is too much emphasis on military operations 
and not enough cooperation among agencies.   
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• February 12.  After one soldier is injured following a bomb blast in 
Narathiwat, a massive man-hunt to find the suspects is initiated by over 100 
soldiers. 
• February 17.  A car bomb explodes in Narathiwat leaving 44 people injured 
and six dead.  This is the first car bomb detonated in Thailand.  Previous vehicular 
explosives were all on motorcycles.  The bomb exploded hours after PM Thaksin 
ends a controversial visit to the south where he says he will enact zoning of the 
south, freeze development funds and use military force against those who support 
Islamic separatists.  During the visit, the prime minister says decisive action is 
needed and he will not allow a single inch of Thailand to be separated, even ``if 
blood covers the land'' (“Hotel car bomb kills four,” 2005). 
• February 19.  After speculation by Narathiwat’s provincial governor that the 
unprecedented February 17, 2005 car bomb may have been linked to foreign 
terrorists, PM Thaksin strongly denies any involvement by anyone other than local 
Thais. 
• February 25.  The Krue Se Mosque, location of the April 28, 2004 attack 
that left more than 100 insurgents dead, is handed over to local officials in Pattani 
after months of government renovation. 
• February 26.  Following Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 
criticism of Thailand’s handling of the southern insurgency and “persistent bloody 
acts of violence” perpetrated against Muslims in the south, the Thai Foreign 
Ministry orders its embassy in Saudi Arabia to clarify the Thai government’s 
handling of the situation.  Nimu Makajae, deputy chairman of the Yala Islamic 
Committee in southern Thailand says that the Thai government should not dismiss 
the OIC’s appeal and instead should consider its recommendations on how to end 
the violence (“South:  OIC lashes Kingdom,” 2005). 
• February.  Controversy erupts over PM Thaksin’s plan to divide the deep 
south into red, yellow, and green zones according to the level of violence that 
villages experience.  Red zones – those most dangerous and prone to 
experiencing violence – will not receive any development funds unless they 
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improve their status to yellow or green through self-policing.  Opponents argue 
that innocent people will be punished and that insurgents will simply relocate to 
green zones where they can operate more freely.  After several weeks of constant 
pressure from critics to abandon the idea of mass punishment for the south, 
government spokesman Jakrapob Penkair publicly announces that the zoning is 
merely an idea, not government policy, and that it is “not being implemented or 
prepared at all” (“Thailand steps back,” 2005). 
• Select February incidents:  A bomb is triggered by a mobile phone as police 
in Pattani investigate the murder scene of a man whose throat is cut; Insurgents in 
all three southern provinces hand out leaflets titled “peaceful warning” which 
threatens local community leaders not to cooperate with the government, an act 
which will result in putting their lives and property at risk (“Rebels warn not to help 
govt [sic],” 2005). 
• March 6. A Tak Bai investigation panel announces that three senior army 
commanders in the south will be removed from their positions as punishment for 
the incident which resulted in 78 deaths in October 2004. 
• March 7.  Human rights groups in Thailand and elsewhere in Southeast 
Asia will submit the case of the disappearance of Muslim lawyer Somchai 
Neelapaichitr (see March 12, 2004) to the UN Human Rights Commission 
conference.  Sunai Phasuk, advisor to the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
criticizes the Thai government for failing to answer questions about Somchai’s 
disappearance (Charoenpo, 2005).  Somchai has yet to be found and is feared 
dead. 
• March 10.  Eight Islamic teachers (or ustaz) from Yala Province are 
charged and plead not-guilty in Bangkok for allegedly organizing in the south.  The 
charges include treason, separatism, and murder.  The teachers, who work at the 
Thammawitthaya Foundation School in Yala are accused of being members of the 
BRN (see Chapter 2) (“Eight ustazes deny all charges,” 2005). 
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• March 21.  After experiencing years of terrorist activity, to include the JW 
Marriott and Bali bombings, the Indonesian government announces that it will 
formally outlaw Jemaah Islamiah (Brummitt, 2005). 
• March 27.  Approximately twenty people are injured when insurgents 
detonate two bombs to stop an armored train patrolling in the south.  
• Select March incidents:  Two armed men in Narathiwat ram their car into 
four roadblocks and shoot at police before one man is shot dead and the other 
escapes; Two policemen in Narathiwat are shot dead while guarding a railway 
station; Three policemen and a civilian bystander are injured when a bomb 
explodes at a place in Yala where teachers gather for police escorts to school; 
Two gunmen on motorcycles shoot dead a village chief in Pattani. 
• April 3.  Near-simultaneous bomb blasts at Hat Yai International Airport, a 
Carrefour superstore, and the Green World Palace hotel in Songkhla Province kill 
two people and injure at least 60 more (including two Americans).   
• April 5.  Provincial Police Major General Panya, a senior officer in the south, 
testifies that former Thai Rak Thai (political party) Member of Parliament (MP) 
Najmuddin Umar has “allegedly trafficked narcotic drugs to Malaysia and used the 
drug money to finance separatist activities in the South” (“Senior police testify 
against Najmuddin,” 2005). 
• April 7.  The US, Australia, and Canada issue warnings against travel to 
southern Thailand following the April 3, 2005 bomb blasts in Songkhla, including 
the popular tourist area of Hat Yai.  According to the US State Department 
warning, the bombings “represent a continuing spread of indiscriminate violence in 
public areas where tourists may congregate'' (“Public announcement: Thailand,” 
2005). 
• April 22.  The government announces that mobile phone users must now 
show identification and register their names when purchasing mobile phone SIM 
cards.  The announcement comes after several bombs in the south are detonated 
using pre-paid mobile phone plans. 
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• Select April incidents:  A policeman is shot dead when insurgents open fire 
on a police base in Yala; Four villagers are shot in Narathiwat; Six insurgents steal 
government-issued shotguns from defense volunteers in Narathiwat; Mobile 
phone-detonated bombs injure six soldiers in Narathiwat Province; A bomb in 
Narathiwat explodes and kills two policemen;    
 
Terrorist attacks in southern Thailand continue to take lives on an almost-
daily basis.  
In April 2005, three simultaneous bomb attacks occurred in Songkhla 
Province.  Thai authorities are concerned that the insurgency may now be 



























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 153




August 1, 2002 
 
The Governments of Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the 
Union of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, 
the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, member countries 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the United States of 
America (hereinafter referred to collectively as "the participants"); 
Mindful of the 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter 
Terrorism, which, inter alia, undertakes to strengthen cooperation at bilateral, 
regional and international levels in combating terrorism in a comprehensive 
manner and affirms that at the international level the United Nations should play 
a major role in this regard; 
Reaffirming their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms 
of terrorist acts in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
international law and all the relevant United Nations resolutions or declarations 
on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267 and 1390;  
Viewing acts of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, committed 
wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, as a profound threat to international 
peace and security, which require concerted action to protect and defend all 
peoples and the peace and security of the world; 
Recognizing the principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity and 
non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States; 
Acknowledging the value of existing cooperation on security, intelligence 
and law enforcement matters, and desiring to strengthen and expand this 
cooperation to combat international terrorism through the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meting on Transnational Crime, as a leading ASEAN body for combating 
terrorism, and other mechanisms; 
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Recognizing the transnational nature of terrorist activities and the need to 
strengthen international cooperation at all levels in combating terrorism in a 
comprehensive manner; 
Desiring to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation between the relevant 
agencies of the participants’ governments; 
Solemnly declare as follows; 
Objectives 
1. The participants reaffirm the importance of having a framework for 
cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism through the 
exchange and flow of information, intelligence and capacity-building. 
2. The participants emphasize that the purpose of this cooperation is to 
enhance the efficacy of those efforts to combat terrorism. 
Scope and Areas of Cooperation 
3. The participants stress their commitment to seek to implement the 
principles laid out in this Declaration, in accordance with their respective 
domestic laws and their specific circumstances, in any or all of the following 
activities: 
I. Continue and improve intelligence and terrorist financing information 
sharing on counter-terrorism measures, including the development of more 
effective counter-terrorism policies and legal, regulatory and administrative 
counter-terrorism regimes. 
II. Enhance liaison relationships amongst their law enforcement agencies 
to engender practical counter-terrorism regimes. 
III. Strengthen capacity-building efforts through training and education; 
consultations between officials, analysts and field operators; and seminars, 
conferences and joint operations as appropriate. 
IV. Provide assistance on transportation, border and immigration control 
challenges, including document and identity fraud to stem effectively the flow of 
terrorist-related material, money and people. 
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V. Comply with United Nations, Security Council Resolutions 1373, 1267, 
1390 and other United Nations resolutions or declarations on international 
terrorism. 
VI. Explore on a mutual basis additional areas of cooperation. 
Participation 
4. Participants are called upon to become parties to all 12 of the United 
Nations conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. 
5. The participants are each called upon to designate an agency to 
coordinate with law enforcement agencies, authorities dealing with countering 
terrorism financing and other concerned government agencies, and to act as the 
central point of contact for the purposes of implementing this Declaration. 
Disclosure of information 
6. The participants expect that no participant would disclose or distribute 
any confidential information, documents or data received in connection with this 
Declaration to any third party, at any time, except to the extent agreed in writing 
by the participant that provided the information. 
7. All the participants are urged to promote and implement in good faith 
and effectively the provisions of the present Declaration in all its aspects. 
Signed at Bandar Seri Begawan this first day of August, Two Thousand 
and Two. 
For the United States of America: 
Colin L. Powell 




Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Brunei Darussalam 
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APPENDIX D. US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THAILAND 
The following information was researched by the Center for Defense Information 
(Garcia, 2004).  
1. BACKGROUND  
Thailand, known as Siam until 1939, is the only Southeast Asian country 
never to have been colonized, although it was occupied by Japan during World 
War II. Since 1945, Thailand has been a close U.S. ally. The two nations have 
entered into several bilateral and multilateral arrangements including the 1954 
Manila Pact and the 1962 Rusk-Thanat agreement, both of which solidified a 
long-term bilateral security alliance. The U.S-Thai alliance granted the United 
States use of Thai military facilities during the Vietnam War. Additionally,  
Thailand’s anti-communist stance and geographic proximity to Vietnam were vital 
to the United States during the Cold War, and its current support in the “War on 
Terror” has once again united the two nations. Thailand has been ruled by King 
Bhumibol since 1946, however, until recently, the country suffered a series of 
political crises and undemocratic installations of heads of state – primarily via 
bloodless military coups. Since the 1992 elections, Thailand has been a 
democratically-governed constitutional monarchy. The current leader, Prime 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, was elected in 2001.  
In its 2003 Human Rights Report, the U.S. State Department described 
Thailand as having a worsening human rights record, as it has experienced an 
increase in extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests as well as persistent 
corruption in the security forces and the judiciary. Since it is part of the notorious 
tri-border Golden Triangle – where Burma, Thailand, and Laos intersect – 
Thailand struggles immensely with drug trafficking and corruption issues. In an 
effort to stem the flow of narcotics in the country, the Thai government undertook 
a “war on drugs” from February to April 2003, leading to more than 2,000 
casualties and 50,000 arrests. While the government has reported that the 
majority of deaths were caused by battles among drug dealers, human rights 
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groups have accused the government of undertaking a “shoot to kill” policy 
during that period. Human rights groups have also criticized the government’s 
use of excessive lethal force in April 2004, when violent clashes between 
government forces and Muslim separatists fighting in the southern part of the 
country resulted in the death of 107 suspected Muslim militants, many of whom 
were between the ages of 15 and 20.  Other human rights violations noted in the 
U.S. State Department’s annual report include: prolonged pretrial detentions; 
restriction of privacy rights; sexual exploitation; discrimination against minorities; 
violence and discrimination against women; child labor and child trafficking. 
  
2. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE PRIOR TO SEPT. 11, 2001  
Thailand’s armed forces are currently estimated at 314,200 active 
personnel. Thailand’s military expenditure was approximately $1.8 billion in 2000, 
which is 1.8 percent of its Gross Domestic Product. Since the 1950s, the United 
States has been furnishing Thailand with military equipment and assistance. 
According to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, from 1993 to 2003, Thailand 
received 238 armored vehicles, 48 combat aircraft, 125 battle tanks, 40 large 
caliber artillery systems, two warships, and 166 missile launchers. According to 
U.S. government data, between 1990 and 2001 Thailand received approximately 
$335 million in Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) and over $100 million in Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS). Also during that period, Thailand received approximately $3 
million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The FMF, however, was distributed 
only in 1990.  In addition to military equipment, since the early 1990s the United 
States has been increasing its military training programs in Thailand; sometimes 
reaching up to 40 joint exercise programs a year. Indeed, between 1990 and 
2001 Thailand received close to $18 million in International Military Education 
and Training (IMET).  
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3. U.S. MILITARY ASSISTANCE SINCE SEPT. 11, 2001  
Thailand has been a major supporter and ally in the U.S. “War on Terror.” 
Thailand has sent military engineering units to Afghanistan and Iraq, and Thai 
officials have made public statement in support of the effort to stamp out 
terrorism worldwide. In August 2003, Thai authorities captured Nurjaman Riduan 
bin Isomuddin – commonly referred to as Hambali – a top Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 
leader. JI is a radical Islamic terrorist group based in Southeast Asia with links to 
al Qaeda and other extremist groups, that seeks to establish a large Islamic state 
in the region. Hambali has been deemed the mastermind behind the October 
2002 bombing in Bali, Indonesia, and is the prime suspect in the J.W. Marriott 
Hotel bombing in Jakarta, Indonesia, on Aug. 5, 2003.  Although there were no 
major terrorist acts in Thailand in 2003, between June and July of that year, Thai 
authorities arrested four suspected JI operatives implicated in a plan to bomb 
numerous targets in Thailand. Following the bombing in Jakarta, Thai officials 
enacted an antiterrorist decree that has been criticized for allowing police to 
search and detain suspected terrorists without trial, and for its potential misuse 
against Muslims in the southern part of the country. 
Since Sept. 11, 2001, the United States has continued to supply Thailand 
with IMET funding. During Fiscal Year 2002 (FY 02) and FY 03, Thailand was the 
recipient of over $1.7 million in IMET each year. For FY 04 and FY 05, Thailand 
has been promised approximately $2.5 million in IMET each year. Additionally, 
the United States resumed FMF to Thailand in FY 02, which had not been 
delivered to the country since 1999.  Specifically, Thailand was allotted $1.3 
million in FMF for FY 02 and nearly $2 million for FY 03. For FY 04, Thailand has 
been promised close to $1 million in FMF, and for FY 05, $500,000. In June 
2003, the United States delivered 30 refurbished UH-1 helicopters, plus spare 
parts and training, as part of a $30 million deal signed in late 2001 between the 
two governments. In addition to granting Thailand increased military assistance 
since Sept. 11, 2001, the U.S. administration gave Thailand Major Non-NATO 
Ally (MNNA) status in October 2003. According to a senior administration official, 
MNNA status was given to Thailand specifically for their long-standing alliance 
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with the United States and for support and assistance in the “War on Terror.”  
While MNNA status does not provide a country with the same mutual defense 
guarantees provided to NATO member states, it gives a state access to 
commercial satellite technology; makes a country eligible for loans of materials 
and equipment for cooperative research and development projects; permits a 
country to use FMF for commercial leasing of defense articles; and allows it to 
buy depleted uranium from the United States. 
Thailand’s Submission to the 
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms   
(Imports, U.S. only) 
 1993  6 Armored combat vehicles 
 1994  26 Armored combat vehicles, 20 Large caliber artillery systems,  1 Warship 
 1995  38 Armored combat vehicles, 20 Large caliber artillery systems, 18 Combat aircraft 
 1996  24 Battle tanks, 6 Combat aircraft 
 1997  101 Battle tanks, 32 Armored combat vehicles, 8 Combat aircraft 
 1998  130 Armored combat vehicles, 1 Warship, 166 Missiles and missile launchers 
 1999  0 
  2000 6 Armored combat vehicles 
  2001 0 
 2002 9 Combat aircraft 
 2003 7 Combat aircraft 




Year IMET FMF Total 
 1990  $2,533,000 $3,017,000 $5,550,000 
 1991  $679,000 $0 $679,000 
 1992  $0 $0 $0 
 1993  $2,339,000 $0 $2,339,000 
 1994  $895,000 $0 $895,000 
 1995  $999,000 $0 $999,000 
 1996  $1,445,000 $0 $1,445,000 
 1997  $1,600,000 $0 $1,600,000 
 1998  $1,985,000 $0 $1,985,000 
 1999  $1,703,000 $0 $1,703,000 
 2000  $1,730,000 $0 $1,730,000 
 2001  $1,852,000 $0 $1,852,000 
 2002  $1,748,000 $1,300,000 $3,048,000 
 2003   $1,768,000 $1,990,000 $3,758,000 
 2004 
(request) $2,450,000 $995,000 $3,445,000 
2005 
(request) $2,500,000 $500,000 $3,000,000 






































APPENDIX E. THAILAND DESIGNATED A MAJOR NON-NATO 
ALLY (MNNA)  
President Bush publicly announced the designation of Thailand as a Major 
Non-NATO Ally (MNNA) on October 19, 2003 during his State Visit to the 
Kingdom of Thailand. The Departments of State and Defense had notified 
Congress of the intent to designate Thailand in early October 2003.  
Background Information: MNNA Status does not entail the same mutual 
defense and security guarantees afforded to North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) members. However, designation of Thailand as an MNNA represents an 
affirmation of the importance the US places on the US-Thai alliance relationship 
in the 21st century. Thailand has been a treaty ally of the United States for nearly 
50 years, since the 1954 Manila Pact. The alliance partnership has continued to 
expand over the years. Recently, Thailand has made important counterterrorism 
contributions and has sent troops to coalition efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
(MNNA) Definitions: U.S. legislation creates two categories of MNNA 
status. The first category is under Title 10 U.S Code Section 2350a (Nunn 
Amendment of 1987). The Second is under Section 517 of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA) (title 22, USC Section 2321k).  
Title 10 U.S. Code Section 2350a authorizes the Secretary of Defense, 
with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, to designate MNNAs for purposes 
of participating with the Department of Defense (DOD) in cooperative research 
and development programs. Israel, Egypt, Japan, Australia, and the Republic of 
Korea were given MNNA designation under Title 10 in 1987, followed by Jordan 
(1996), Argentina (1998), New Zealand and Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines 
and Thailand (2003).  
Designation under this provision:  
· Permits firms of the country to bid on certain USG contracts for maintenance, 
repair or overhaul of DOD equipment outside the Continental US. (10 USC 2349) 
· Makes a country eligible for certain joint counterterrorism research & 
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development projects. (22 USC 2349a-10(b); PL 104-132 sec. 328(b)) 
· Allows DOD to enter into cooperative R&D projects with the country to improve 
conventional defense capabilities on an equitable cost-sharing basis. (10 USC 
sec 2350a)  
 
Section 517 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, authorizes 
the President to designate a country as a MNNA after 30-days notification to 
Congress, for purposes of the FAA and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The 
statute, enacted in 1996, initially designated Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the 
Republic of Korea, and New Zealand as MNNAs. Subsequently, Jordan (1996), 
Argentina (1998), Bahrain (2002), and the Philippines and Thailand (2003) have 
also been designated as MNNAs under this provision. 
Designation under this provision: 
· Makes a nation eligible, to the maximum extent feasible, for priority 
delivery of excess defense articles if it is on the South or Southeastern flank of 
NATO. (FAA §516) 
· Makes a nation eligible to buy depleted uranium ammunition. (FAA §620G) 
· Makes the country eligible to have U.S.-owned War Reserve Stockpiles on its 
territory outside of U.S. military installations. (FAA §514) )]. [Note: The US closed 
down a previously existing War Reserve Stockpile, established in 1987, in 2002, 
and transferred the remaining munitions to Thai ownership.]  
· Allows the country to enter into agreements with the USG for the cooperative 
furnishing of training on a bilateral or multilateral basis under reciprocal financial 
arrangements that may exclude reimbursement for indirect costs and certain 
other charges. (AECA §21(g)) 
· Allows the country to use U.S. provided Foreign Military Financing for 
commercial leasing of certain defense articles. (Section 589 of the FY01 Foreign 
Operations Appropriation Act, Public Law 106-429) 
· Makes a country eligible for loans of materials, supplies and equipment for 
cooperative R&D projects and testing and evaluation. (AECA §65) 
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· Makes a country eligible for expedited processing of export licenses of 
commercial satellites, their technologies, components, and systems. (Section 
1309 of the James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign Relations Authorization 
Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001, Public Law 106-113) 
MNNA designation under section 517 of the FAA can be terminated at the 
discretion of the President with 30 days notice to the Congress, but no specific 
criteria or precedents exist regarding termination.  
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